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ARTICLES
THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
JURIES IN TECHNICAL CASES
Jack E. Brownt
The complaints expressed concerning juries for disputes in
technical cases have centered on charges that:
(1) juries are not competent (or at least are less competent
than judges) to comprehend the facts involved in technical dis-
putes and to understand and treat rationally the intellectually de-
manding legal issues in complex cases;' and
(2) they are subject to biases (more so than judges) that
too often preclude or influence them against their fair considera-
tion of the evidence they do comprehend in accordance with the
instructions they do understand.2
No one doubts that there are serious, recurrent and pervasive
problems in consistently achieving rational and just results in tech-
nical cases decided by juries. But the vast literature concerning ju-
Copyright © 1993 by Jack E. Brown.
t Mr. Brown is a founding member of Brown & Bain, a law firm located in Phoenix,
Tucson and Palo Alto. He is a graduate of Northwestern University (B.S. 1949) and Harvard
Law School (LL.B. 1952). He served as law clerk to United States District Court Judge
Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. (D. Mass.) in 1952-53 and as a law clerk to Arizona Supreme Court
Justice Charles C. Bernstein in 1959. Mr. Brown has served as lead counsel in important
antitrust cases and a variety of other cases involving high technology issues. He was recently
listed in the National Law Journal as one of the 100 most influential lawyers in the United
States.
1. E.g., Neil J. Vidmar, Empirical Research and the Issue of Jury Competence, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 1 (citations omitted):
Many contemporary critics would endorse Judge Jerome Frank's assertion that
the jury applies law it doesn't understand to facts it can't get straight. The civil
jury has received the most criticism. A leader of the attack during the 1970's
and 1980's was former Chief Justice Warren Burger, who complained that ju-
rors are not competent to deal with the complex disputes that come to trial in
the federal courts.
2. See, e.g., Jeffery R. Boyll, Psychological, Cognitive, Personality and Interpersonal
Factors in Jury Verdicts, 15 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 163, 163 (1991) (quoting one expert as
stating: "So overwhelming is the data on behalf ofjuror bias throughout the trial, that for the
most part behavioral scientists do not accept the idea of impartiality and regard it as legal
fiction.").
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des, except for some reports that measure jury performance by
comparison with cases decided by a judge, rarely attempts to assess
explicitly the comparative advantages and disadvantages of a bench
trial.
The choice faced by the litigant most often is between (i) a
small number (6 to 12) of unknown jurors from a known, relatively
confined geographical area (although not always with a homogene-
ous population) and (ii) a known judge (or one of a few identifiable
judges) vastly superior to the average juror in intelligence, relevant
training and experience and with a record of prior decisions. Given
that choice, the litigant who believes in his or her case most often
would be inclined to favor a bench trial. I would suggest, however,
that a rational litigant with a strong case might prefer a jury in
certain types of cases, including technical cases, particularly where
the facts may be interpreted in different ways according to the per-
spective and attitude of the viewer.
Illustratively, a rational litigant might choose a jury to decide
in a libel case whether a defamatory statement concerning a public
official was written with the requisite "malice" (recklessness) to
meet the constitutional standard of libel;3 or to decide in a section
1983 case4 whether a governmental official undertook a warrantless
search in such circumstances and in such a way as to deprive the
plaintiff of his or her "clearly established" constitutional right;5 or
to decide whether a tying arrangement was imposed as an exercise
of "market power," injuring competition in a reasonably defined
market. 6
3. See Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1952). But see Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (re-
stricting jury's authority to determine the relevance of a defamatory statement to the defend-
ant's status as a public figure).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5. See Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1100
(1989); Brisk v. City of Miami Beach, 726 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D. Fla. 1989). But see Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), on remand, 724 F. Supp. 654 (D. Minn. 1989); cf Reyn-
olds v. Avalon, No. 90-4250 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 1992) (municipality liability for sexual harass-
ment presented a jury question). See generally John M. Baker, The Shrinking Role of the
Jury in Constitutional Litigation, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 697 (1990).
6. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992);
Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S.
908 (1985).
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In each case the nature of the question to be resolved is such
that the attitude that the decisionmaker brings to the task is likely
to have as much or more to do with the result reached than the
evidence or argument presented in the courtroom. Thus, the popu-
larity of the public official is likely to have a significant bearing on
consideration of his or her libel claim; whether one is sympathetic
or unsympathetic to police aggressiveness seems likely to have a
great deal to do with the outcome of the posed warrantless search
case; and the attitude of the decider toward big business, small busi-
ness and business conduct may be outcome-determinative in the ty-
ing case involving a claim of business leverage. Any attempt to
explain such a decision in terms of rationality may well be charac-
terized in good part as rationalization.
Likewise, a reasonable litigant might prefer a jury in certain
technical cases - to decide, for example, whether a Mondrian-type
pattern by an alleged copyright infringer is "substantially similar"
to a Mondrian pattern created and copyrighted by the copyright
holder, which itself imitated the Mondrian style;7 or whether a pat-
ent should be invalidated because of "obviousness;" ' or whether a
computer program reflects creative artistry or a constrained appli-
cation of unwavering engineering rules.9
The attitude of the decider toward the artistic subtleties in-
volved in creating variations of the original Mondrian theme seems
likely to be influential in a determinative way of the posed "substan-
tial similarity" case." The attitude of the decider toward the crea-
tive role of workmen might well prove decisive in determining
7. See, e.g., North Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1992).
8. See J. Robert Chambers, Jury Trials in Patent Cases: The First Six Years of the
Federal Circuit, 29 IDEA. 275 (1988).
9. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (2d Cir.
Jun. 22, 1992).
10. Judge Schroeder, in her opinion for the court in North Coast, 972 F.2d at 1035 and
n.l., showed an appreciation for the artistry of Mondrian and art history in the following
passages, among others:
Mondrian 'developed a distinctive style of nonobjective painting based on the
reduction of pictorial elements to vertical and horizontal lines, using the three
primary colours and non-colours. His work has exerted a powerful influence
on 20th-century art, including architecture, advertising art, and topography.'
12 Encyclopaedia Britannica 343 (15th ed.) (1982). [Strange as it may seem,
Mondrian's exquisite sense for nonsymmetrical balance is so specific that crit-
ics well acquainted with his work have no difficulty in distinguishing fakes
from genuine pictures. HOaST W. JANSON, HIsToRY OF ART 729-730 (1991)
(revised and expanded by Anthony F. Janson).] If we were to accept the view
that, as a matter of law the differences in the placement of geometric shapes
should be regarded as trivial, we would be forced to conclude that Mondrian's
creativity with geometric shapes ended with his first painting, and that he went
1993] 405
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whether some combination of old elements was obvious to the
skilled artisan.
The importance of attitude has only recently been revealed in
several cases involving the protection of computer programs under
the copyright law, as illustrated by the following examples.
First in Computer Associates,1 the rulings of the trial judge
(Circuit Judge George Pratt) and the court of appeals both plainly
reflected a brooding hostility to the protection of computer pro-
grams that heavily influenced and probably was determinative of
the result. 2 The decision acknowledged that protection of com-
puter programs as "literary works" was mandated by the Software
Protection Act of 1980.13 It also acknowledged the "powerful" syl-
logism that "if computer programs are literary works, as we are told
by the legislature[,] then the non-literal structures of computer pro-
grams are protected by copyright."' 4 But the court nevertheless
drew upon the academic arguments originally advanced in opposi-
tion to enactment of the Software Protection Act to devise a method
of defeating protection for virtually any computer program (and
which probably also would deprive any literary work of meaningful
protection). 5 Indeed, the opinion directly undermines the congres-
sional enactment by (i) treating computer programs as "essentially
utilitarian [in] nature,"' 6 "dictated by considerations of efficiency"
on to paint the same painting a thousand times. This is not the judgment of art
history, and it cannot be the correct judgment of a court as a matter of law....
11. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1991),
aff'd, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (2d Cir. 1992) (withdrawn and superseded on other
grounds, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992)).
12. The fasts of the case, as recited in the opinion of Circuit Judge Herbert Walker for
the court of appeals, are as follows:
An employee of Computer Associates (CA) left CA to work for Altai and wrongfully
took with him copies of the source code for two versions of CA's valuable ADAPTER pro-
gram. At Altai, the employee created a competing program (called OSCAR) using the stolen
source code.
The appeal involved only the rewritten program and presented the question of whether
the rewritten program was substantially similar to CA's ADAPTER program. Computer As-
sociates, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1246-48.
13. "While computer programs are not specifically listed as a part of the ... statutory
definition [of literary works], the legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended
them to be considered literary works." Computer Associates, 23 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1249. Pub. L.
No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980)) (including
a computer program within the copyright category of literary works). Id.
14. Computer Associates, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1249-50.
15. The direction of the court was that the trial court should "break down the allegedly
infringed program into its constituent structural parts" and then "sift out all non-protectable
material" so as to confine protection to the "kernel, or possibly kernels, of creative expression
[left] after following this process of elimination." Id. at 1253-54.
16. Id. at 1251.
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or by "market externalities""7 - in effect denying the contribution
of any significant creativity in the writing of computer programs;
(ii) viewing copyright as "not ideally suited to deal with the highly
dynamic technology of computer science;"" (iii) recommending
"further legislative investigation;"1 9 and (iv) rejecting prior deci-
sions as attempts "to fit the proverbial square peg in a round
hole."2 °
Secondly, the ultimate decision of District Court Judge
Vaughn Walker in Apple Computer, Ina v. Microsoft Corp.21 was
similar in tone and the outcome, emasculating protection for the
copyrighted audiovisual works in issue (in particular, the Apple
Macintosh graphical user interface), was thus quite predictable.'
Given that analysis, a reasonable litigant might well conclude
17. Id. at 1253-54.
18. Id. at 1257.
19. Computer Associates, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1257.
20. Id. Both Judge Pratt and Judge Walker plainly were impressed by the views of Dr.
Randall Davis of MIT, appointed by Judge Pratt as the court's expert. Indeed, Judge Pratt
even cited and relied on Dr. Davis to criticize the decision of the Third Circuit in Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), as "fundamentally flawed.., by
failing to distinguish between the static and dynamic ["behavior"] views of a program." 775
F. Supp. at 560. Neither court noted that Dr. Davis was well known for his view that the
congressional decision to extend copyright protection to computer programs should be reex-
amined.
The court of appeals also was influenced by the criticism of Whelan by David Nimmer
(referred to in Judge Walker's opinion as "[t]he leading commentator in the field" Computer
Associates, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1252. Perhaps he was referring to Mr. Nimmers deceased fa-
ther, Professor Melville Nimmer.).
21. 799 F.Supp. 1006, (N.D. Cal. 1992).
22. Id. at 1023. Judge Walker rejected comparison of defendants' interface works with
the Macintosh interface on the ground that
[t]he elements of such an arrangement [the graphical interface] serve a purely
functional purpose in the same way that the visual displays and user com-
mands of the dashboard, steering wheel, gear shift, brakes, clutch and accelera-
tor serve as the user interface of an automobile. See Synercom Technology. Inc.
v. University Computing Co., 462 FSupp 1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Purely
functional items or an arrangement of them for functional purposes are wholly
beyond the realm of copyright as are other common examples of user interfaces
or arrangements of their individual elements-the dials, knobs and remote con-
trol devices of a television or VCR, or the buttons and clocks of an oven or
stove. Of course, the elements of these everyday user interfaces are seldom
conflated into metaphoric images, but that does not mean that the user inter-
face of a computer is less functional.
Id. at 1023-1024. The court also emphasized that the features of the Macintosh had proven
so popular that today's "graphical user interfaces almost always incorporate the basic ele-
ments of the Macintosh interface." Id. at 1025. Judge Walker's opinion, citing the Computer
Associates court of appeals opinion, also criticized Whelan and cited with favor other well-
known critics of the copyright protection granted by Congress to audiovisual works insofar as
the law was applied to protect computer interfaces. See id. at 1020.
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that it would be safer to have such cases determined by a jury rather
than a judge because:
(1) less educated persons are likely to have their biases in
such matters less well formulated by what they learn outside the
courtroom, reducing the risk of the decider learning things that
are not so and of decisions based on unknown and non-review-
able evidence;23 and
(2) the 6 to 12 persons in a jury are more likely to round
off or balance differing biases24 and, in result, resort to the partic-
ulars of the case to reach a verdict.
23. NEIL J. VIDMAR, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE, A SOCIAL
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE, IN THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVI-
DENCE IN THE COURTS 279-319 (S. Fienberg ed., 1989) (reviewing data showing that judges
are not immune from factual misunderstandings). Cf. Dan R. Gallipeau, Jurors' Perceptions
in Patent Litigation (Litigation Sciences 1992) (pointing out the risk that a juror with some
technological experience may be viewed as an expert even though his information may be
inaccurate, making jurors "with little or moderate experience . . . typically a great deal
'safer' "-a comment that is equally applicable to judges who may view themselves as "ex-
pers").
In addition to other examples of judges assuming facts contrary to the evidence (and
sometimes contrary to all evidence), there may be cited the view of a tax court judge that a
computer program was like "a light switch" and not "intellectual property":
My preconceived notion, prior to this educational process, and perhaps even
with it, because I'm not sure there's a difference, is that the computer program
was a means of coding a sequence of magnetic or electromagnetic impulses that
actually operated hardware. And I am under the impression that that's the
way it works.
If that's the case, from a functional standpoint, why is a computer pro-
gram any different than a light switch? And I remember in the initial briefing
that came, there was talk about intellectual property, and this is intellectual
property and, therefore, it's not tangible.
Well, I don't believe it's intellectual property. I believe it's more mechani-
cal than intellectual. I don't think there's any art involved in a computer pro-
gram. I recognize that the guy that does it - lots of people can do it better
than other people can, and it takes a lot of training and a lot of work to put one
of them together.
But basically it's just - I hate to use that word because I don't mean to
belittle anybody's work effort - but it's sequencing electrical impulses.
Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 28-29, IBM Corp. v. City of Scottsdale, No. TX 91-
00795 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 1992). (Fortunately, the tax court judge recognized that
evidence concerning his preconceptions was required and he subsequently invited such evi-
dence to be proffered.)
24. Valerie P. Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 177, 184-185; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve
Heads Better Than One?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205, 206 ("Ideally,
... the final verdict is forged from a shared understanding of the case. This understanding is
more complete and more accurate than any of the separate versions that contributed to it, or
indeed than their average. This transcendent understanding is the putative benefit of the
deliberation process.... A judge does not have this vivid reminder that alternative construals
are possible."). See also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV.
1055, 1067 (1964):
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Approaching the question of comparing jury competence in a
different way, no doubt a judge is much more likely than a jury to
grasp the complexities of a patent claim, Bayes' Theorem or any
other sophisticated factual or legal question. However, where the
question is put and explained and commented upon by the testi-
mony of competing experts (as is frequently the case in technical
cases), the most important question in the rendering of justice may
be whom to believe. There are at least some experienced trial law-
yers who think that juries answer that question correctly (or at least
satisfactorily) at least as often as judges do.25
There is another reason for viewing jury trials in technical
cases with greater equanimity: much can be done to assist juries in
better performing the tasks assigned to them, and thus to enhance
the predictability of jury verdicts and increase satisfaction with jury
trials. Among the procedural improvements that have been sug-
gested, some of which have been adopted by some courts with good
results, include the following:
* Providing the jury an explanation of the nature of the case
and the questions presented, including preliminary instructions,
at the beginning of the case, and not just at the end;26
Often in the debate over the jury the capacity of one layman is compared
to the capacity of one judge, as though this were the issue. The distinctive
strength and safeguard of the jury system is that the jury operates as a group.
Whether twelve lay heads are better than one judicial head is still open to
argument, but it should be recognized that twelve lay heads are very probably
better than one.
25. See SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 149 (1956) ("I think it must be agreed
that there are some determinations in which twelve minds are better than one, however
skilled, and most people would accept that the determination whether a witness is telling the
truth is one of them."). See also WALTER R. HART, LONG LIVE THE AMERICAN JURY 66
(1964) ("The advantage of a right to trial by jury in either a civil case or a criminal case is
that the parties get the benefit of the group thinking, discussion and decision of twelve indi-
viduals, whereas in a trial by judge, the decision is made by one individual who, however
learned, does not have the advantage of presenting his reasons in discussion with others and
hearing reasons advanced by others who have opposing views.")
26. See the report of the experiments conducted by the district judges of the Second
Circuit, reported in Judicial Council of the Second Cir., Report of the Committee on Juries 42-
43 (Aug. 1984); the Survey of Juror Attitudes, Ninth Cir. Judicial Council, Final Report 7
(1986); and the report of Wisconsin judges in Comm. on Improving Jury Communications,
Wis. Judicial Council, Draft Final Report 17-18 (May 1985).
Candor requires recognition of the role of the judge in achieving a fair trial by a jury.
Fortunately, most judges are scrupulously fair in treating all witnesses and counsel for all
parties with courtesy and being careful not to influence the jury for or against any party by
any inadvertent conduct or any unfair advertent conduct. Everyone who has ever spent any
time in a courtroom knows how powerfully the judge may influence a jury. See David
Hittner, A Judge's View of Jury Service: A Personal Perspective, TEX. BAR J., March 1984, at
227, 228 (explaining that the author's jury experience "gave me an insight into how impor-
tant both actual and apparent impartiality is in insuring a fair trial").
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* Providing the jury with interim (perhaps daily) state-
ments of what the evidence about to be presented is intended to
prove and summaries as to what the evidence just presented is
claimed to have proven;
2 7
* Requiring tutorials as to the technological matter to be
referred to by the witnesses during the course of the trial and
requiring glossaries of the technical terms to be furnished to the
jury;"
* Providing the jury in long trials with interim summations
by counsel;
29
* Encouraging counsel to use summary charts and demon-
strative evidence in opening statements and throughout the
trial;3
0
* Encouraging expert witnesses to make greater use of lec-
ture-type presentations (perhaps with the precaution of requiring
written text) so as to have the testimony presented in a more
coherent fashion;
* Encouraging jurors to take notes and providing them with
notebooks; 31
e Permitting the jurors to participate in the trial by asking
questions (through the judge);3 2
e Simplifying the jury instructions and making them more
understandable and instructive concerning the objectives of the
law to be applied;
33
• Simplifying the forms of verdict or making better use of
jury interrogatories;34
" Placing tighter limits on the time allotted for trial;3 5 and
* Using "blue ribbon" jury panels to the extent constitu-
tionally permissible, reversing the trend favoring the selection of
27. Comm. on Fed. Courts of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Improving Jury Comprehension
in Complex CivilLitigation, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 549, 554-55 (1988); Boyll, supra note 2, at
174.
28. Mitchell Zimmerman, Educating the Judge and Jury: The Technology Tutorial,
COMPUTER LAW., May 1990, at 1.
29. See Pierre N. Leval, From the Bench: Westmoreland v. CBS, LITIGATION, Fall
1985, at 7-8, 66-67.
30. See James G. Apple, Is the Jury Listening?, 13 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 851, 859-60
(1989).
31. Comm. on Fed. Courts, supra note 27, at 559-60; Steven I. Friedland, The Compe-
tency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 209-11 (1990).
32. Comm. on Fed. Courts, supra note 27, at 560-61; Friedland, supra note 31, at 211-
18; Mark A. Frankel, A Trial Judge's Perspective on Providing Tools for Rational Jury Deci-
sionmaking, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 221 (1990).
33. Comm. on Fed. Courts, supra note 27, at 562-63.
34. Id. at 565-70; Ellsworth, supra note 24, at 224.
35. See Roger W. Kirst, Finding a Role for the Civil Jury in Modern Litigation, 69
JUDICATURE 332, 337-38 (1986).
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less educated and ill-informed jurors to favor the selection in reg-
ular course of better-educated and presumably better-informed
jurors.
3 6
In sum, jury trials are not necessarily to be feared or disdained
by judges, by plaintiffs or by defendants. Occasionally, they may
rationally be preferred both by courts and all parties. Greater at-
tention is required, however, to improving the conduct of jury trials.
36. Friedland, supra note 31, at 196; Hans, supra note 24, at 190.
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SELF-HELP REMEDIES FOR SOFTWARE
VENDORS
Henry Gittert
The rapid growth of the computer industry has created a new
operating environment for business. Many firms are now com-
pletely dependent on computers to conduct their business affairs.
This dependence requires that disputes between software vendors
and their clients be resolved quickly and with no disruption to the
client's computer system.1 Recently, a software vendor used what it
characterized as "self-help repossession" to resolve a dispute with
one of its clients. Such action raises issues that must be examined
before this remedy can be sanctioned for use in this novel applica-
tion.2 This article examines self-help repossession within the con-
text of computer software contracts, and asserts that its use should
be confined to a limited set of facts.
The first part of this article describes the October 1990 Revlon
case where self-help was used to repossess computer software.' The
article then discusses the background and rationale underlying self-
help repossession. Part II reviews the Uniform Commercial Code's
(U.C.C.) support of self-help repossession and the weaknesses inher-
ent in the U.C.C.'s provisions as they apply to software disputes.
Part III outlines other legal doctrines containing self-help provi-
sions that fail to support software repossession. Finally, Part IV
proposes the use of self-help repossession in a limited set of circum-
Copyright © 1993 by Henry Gitter.
t Mr. Gitter is currently serving a two-year appointment to the Hon. Michael J.
Kaplan, Chief Judge Bankruptcy Court, Western District of New York. He received his J.D.
from Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (1992), M.B.A. from Pace University (1989) and
B.A. from the State University of New York at Oswego (1978).
1. Software disputes can arise under two sets of circumstances. The most common
scenario is when the client and vendor disagree on the performance of the software and the
client refuses to pay for it. Less common is when the client flatly refuses to pay for the
software despite agreeing that it performs as expected.
2. Among the techniques used by software vendors to repossess software are pre-
planted time bombs. A time bomb is a software device that, if not deactivated by the vendor,
will cause the software to stop functioning. The vendor may also gain access to the client's
system and shut down the software.
3. Revlon Group, Inc. v. Logisticon, Inc., No. 705933 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara
Cnty., complaint filed Oct. 22, 1990).
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stances and explores other forms of self-help that do not rely on
repossession.
I. REPOSSESSION: PAST AND PRESENT
A. Revlon v. Logisticon
A dispute between the Revlon Group (Revlon) and one of its
software suppliers thrust the issue of software repossession into the
headlines.4 Logisticon, Inc. (Logisticon) agreed to develop and in-
stall software for Revlon's warehouse inventory system.5 The con-
tract called for development in stages with milestone payments for
successfully completed phases. Logisticon obtained dial-up access6
to Revlon's computer system in order to develop and test the
software. The first phase was installed but Revlon was dissatisfied
with the software's operation. After Logisticon attempted to rem-
edy the problems, Revlon informed them that it would withhold a
portion of the first payment and cancel the remainder of the con-
tract. Logisticon responded by dialing into Revlon's computer sys-
tem and disabling its software. The firm advised Revlon that the
software would be restored upon payment and that none of Rev-
lon's data was affected.
Disabling the software disrupted Revlon's two main distribu-
tion centers, closed operations for three days and caused $20 millon
in product delivery delays. Revlon brought suit against Logisticon
alleging misappropriation of trade secrets as well as contract claims.
The suit settled out of court, and the settlement terms remained
undisclosed.7
B. Self-Help Repossession and the UC. C.
Self-help8 is action taken to enforce or protect one's rights
without resort to the legal system.9 Records show that self-help was
available to would-be plaintiffs as far back as Greek jurisprudence.t 0
4. Andrew Pollack, Revlon Accuses A Supplier Of Sabotaging Its Software, N.Y.
TIMES, October 25, 1990, at DI, col. 1.
5. See Jeffery B. Ritter, Disabling Software Devices: 'Revlon' Inspires Contracting
Strategies, COMPUTER LAW STRATEGIST, January 1991, at 1-2 for the facts of Revlon.
6. Dial-up access allows someone to access a computer from a remote location using a
modem and a telephone line.
7. "Repossession" by Disabling Software In User's Warehouse Spurs Suit, But Parties
Settle, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, December 1990, at 34.
8. For an excellent overview of the history of self-help repossession see James R. Me-
Call, The Past as Prologue: A History of the Right to Repossess, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 58 (1978).
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (5th ed. 1979).
10. See McCall, supra note 8, at 63-75.
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English common law recognized self-help, after years of suppres-
sion, due to concerns that violence would result from its execu-
tion.11 The self-help remedy quickly gained recognition in
American courts, 12 and was later codified into such diverse areas of
the law13 as commercial,14 tort and nuisance,15 self-defense 16 and
landlord/tenant law.17 The U.C.C. limits self-help to repossession
within the commercial law arena and regulates its use against debt-
ors. i" A secured creditor may repossess its collateral from a debtor
in default without judicial intervention. 9 This remedy is not with-
out rules, as creditors are forbidden from using violence or the
threat of violence to repossess their collateral.20
C. Rationale for Self-Help In Commercial Disputes
1. Consumer Debtors
The arguments supporting self-help repossession for consumers
focus on efficiency. Proponents contend that self-help repossession
offers a two-fold economic benefit. Self-help repossession increases
the amount of credit available to consumers while decreasing the
cost of credit.21 In addition, judicial efficiency is increased by re-
ducing the caseload of overburdened courts.22
The arguments opposing self-help repossession extend beyond
purely economic terms. Those opponents of self-help repossession
focus on the unfair advantage that creditors have over debtors. The
Supreme Court responded to these concerns in cases such as Fuen-
tes v. Shevin,23 by imposing due process requirements when state
11. Id. at 68.
12. Id. at 73. See also Right of Conditional Seller To Retake Property Without Judicial
Aid, 55 A.L.R. 184 (1991) for a collection of early self-help cases.
13. For a complete discussion of self-help in "non commercial" settings see Douglas I.
Brandon, et al., Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary
American Society, 37 VAND. L. REV. 845 (1984).
14. See U.C.C. §§ 2A-525, 9-313(8), and 9-503.
15. For a complete discussion of self-help in tort and nuisance cases see Jon K. Wactor,
Note, Self-Help: A Viable Remedy for Nuisance? A Guide for the Common Man's Lawyer, 24
ARIZ. L. REV. 83 (1982).
16. Brandon et aL, supra note 13, at 878.
17. Id. at 937.
18. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK o- THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-11 at 1063, § 26-6 at 1094-1102 (1980).
19. See U.C.C. § 9-503.
20. Id.
21. James J. White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More,
Wis. L. REV. 503, 522-523 (1973).
22. Brandon et al., supra note 13, at 849.
23. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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action was used to enforce a creditor's self-help remedies. The
Court held that due process requires a creditor to seek a writ of
possession from a judge and hold an immediate hearing after repos-
sessing a debtor's goods.
Opponents further disparage self-help repossession because it
encourages unethical practices by creditors.24 Among the practices
criticized are the use of violence and the excuse of a minor breach to
justify repossession. These and other unscrupulous repossession
practices diminish public respect for law.
2. Business Debtors
The issues raised by self-help repossession in business are simi-
lar to those in the consumer world. Proponents contend that it is
more efficient to seize the collateral rather than litigate the dispute.
This lowers the cost of doing business, in turn allowing sellers to
offer lower prices. Self-help repossession also protects business by
ensuring that their goods are not destroyed by the debtor.2" Oppo-
nents to self-help repossession in business raise the same arguments
as those in the consumer realm. In response, Professor Gilmore
states that repossession causes little trouble in the business world.26
II. SOFTWARE REPOSSESSION AND THE U.C.C.
A. Applicability of the U. C.C. to Software
The current trend in computer law is to treat software as goods
under the U.C.C. 7 This allows vendors to rely on the U.C.C.'s self-
help provisions in contract disputes with their clients. Both custom
and "off the shelf" software 8 have been deemed goods, although
not all courts have agreed with this viewpoint.2 9 In contrast, courts
have agreed that ancillary services (such as training) are not consid-
24. See Thomas D. Crandal, Proposal For Consumer Credit Reform: A Definition Of
Default, A Right To Cure, And A Right To Notice And An Opportunity For A Hearing Before
Repossession, 13 GONZ. L. REV., 11, 31-33 (1977). See also GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 44.1 at 1212 (1965).
25. Soia Mentschifkoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 767, 779 (1973).
26. See GILMORE, supra note 24, at 1212.
27. RRX Industries v. Lab Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985). The court held that
software would be treated as goods under the U.C.C. so long as the sales aspects of the
transaction predominated.
28. "Off the shelf" software has already been developed and is sold to buyers ready to
use.
29. See H/R Stone, Inc. v. Phoenix Business Systems, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.
N.Y. 1987) (hardware and custom software are not goods under the U.C.C.).
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ered goods.30
Once software is classified as goods, then there are two areas
within the U.C.C. that vendors can rely on to repossess computer
software: secured transactions and leases.3 1 The following sections
present arguments that both sides can use when litigating the use of
self-help repossession in software disputes. Attorneys counseling
their clients should carefully consider these arguments before
resorting to self-help.
B. Secured Transactions and the U. CC.
1. Article 9
U.C.C. Article 9 governs transactions in instances where a
creditor retains a security interest in the goods held by the debtor.32
Section 9-503 allows a secured creditor to repossess its collateral
when the debtor defaults,33 unless otherwise specified in the security
agreement. Repossession may proceed so long as neither the credi-
tor nor the debtor breaches the peace.34
Breach of peace is a term of art describing the prohibition
against violence or threats of violence by the two parties against
each other.35 It requires that the creditor gain the consent of the
debtor before entering his property to repossess the collateral.36
Consent is revoked by any objection raised by the debtor, even if the
repossession occurs in a public place.37 In turn, creditors may re-
sort to skillful deception in order to obtain a debtor's consent to
repossession.
Apparently the deceptive creditor appeals to judges, as courts
30. RRX, 772 F.2d at 546.
31. See U.C.C. § 2A-525, § 9-313(8), § 9-503.
32. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, § 26-6 at 1094-1102.
33. U.C.C. § 9-503 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may
require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the se-
cured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reason-
ably convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render
equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises
under Section 9-504.
34. Id.
35. For an in-depth discussion of what the term "breach of peace" means see Eugene
Mikolajczyk, Note, Breach of Peace and Section 9-503 and the Uniform Commercial Code - A
Modern Definition for an Ancient Restriction, 82 DICK. L. REv. 351 (1978).
36. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, § 26-6 at 1095.
37. Id.
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have found consent where the creditor has misrepresented his pur-
pose in entering and taking the debtor's property. For example, in a
nineteenth century case, consent by misrepresentation was upheld
in the repossession of a piano by creditors who posed as "piano
tuners."3 On the other hand, consent by misrepresentation is
barred when state action or the color of state action is involved.39
2. Secured Transactions and Software
Secured transactions are used in intellectual property to pro-
vide capital to firms by using their software as collateral.' In addi-
tion, software development contracts can be structured as secured
transactions.41 Upon default, a creditor with a valid security inter-
est may use judicial or non-judicial action to stop the debtor from
using the secured intellectual property. 2
An effective security interest requires that the creditor reserve
its rights to the software in order to transfer ownership upon repos-
session.4 3 These rights include ownership of the copyright in the
source code, object code and documentation.' The creditor must
also reserve the rights in the software storage media45 and any
licenses or contracts affecting the software.46
3. Breach of Peace
Self-help repossession in computer transactions requires an ex-
amination of the breach of peace doctrine within the software envi-
ronment. Under breach of peace doctrine a creditor may not enter
the locked premises of the debtor without consent.47 In computer
systems, the locked door is replaced by the mechanisms that limit
38. Mikolajczyk, supra note 35, at 368.
39. Id. at 369.
40. See generally G. Larry Engle & Mark F. Radcliffe, Intellectual Property Financing
for High-Technology Companies, 19 U.C.C. L.J. 3 (1986).
41. See Raymond T. Nimmer& Patricia A. Krauthaus, Secured Financing and Intellec-
tual Property Rights, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 195 (1987).
42. Id. at 218-220.
43. A recent case has held that a security interest in a copyright needs to be filed with
the Copyright Office, rather then with the state. See Peregrine Entertainment, LTD v. Capi-
tal Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
44. Engle & Radcliffe, supra note 40, at 29.
45. These are the devices the software is stored on and include tapes and disks.
46. Engle & Radcliffe, supra note 40, at 29.
47. See Mikolajczyk, supra note 35, at 359, where courts have held that a creditor's
entry onto locked premises constitutes a breach of peace when repossessing his property. But
see Cherno v. Bank of Babylon, 282 N.Y.S.2d 114 (Sup. Ct. 1967); aff'd, 228 N.Y.S.2d 862
(2d Dept. 1968) where the court upheld a creditor's entry onto the debtor's business premises
using a key obtained without the debtor's consent.
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access to authorized users. The arguments surrounding breach of
peace in the computer environment depend on whether the vendor
is characterized as an authorized or unauthorized user.
Opponents can employ two arguments to oppose software re-
possession by unauthorized users. First, a creditor gaining access to
a computer system without a valid access code is breaching the
peace. Entry to a "locked" computer system without consent is
similar to a creditor breaking through a locked door. Second, fed-
eral computer crime statutes bar unauthorized access to computer
systems.48 These statutes reinforce the characterization of unau-
thorized systems access as the equivalent of entry through a locked
door. A creditor wishing to repossess software, without authorized
access, is prohibited by both the breach of peace doctrine and fed-
eral law. Creditors, however, have other means at their disposal to
repossess software, without relying on unauthorized access.
In the more common scenario, as in Revlon,49 the vendor is
authorized to access a client's system, but abuses that access by us-
ing it to repossess the disputed software. One can draw an analogy
between consent by misrepresentation and a creditor's use of its au-
thorized access to repossess software. A client gives a software ven-
dor consent to access its system to develop and test software. The
vendor obtains consent by misrepresentation when it enters a cli-
ent's system under the guise of software development to repossess
its software.
As stated earlier, consent by misrepresentation is allowed ex-
cept where state action or the color of state action is involved. Ac-
cordingly, vendors engaged in self-help will argue that their access
is merely consent by misrepresentation and therefore no breach of
peace occurs. On the other hand, clients will argue that the use of
common carriers (e.g., a telephone company) regulated by the gov-
ernment should be included under the definition of state action.
Under this rationale, a creditor breaches the peace when it uses a
common carrier while gaining a client's consent to enter its system
by misrepresenting its purpose. The client's argument fails, how-
ever, due to a Supreme Court ruling that privately owned utilities,
though heavily regulated, do not function under state action. 50
Any argument opposing self-help repossession on breach of
48. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a) (West Supp. 1991) which prohibits unauthorized access
to computer systems.
49. Revlon Group, Inc. v. Logisticon, Inc., No. 705933 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara
Cnty., complaint filed Oct. 22, 1990).
50. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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peace grounds fails because its underlying rationale is no longer ap-
plicable.51 The ban against breaching the peace is meant to discour-
age violence. In the software environment, unlike consumer and
business repossessions, the chance of violence is minimal since re-
possession is possible without human contact. As a result, arguing
that repossessing software is a breach of the peace is difficult to
sustain.
Clients may yet have the final word under Federal law. In ad-
dition to barring unauthorized use, the Computer Crime Act pro-
hibits a computer user from exceeding its authorized access. 52
Clients can argue that they give their vendors access to their sys-
tems strictly for software development and testing purposes. A ven-
dor's use of that system to repossess its software exceeds its
authorization and is therefore illegal.5 3
4. Consequential Damages
Neither the U.C.C. nor the traditional self-help doctrine allows
a debtor to recover the consequential damages of the creditor's re-
possession.54 These damages include the loss of earnings due to the
disruption of the debtor's business. The rationale behind this is eas-
ily seen: a debtor brings the loss on himself by defaulting on his
debt. The increased consequential damages due to software repos-
session require that we reconsider self-help in light of computer
technology.
In the past, the small business owner was better able to foresee
the ramifications of not paying for its goods. In today's more com-
plex arena, a small business may be unsophisticated both legally and
technically. Accordingly, the business owner may be unaware that
51. Mikolajczyk, supra note 35, at 352. The prohibition against breaching the peace is
used to prevent violence.
52. 18 U.S.C.A § 1030(a)(4) (West Supp. 1991) defines a violation of the Act as "know-
ingly and with intent to defraud ... exceeds authorized access and by means of such conduct
furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and
the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer, . . ." Further, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1030(e)(6) (West Supp. 1991) defines exceeding authorized access as accessing "a computer
with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that
the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter...."
53. The district court in Minnesota rejected a similar argument made by two agricul-
tural dealers who leased computer hardware and software. The court found that the vendor's
access to deactivate the software was authorized under the terms of the contract. The lessees'
had defaulted on payment triggering the contract's cancellation clause. American Computer
Trust Leasing v. Jack Farnell Implement Co., 763 F. Supp. 1473 (D. Minn. 1991).
54. There are, however penalties for a creditors' willful repossession. See 35 A.L.R. 3rd-
4th, 1041 (1991) for a collection of these cases.
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the contract allows the vendor to repossess his software." It is
doubtful that the contract will make specific reference to self-help
remedies, even if it indicates the vendor may rely on any U.C.C.
remedy. In a dispute about software performance, the buyer, not
realizing the consequences of its action, may withhold payment
rather than seek legal action. The vendor, taking advantage of the
client's innocence, is able to render the business helpless by repos-
sessing its software. Large businesses are often protected against
this practice because of their ability to access legal and technical
resources easily.
The large business computer user presents an additional set of
issues. Computer software is unlike the usual class of repossessed
collateral. Interconnected computer networks are the new high-
ways that transport information just as highways move goods. A
network links many separate computers allowing data to flow
around the country and the world. As in Revlon,5 6 software repos-
session can disable a local system as well as cripple an entire net-
work. The results can be widespread, not only disabling the
intended business, but also damaging other businesses that are part
of interconnected computer networks. The AT&T telephone out-
age in January 1990 is an example of what can happen when a criti-
cal piece of software fails.57 The losses resulting from a failure due
to software repossession can easily exceed the value of the disputed
computer system. As a result, one can argue that creditors should
not be allowed to wield such power unchecked by the judicial
system.
Despite these arguments, self-help repossession is not re-
stricted, even if it causes a business to fail. Clients, therefore,
should insist that self-help repossession be specified in the contract
or barred as a remedy.58 This would remove the element of surprise
in software repossession and limit consequential damages.
55. A vendor can structure a software contract as a secured transaction in order to take
advantage of the self-help repossession provision in the U.C.C.
56. Revlon Group, Inc. v. Logisticon, Inc., No. 705933 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara
Cnty., complaint filed Oct. 22, 1990).
57. See Edmund L. Andrews, Telephone Techology Questioned After Failures, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 28, 1991, at A16, col. 1 for an example of how a single software failure affected
most of the phone lines on the East Coast.
58. One Court issued an injunction against a software vendor using a drop-dead device,
without disclosing it to the client. Frank & Sons v. Information Solutions, Inc., No. 88-C-
1474-E (N.D. Okla. 1988). See also Clayton X-ray Co. v. Professional Systems Corp., 812
S.W.2d 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), where the court assessed punitive damages against a
programmer who used a "lockeys" device to enforce his/her contract with the client. See
also Werner v. Lewis, New York Law Journal, Aug. 4, 1992 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. Cnty, Aug.
4, 1992). But see American Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farwell Implement Co., 763 F.
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C. Fixtures
1. Traditional Fixture Doctrine
Fixture doctrine 9 is another area within secured transactions
permitting creditors to repossess their collateral. Fixtures are goods
so attached to the particular real estate that the property owner
may have an interest in them under local real estate law.60 A con-
flict arises when a creditor lends money to a debtor to purchase
goods and the real propety holder asserts a priority over them. In
turn, creditors can use a fixture filing to assert their priority over the
real estate holder."
The repossession provisions under U.C.C. Sections 9-503 and
9-313(8) are similar in that a secured party must adhere to the
breach of peace provision. Neither section allows the debtor to col-
lect damages for lost business revenues or consequential damages
due to the repossession.62 Debtors gain a measure of protection as
creditors are liable for conversion upon seizing other property of the
debtor. Unlike section 9-503, there are instances when a creditor
must give notice prior to repossessing its collateral. In addition,
repossession is allowed despite "material damage" to the premises,
but the creditor must reimburse the property owner for any physi-
cal damage to its real property.
2. Software as a Fixture
In software repossession, both parties may use the U.C.C. fix-
ture provisions to support their positions. To take advantage of the
provisions, computer software must be considered a fixture. The
definition of a fixture varies from state to state. However the
U.C.C. refers to "readily removable office machines" when dis-
cussing fixtures. White & Summer's inclusion of small computers
within this category takes no great leap of faith, but its expansion to
encompass computer software has not been considered by the
Supp. 1473 (D. Minn. 1991), where the court upheld deactivation of software as a remedy in
a vendors dispute with its clients.
59. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, § 25-11 at 1054-1064.
60. American Law of Property defines as goods so related to the property that a disin-
terested observer would consider it part of the property. See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 19.1, at 3-4 (A. James Casner et al. eds., 1952). See also U.C.C. § 9-313(l)(a).
61. Creditors can use one of two methods to protect security interests in fixtures. The
creditor can file in the real estate record before the mortgage creditor. The second method
allows a creditor to obtain a purchase money security interest in the goods if the mortgage
creditor has filed first. See U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a)(b).
62. See U.C.C. § 9-313(8), comment 9.
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courts and arguments in its favor may be difficult to sustain.63
Those seeking to characterize software as a fixture might do so
in a number of ways. First, software supplied with the hardware at
the time of sale may be considered part of the hardware and there-
fore a fixture. Independently supplied software may be character-
ized as part of a fixture once it is loaded onto the computer, and
finally, a creditor may use a fixture filing to cover the software.
Under the fixture provisions of the U.C.C., a debtor can avoid
being surprised by a creditor's repossession. Section 9-313(8) forces
a creditor to seek the permission of the real estate holder who has
priority over the creditor, before repossessing the collateral. Where
the client owns the computer site, a software vendor seeking to re-
possess his software can be prevented from carrying out the repos-
session. In the alternative, a vendor may have to contact the owner
of the computer site, who in turn may give notice to the client.
While fixture doctrine may pre-empt the surprise of reposses-
sion, the argument against granting consequential damages to the
client becomes stronger. Section 9-313(8) also states that no com-
pensation is allowed for "loss of business" due to repossession. Cli-
ents may argue that the consequential business damage due to
software repossession is more analogous to physical damage than to
real property, and therefore business losses should be compensated.
This argument would appear to be difficult to sustain.
D. Leases - Article 2A
In the computer industry many software contracts are written
in the form of a lease. Article 2A of the U.C.C. is a new provision
that was written to regulate leases."4 To date at least eighteen states
have adopted Article 2A.65 Section 2A-525 allows the lessor to dis-
able or remove the leased goods upon default by the lessee.66 Simi-
lar to Article 9, the lessor may undertake self-repossession so long
as the peace is not breached.67
Article 2A may give software vendors their most powerful ar-
gument in support of software repossession. It allows a creditor to
63. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, § 25-11 at 1060.
64. For a history of Article 2A see Amelia H. Boss, History ofArticle 2A: A Lesson For
Practitioners and Scholars Alike, 39 ALA. L. REv. 575, 579 (1988).
65. See GUIDE TO COMPUTER LAW (CCH) § 7230 (1991).
66. See U.C.C. § 2A-525(c) which provides that "the lessor may proceed under subsec-
tion (2) [repossession] without judicial process if it can be done without breach of the
peace ......
67. Id.
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disable the leased item upon the lessee's default.6" This language
follows the rationale underlying section 9-503, allowing a secured
party to disable its goods if repossession is impossible or impracti-
cal.6 9 Vendors can argue that physical repossession of computer
software is impractical because the client can retain a copy of the
software and continue to use it. As a result, disabling the software
is the vendors only recourse if the client withholds payment. There
has been little litigation under Article 2A, although commentators
have noted that it may be applicable to software leases.70
III. NoN-U.C.C. PRINCIPLES
Self-help repossession is limited to U.C.C. Articles 2A and 9
even though computer disputes are litigated under other legal theo-
ries. In the areas of replevin, lien, licensing and bankruptcy, self-
help repossession of computer software is barred. Despite these lim-
itations, examining the impact of these theories on self-help repos-
session raises interesting arguments for practitioners.
A. Replevin
Replevin actions allow sellers to repossess their goods from de-
faulting buyers.7" Actions to replevy goods require that the creditor
file and post a bond with the court before repossessing its collateral.
Some states allow a debtor to post a higher bond in order to recover
the goods until the issues in dispute are heard.72 The Supreme
Court limits on self-help repossession 73 are also applicable to re-
plevin actions.
In computer disputes, replevin may be a useful alternative to
self-help repossession as vendors may reclaim their software under
judicial authority.74 Replevin actions also allow clients to air their
68. U.C.C. § 2A-525(b) provides that "without removal the lessor may render unusable
any goods employed in trade or business .. "
69. See U.C.C. § 9-503 and comment. The comment uses heavy equipment as an exam-
ple of collateral that cannot easily be repossessed.
70. See Edwin E. Huddleson, Old Wine in New Bottles UCC Article 2A - Leases, 39
ALA. L. REV. 615 (1988).
71. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 513 at 399 (1973).
72. See Honeywell Information Systems v. Demographics Systems, Inc, 396 F. Supp.
273, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
73. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
74. F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 430 F. Supp. 988
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); aff'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979). Also see the following cases where
replevin was used in computer cases: Computer Leasing Co. v. Computing & Software, Inc.,
306 N.E.2d 191 (Ohio Ct. of Com. Pleas 1973) and Honeywell Information Systems v.
Demographics Systems, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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consequential damages in an appropriate forum. These arguments
will have little effect on courts since they have held that, absent
contract provisions to the contrary, the vendor's breach generally
does not give the client the right to default on the contract.75 As a
result, computer software may be replevied, while the client must
sue for damages caused by a vendor's breach of warranty.
The court in F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Systems
Corp.,76 discussed the good faith defenses that clients might use
when arguing against a replevin action.77 These defenses would al-
low a buyer, when faced with a breach by the seller, to withhold
payment without automatically being subject to replevin. The court
rejected all of Schaefer's defenses, but gave the most weight to their
fraudulent misrepresentation argument. Future courts may dis-
courage replevying a computer system from a defaulting buyer
based on a vendors intentional misrepresentation of the system's
capabilities.
B. Liens
Lien theory is another area that permits a creditor to use self-
help.7" A lien is an encumbrance on a debtor's property for the
payment or discharge of a particular debt. The property acts as se-
curity until the debt is satisfied, and can be sold by the court to
enforce the lien. The authority to place a lien arises under both
common law and specific statutes.
Certain classes of professionals are allowed liens on property
held for their client, to ensure payment for rendered services. An
attorney can choose between two types of liens to collect a debt
owed by a client. A charging lien allows the attorney to be reim-
bursed out of any judgement obtained for the client.79 An attorney
may instead enforce a retaining lien, permitting him to hold his cli-
ent's papers until the debt is satisfied. The right of an attorney
under a retaining lien extends solely to those documents in the at-
torney's possession. 0 Unlike charging liens, retaining liens require
no judicial action to enforce.
There are two other major classes of professionals that can
75. Honeywell Information Systems v. Demographics Systems, Inc, 396 F. Supp. 273,
278 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
76. 430 F.Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); aff'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979).
77. Id.
78. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Liens § 1 (1991).
79. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys At Law § 315 (1991).
80. For a collection of cases discussing which of the client's property is subject to an
attorney's lien see 70 A.L.R. 4th § 18 at 827 (1991).
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place liens on their client's property. Accountants' liens, like attor-
neys' liens, allow them to keep their client's papers until the debt is
paid."1 Architect liens allow them a statutory right for unpaid serv-
ices provided on real estate.8 2
A software developer seeking to enforce a lien can draw an
analogy between himself or herself and a professional. The software
developer and the professional both provide unique services for fi-
nancial gain. In both cases the client can withhold payment. As a
result, vendors will argue that they can repossess their client's
software in order to enforce a professional lien for services they pro-
vided but for which they were not compensated.
Lien doctrine fails to support this argument as common law
requires that the vendor already possess the software in order to
enforce a lien. Statutory liens allow a vendor to enforce a lien with-
out possession, but no statutes exist explicitly giving a software ven-
dor this right.
Vendors may argue that they "possess" the software (by con-
tinuing to hold title) due to the client's breach and that they can
therefore enforce a lien under common law. The client can respond
by arguing that the vendor holds only a security interest in the
software. Accordingly, self-help repossession is not available to the
vendor unless its security interest is perfected under Article 9 of the
U.C.C.
Software vendors may also argue that their case is analogous to
a professional lien where the final work is held back until payment
is completed. This argument fails because disabling software re-
quires an affirmative action as compared to the passive nature of a
professional lien.
C. Licenses
The Copyright Act allows authors to license their works. Ven-
dors can license software to their clients through either a site license
or a one copy per machine basis. A vendor may impound the
software of a client that violates its license provisions. Courts have
held that the Copyright Act's impoundment provision does not go
so far as to authorize self-help repossession. 3
81. See 1 AM. JUR. 2DAccountants § 11-12 (1991).
82. See 5 AM. JUR. 2D Architects § 20-22 (1991).
83. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1989).
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D. Bankruptcy Proceedings
The "automatic stay" provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code
prevent secured creditors from using self-help repossession when a
debtor files for bankruptcy."s The stay applies during the entire
bankruptcy proceeding unless lifted by the court, although a credi-
tor can apply to the court for an exemption. As a result, the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not permit self-help repossession by software
vendors.85
IV. ACCEPTABLE FORMS OF SELF-HELP
Self-help repossession should be barred in the majority of
software disputes. The danger lies when its availability is not delin-
eated in the contract and it is used without warning. The subse-
quent consequential damages caused by disabling the client's
computer systems can be disproportionate to the value of the dis-
puted software. Despite these drawbacks, self-help repossession
should be allowed in software disputes in some limited situations.
Software repossession can be justified when the client is in a
more powerful position than the vendor and can afford extensive
litigation. In this instance, one can argue that a small vendor's only
leverage is self-help repossession. Although attractive on its face,
the consequences to the small vendor may be self-defeating. Upon
reasoned reflection, it should be clear that any "victory" achieved
through self-help repossession will indeed be short-lived. The dam-
age to the vendor's reputation can sour relations between old clients
and make new business difficult to obtain.86
Allowable self-help alternatives do exist and are used in the
software industry. There are vendors who display a warning
message on the client's computer screen indicating that the software
will be disabled if payment is not received after a trial period. Other
vendors automatically disable a demonstration version of software
after a fixed period of time. These methods allow a software vendor
to supply a client with software while maintaining a measure of
control.
A vendor may argue that resorting to self-help repossession is
justified because litigation is unwieldy and expensive. Alternate dis-
pute resolution processes (ADR) are available to the parties so that
84. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West Supp. 1991).
85. See generally Terence W. Thompson, Software Suppliers Rights in Clients Bank-
ruptcy, 3 SOFTWARE L.J. 1, 14 (1989).
86. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CoNTRAcr LAW 179-180 (1979).
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software disputes can be resolved without employing self-help re-
possession.87 ADR encompasses a broad range of dispute resolu-
tion processes, including negotiation, mediation and arbitration,
with the advantages of lower cost than litigation and faster resolu-
tions. Disadvantages of ADR include the inability to appeal a deci-
sion and a lack of provisional remedies. Vendors may be hesitant to
use ADR because preliminary relief may be unobtainable to stop
use of disputed software. Despite these disadvantages, ADR re-
mains an attractive alternative as shown by IBM and Fujitsu's use
of ADR to resolve their dispute.88
When deciding whether a software vendor may use self-help
repossession, the following issues should be considered. Does one
party have an unfair advantage (economic, legal or technical) over
the other? Was the contract structured as a secured transaction or
lease so that self-help is available under the U.C.C.? Did the con-
tract specify repossession as a possible remedy or was a boilerplate
provision (e.g., all remedies under the U.C.C. are available) used?
Did the client's business and type of software make widespread con-
sequential damages reasonably foreseeable? Were any other means
used to resolve the dispute before self-help was employed? These
questions allow a starting point for analysis, although specific cir-
cumstances may require consideration of other factors.
V. CONCLUSION
High technology is making computers and software available
to an increasing market. This growth will spawn an increasing
number of disputes involving software. Following in Logisticon's
footsteps, vendors may see self-help repossession as an attractive op-
tion to litigation.
Self-help has historically been condoned as a means of resolv-
ing disputes. Starting with Greek jurisprudence, continuing
through English common law and by its acceptance into American
law, self-help is a viable alternative to the legal process. The U.C.C.
provides for self-help by allowing secured creditors and lessors to
repossess their property upon default by the debtor. Society im-
poses a measure of restraint by barring creditors and debtors from
engaging in violence during the process. Replevin, liens, licenses
and bankruptcy are areas of commercial law that also place limits
87. See Brian T. Nash, Analysis ofAlternate Dispute Resolution in Computer Disputes, 2
SOFTWARE L.J. 29 (1987).
88. See N.Y TIMEs, November 11, 1991, at Al, col. 5 for a full description of the
dispute between IBM and Fujitsu as well as its eventual settlement.
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on self-help repossession. These doctrines, as well as the U.C.C.
provisions, were formulated before the explosion in technology.
The authors of these doctrines and provisions could not foresee self-
help's application to computer software. Accordingly, traditional
issues that surrounded self-help repossession must be reviewed
within the arena of computer software.
Self-help repossession of software should not be allowed in the
majority of software disputes for two reasons. First, it can cause
consequential damages that are disproportionate to the disputed
software. These damages can extend from the intended target busi-
ness to affiliated businesses whose only connection to the creditor is
through a computer network. Second, the circumstances under
which self-help repossession are employed may be fundamentally
unfair to the naive client. They are afforded little opportunity to
take measures to protect their computer systems and business
interests.
The circumstances surrounding the use of self-help reposses-
sion in software disputes must be closely examined and alternate
means of dispute resolution considered before the use of this remedy
is sanctioned.
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A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
PROTECTING INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
ACROSS THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Joshua D. Blackmant
I. INTRODUCTION
Information technology is providing businesses with powerful
new marketing tools. Before the computer revolution, direct mar-
keters flooded mailboxes with junk mail for relatively few sales.
Now software can pinpoint target groups by comparing mailing lists
or by using "point-of-sale" 1 information to identify consumers
likely to buy certain products.2 Similarly, records kept in the com-
puter memory of TRW, Trans Union Corporation and Equifax,
Inc. gather the financial minutiae of most (more than 170 million)
American adults.3 From this financial data, mailing lists based on
an infinite variety of criteria are created and sold. While consumers
have legislative permission to obtain copies of their credit reports
Copyright 0 1993 by Joshua D. Blackman.
t Director, Legal Research Group, Find SVP. New York City; attorney admitted in
New York and Connecticut; author of The Legal Researcher's Internet Directory; email ad-
dress joshb@panix.com.
1. The Chief Executive Officer of Citicorp's Point-of-Sale (POS) Information Services,
Jerry Saltzgaber, described the features of a POS system:
When they join, consumers receive a personalized card with either a mag stripe
or a UPC bar code. Then by presenting these cards at the checkout counter
consumers automatically get credit for all the store coupons in effect at that
time and all purchases are recorded by household.
[The database is used] for a wide variety of direct marketing applications,
including delivering bar soap samples to competitive brand users, sending dis-
posable diaper coupons and baby food coupons to households with infant chil-
dren - inferred from prior purchases - and targeting the best prospects' for
magazine subscription acquisition programs.
Data Protection, Computers, and Changing Information Practices, Hearings on H.R. 685
Before the Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House
Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 86 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing
Record] (emphasis supplied).
2. This practice is known in the direct mall industry as "profiling." Swedes Worry
That European Community Membership Will Compromise Databases, COMPUTERGRAM
INT'L, Jan. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEXIS World Library, Txtline File.
3. Peter Kerr, Big Credit Bureau to Let Consumers See Reports Free, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
15, 1991, at Al.
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"for a reasonable charge," 4 nothing other than corporate discretion
prevents credit reporting agencies from selling those personal
records to whomever they choose.
The most intimate personal information regarding nearly every
American adult, including age, marital status, salary, home address
and phone, medical procedures paid for (or unpaid for), and debts
owed, is thereby freely traded, without the authorization of the indi-
vidual from whom it was collected. Not only does this practice in-
trude on individual privacy by its unauthorized disclosure of
personal data, it also perpetuates an economic imbalance. Private
companies with the resources to collect or purchase personal data
are presently able to exploit that information virtually free from leg-
islative restraint and gain economically without compensating the
people whom that data describes, or protecting them in case dam-
age ensues due to its mishandling.
The 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer is an extreme,
though illustrative example of the destruction that the lack of infor-
mational privacy can cause. Ms. Schaeffer, the co-star of the televi-
sion series "My Sister Sam," was killed outside her Los Angeles
apartment by an obsessed fan who acquired her address from the
California Department of Motor Vehicles.5
Although governmentally-held personal information is pur-
portedly protected from misuse,6 no such restrictions on the DMV's
distribution of this personal data existed at the time of Ms. Schaef-
fer's death. The lack of protection for similar records retained in
innumerable private sector databases reveals the potential for abuse
of the personal information of every citizen.
Consider, for example, what happened to Supreme Court nom-
inee Robert Bork during his confirmation hearings. A Washington
D.C. weekly newspaper published a list of the 146 videotapes Bork
and his wife had rented over a two year period.' Fortunately for
Mr. Bork and his wife, their videotape choices were socially inoffen-
4. The Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act § 612, 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (1988).
5. James Harney, DMV" Registered Driver: License Plate: Confidentiality, USA TO-
DAY, Mar. 10, 1992, at 3A.
6. The Privacy Act of 1974 provides: "No agency shall disclose any record.., by any
means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written
request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record per-
tains .... 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1988).
Similarly, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 provides that: "[N]o Government
authority may have access to ... the information contained in the financial records of any
customer from a financial institution unless ... such customer has authorized such disclosure
..... 12 U.S.C. § 3402(l) (1988).
7. Personalities, WASH. PosT, Sept. 26, 1987, at C3.
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sive. Had the list included pornography or other provocative mate-
rial, damage to his career or their marriage may have been great.
In response to that incident, Congress passed the Video Pri-
vacy Protection Act,8 proscribing disclosure of personal data by
"videotape service provider[s]." 9 However, there is no similar pro-
tection for records about the purchase of magazines, books, music,
computer software, mail order merchandise, airline tickets, foods,
film developing and the range of consumer goods and services
purchased by American citizens. 10 Companies are free to collect
and sell this information without restriction or notice to consum-
ers."1 The following troubling examples illustrate the extensive po-
tential for privacy invasions permitted by the current lack of
protections.
Purchasers of pregnancy-testing kits may receive solicitations
from pro- and anti-abortion groups, or from sellers of birth-con-
trol products and diaper services. Purchasers of weight-loss
products or participants in diet programs may be targeted for
promotional offers from sellers of candy, cookies and ice cream,
or, conversely, those whose purchases of the latter exceed the
average may receive offers for weight-loss products and services.
Subscribers to gay and lesbian publications may be targeted by
religious and therapeutic organizations or face employment deni-
als, harassment, and even blackmail. Frequent travelers and
those with multiple residences may receive solicitations from sell-
ers of home-security products, and such lists would be a boon to
sophisticated burglars. A list of tobacco users might be of inter-
est to potential employers and insurance companies. A list of
those with credit troubles and excessive indebtedness would cer-
tainly be of interest to promoters of scams that promise to help
people obtain credit cards or get out of debt. A cynic might even
hypothesize that such a list would be used by promoters of alco-
holic beverages, sweepstakes advertising, and gambling junkets. 12
Individuals are also not protected from the errors made by
mailing-list merchants. According to Bankcard Holders of
8. The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 1395
(1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988)).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). The Act provides: "A video tape service provider who
knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any con-
sumer of such provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person for the relief provided in sub-
section (d)." Id.
10. See 137 CONG. REc. H755, H756 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1991) [hereinafter Rep. Wise's
Introductory Remarks] (statement of Rep. Wise introducing H.R. 685).
11. Id.
12. Gary T. Marx, Privacy and Technology, WHOLE EARTH REV., Winter 1991, at 90,
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America, a consumer advocacy group, thirty-five percent of those
who pay to see their own credit reports find that their credit report
contains someone else's data. 3
[In one such incident,] Michael Riley, a Washington-based Time
magazine reporter, jumped at the mail solicitation he received in
late 1989 for a pre-approved Citibank visa card. A few weeks
later, his wife, Arline, was about to buy a blouse when the cash-
ier told her the card was no good.
When the Rileys checked further with Citibank, they were
told that their car had been repossessed, they faced $70,000 in
tax liens and that they had filed for bankruptcy. As it turned
out, Citibank, which had purchased its credit information from
TRW, according to Riley, had confused Michael George Riley
with a Michael Gilbert Riley.14
Horror stories like this could be avoided if legislation required that
data collectors acquire the data subject's consent prior to distribut-
ing personal information.
Medical records are similarly unprotected. Health insurers
maintain vast databases of patients' medical records, which the in-
surers claim they keep private. 5 But self-insured employers also
have access to such data which they can use to educate or even
discipline employees. 6 Only employer discretion, not legislation or
regulation, determines how employee medical records are used. 7
The marketing industry claims that access to such information
is vital to the health of their business.'I The claims are that no harm
is done to the consumer by the free dissemination of this informa-
tion. On the contrary, argue claim marketers, the consumer is able
to enjoy greater, focused access to the products she wants and will
receive less junk mail if tailored marketing can be achieved via free
access to this personal data.'9 But this argument ignores the threats
to personal privacy engendered by the unrestricted free trade in per-
sonal data.
While large marketing firms may have security measures in
place to prevent disclosure of the personal data in their computer
13. Daniel Mendel-Black & Evelyn Richards, Peering Into Private Lives: Computer Lists
Now Profile Consumers by their Personal Habits, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1991, at HI, H6.
14. Id.
15. Milt Freudenheirn, Software Controls on Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992,
at D2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Mendel-Black & Richards, supra note 13, at H6.
19. See id.
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memories to those who might mishandle that data, smaller compa-
nies might not be able to afford such care. Smaller companies also
might not have the assets to recompense a consumer damaged by
the misuse of her data.
Nonetheless, in order to offer marketing opportunities to small
businesses, Lotus Development and Equifax were planning to mar-
ket a CD-ROM product known as Lotus Marketplace: Households
("Marketplace") in 1991.20 The Marketplace database cataloged
information on 80 million households" and 120 million consum-
ers22 including names, addresses, estimated income, and propensity
to buy over 100 consumer product categories.23 The product was to
retail for $695, and was targeted at small businesses.24 But Market-
place was never released because some 30,000 consumers demanded
that their names be removed from the CD-ROM.25 However, no
existing legislation would have prevented its sale. The protection of
personal privacy should not depend merely on consumer protests,
the timely reporting of a potentially threatening product's release,
or the fortuitous decision of company executives.
Protection of personal data in the private sector historically
has been provided by legislation tailored to remedy narrowly per-
ceived problems. Congress has passed legislation to protect con-
sumer's informational privacy in the financial,26 cable television,27
and the video retailing industries.2" Such niche legislation, how-
ever, does not effectively protect personal privacy across the broad
spectrum of situations where it is threatened.
Personal data is also protected by the private sector itself, but
only when it serves private sector interests. As noted by the Chief
Executive Officer of Citicorp's Point-of-Sale Information Services,
Jerry Saltzgaber, "[t]hose of us involved in consumer marketing are
the best agents for protecting the consumer's privacy, because if we
don't, we won't have a business."29
However, there is an inherent conflict of interests when compa-
nies serve as both collectors and protectors of personal data. Ar-
20. Jacob Sullun, Secrets for Sale: Do Strangers with Computers Know Too Much About
You?, REASON, Vol. 23, April 1992, at 29.
21. Mendel-Black & Richards, supra note 13, at HI.
22. Sullum, supra note 20, at 29.
23. See Mendel-Black & Richards, supra note 13, at HI.
24. Sullum, supra note 20, at 29.
25. Id.
26. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 §§ 1101-22, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1988).
27. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 631, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1988).
28. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 § 2(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).
29. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 88.
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guably, when a company is threatened by an economic recession,
for example, one cannot expect it to put consumers' interests above
its own. Nor can it be expected to forego the exploitation of all its
assets, including its consumer database, to protect its business inter-
ests. Thus personal data is subject to the vagaries of the economy
and corporate discretion. Such an insecure system for protecting
personal data is inadequate to guarantee informational privacy
rights. Individuals need protection from the private sector itself,
both from unnecessary collection of personal data and from its un-
authorized disclosure.
In an attempt to reconcile the interests of personal privacy and
American business development, Representative Robert Wise of
West Virginia has proposed the establishment of a Data Protection
Board (DPB).30 Rep. Wise's bill is an idea whose time has come,3 1
but the proposed "watchdog"3 2 DPB has not been provided with
the teeth to accomplish its stated purpose. As proposed, the DPB
only has advisory power.33
The "Functions of the Board" section of the House bill34 pro-
vides that the DPB shall develop guidelines for use by Federal agen-
cies in implementing the Privacy Protection Act of 197435 (the
"Privacy Act").36 In addition, with respect to the Privacy Act, the
DPB shall assist federal agencies, publish a guide, issue advisory
opinions, investigate compliance, and make recommendations for
amending the Freedom of Information Act 37 and the Privacy Act. 38
Representative Wise has proposed two goals for the DPB: to
protect personal privacy and to ensure that American businesses
can compete in the European Community. 39 However, neither goal
30. H.R. 685, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
31. A Data Protection Board has been proposed in Congress at least twice before. Rep.
Wise introduced a bill to establish such a board on November 15, 1989. H.R. 3669, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Senator Samuel J. Ervin, Jr. introduced S. 3418 (which was passed to
become the Privacy Act of 1974) to create a Federal Privacy Board on May 1, 1974.
In addition, the Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 3(2), 101 Stat.
1724, 1724-25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3(a)(3) (1988)), mandated that the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology develop "standards and guidelines for the cost-effective
security and privacy of sensitive information in Federal computer systems." Id.
32. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H756.
33. H.R. 685 § 2(c)(2)(A).
34. Provision (c) in H.R. 685, "Functions of the Board," would become section 5(c) of
the Privacy Act of 1974. H.R. 685 § 2.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988). The Privacy Act of 1974 protects individuals from unau-
thorized disclosures of personal data by the federal government. Id.
36. H.R. 685 § 2(c)(l)(A).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
38. H.R. 685 § 2(c).
39. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H755-56.
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will be well served by a government board charged with merely
"guiding," "opining" and "recommending" means of achieving in-
formational privacy. Furthermore, a DPB whose primary legisla-
tive guides are the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Freedom of
Information Act (which regulate governmentally held personal
data) will have little impact on private sector users of consumer
data.
The lack of a central U.S. data protection authority (like the
DPB) has also left American industry unrepresented when interna-
tional decisions are made about transborder data use by multina-
tional companies. Furthermore, the data protection legislation of
many countries prevents the transfer of personal data to another
country in the absence of reciprocal data protection legislation,'
which ensures that personal data will be as well protected in the
transferee country as it was in its native country. The U.S. has no
such reciprocal legislation.
The European Commission has issued draft Directives that
would preclude transfers of personal data between countries that
have not "ensure[d] an adequate level of protection."41 The Com-
mission may decide that a particular country has adequate personal
data protection by reason either of its international commitments or
domestic law.42 Rep. Wise noted that "[a]doption of this Directive
[without concomitant legislation in the U.S.] could make it expen-
sive or impossible for American companies that need to transfer
personal data to and from Europe to do business. The result could
be a loss of jobs, profits, and business opportunities for America."43
The conflict between the United States' need for open access to
the EC market and the EC's intention to require reciprocal data
protection laws poses an economic imperative for the United States.
Failure to put adequate data protection laws in place and represent
U.S. business interests in this regard may cause U.S. businesses to
suffer.' American banks, for example, which are prevented from
transferring personal account data from Switzerland to New York
will find it difficult to compete in the transnational market with
Swiss banks which face no such impediment to transferring data.45
40. See Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 3.
41. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Relation
to the Processing of Personal Data, art. 24.1, 1990 O.J. (c277) 3,10 [hereinafter Draft
Directive].
42. Id. at 10.
43. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H756.
44. Id.
45. See id. Rep. Wise noted in his Opening Statement before the Subcommittee Hear-
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The United States is faced with either creating legislation to
protect personal data and national business interests, or subjecting
American companies to a regulatory apparatus controlled in Brus-
sels, review of American companies' management practices by Eu-
ropean bureaucrats and the determination by European courts of
American companies' legal liabilities.46
Recognizing, at least for argument's sake, that this latter alter-
native is not workable, the problem is how to balance the privacy
concerns of American consumers and the European Commission
against the profit-driven needs of American companies. Achieving
this balance will ensure a competitive position for U.S. businesses in
the E.C., and privacy protection for people.
The solution consistently chosen to resolve related problems by
the U.S. government47 and EC countries48 is a simple one. Compa-
nies can satisfy privacy concerns by merely obtaining permission to
use personal data (for purposes other than the purpose for which it
was provided) from the source-individual. Business' resistance to
adopting this solution on its own is great, due to perceived costs and
a perceived loss of autonomy to exploit information. 49  However,
such resistance can be neutralized, adherence ensured across the
private sector, and reciprocal legislation requirements fulfilled if
federal legislation is passed compelling businesses to acquire an in-
dividual's authorization prior to disclosing (or otherwise making
use of) her personal data.
In order to demonstrate the viability of adopting such legisla-
ings on the DPB bill that "[r]ecently, for instance, the French data protection commission
stopped Fiat in France from transferring information about its employees to Fiat in Italy."
Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 3.
46. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H757.
47. The Privacy Act of 1974 provides: "No agency shall disclose any record ... except
pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom
the record pertains .... 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1988) (emphasis supplied). The Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act of 1978 provides that "no Government authority may have access to...
the information contained in the financial records of any customer from a financial institution
unless... such customer has authorized such disclosure .... " 12 U.S.C. § 3402(1) (1988)
(emphasis supplied).
48. The Directives proposed by the European Commission in July 1990 seek to harmo-
nize the data protection laws of EC countries. Most of those countries, however, including
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain Switzer-
land and the United Kingdom already have data protection laws which require that stored
data be used only for the purposes stated when the data was originally collected. Those same
laws provide the data subject with objection, correction and erasure rights regarding personal
data. European Data Protection Survey, BULL. (Info. Technology Law Group/Eur.) Issue 6,
Autumn 1991.
49. Lovella Miles, Feeling the Draft; European Community's Data Protection Directive,
MARKETING, May 30, 1991, at 16.
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tion, this article will examine the legal and policy bases for such a
privacy law and will explain why this form of privacy protection
will provide benefits to all involved parties, far outweighing any po-
tential harms.
II. BASES FOR PROTECTING INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
A. Constitutional Basis for Protecting Informational Privacy
Although the United States Constitution does not contain the
word "privacy," the Supreme Court has recognized various privacy
rights based on several of the Amendments. Justice Douglas out-
lined the "zones of privacy" protected by the Bill of Rights in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut.50
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is [a zone of privacy]. The Third Amendment in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."51
Griswold represented the. Supreme Court's first recognition of a
fundamental privacy right. Douglas' opinion held that Connecti-
cut's anti-contraceptive statute violated the right of marital privacy,
a right "older than the Bill of Rights."52
However, while the Griswold Justices agreed that there was a
"right to privacy," they disagreed about the constitutional basis for
the right.53 Eight years later, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v.
50. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 486.
53. Justice Goldberg attributed the "fundamental personal [privacy] right" to those
unenumerated rights retained by the people pursuant to the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 486-
87.
Justice Harlan applied a traditional due process analysis, holding that the Connecticut
statute violated "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'." Id. at 500 (citing
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
Justice White also found that the Connecticut Statute imposed on a Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty which he defined as "a 'realm of family life which the state cannot enter' without
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Wade 4 identified the source of Giswold's "right to privacy" as the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 55
Douglas' "zones of privacy" were further defined in the
Court's decisions following Griswold. The Court found that the
Due Process Clause's substantive protection for "fundamental"
rights safeguards the right to decide to marry, 6 the right to decide
to end a pregnancy, 7 and the right of parents to make decisions
regarding the education and upbringing of their children. 8
The series of Supreme Court decisions leading from Griswold
was narrowed by Justice White's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick59
to "a fundamental individual right to decide whether or not to beget
or bear a child."' The Bowers Court claimed that "none of the
rights announced in [the Griswold line of] cases bears any resem-
blance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage
in acts of sodomy,"61 thereby upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy
statute. Justice White's opinion shifted the Court's focus and hold-
ing away from the right to privacy to the very narrow right to en-
gage in sodomy. Justice Blackmun's dissent acknowledged this
shift, reasoning that
[t]his case is [not] about "a fundamental right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy".... Rather, this case is about "the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,"
namely, "the right to be let alone." 62
By narrowly construing its prior privacy-related holdings, the
Bowers Court ignored the Due Process basis for the right to privacy
as identified in Roe. Instead, the Court relied on historical notions
of liberty which precluded finding that the right to engage in sod-
omy was a "fundamental" right.63
substantial justification." Id. at 502 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1943)).
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. Id. at 153 ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of... liberty ... as we feel it is, or ... in the Ninth Amendment ... is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.") (em-
phasis supplied).
56. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 708 (1977)(Powell, J., concurring);
and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
59. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
60. Id. at 190.
61. Id at 190-191.
62. Id. at 199 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
63. Id. at 192-194.
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The Court also constricted the right to privacy in Paul v. Da-
vis.6" That decision denied constitutional protection against the
public disclosure by police of the respondent's arrest on a shoplift-
ing charge, even though the respondent had never been convicted.65
The Court characterized the respondent's claim as defamation, and
therefore not within the meaning of either "liberty" or "property"
as used in the Due Process Clause.66
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion distinguished "fundamen-
tal" privacy rights "relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, and child rearing and education" from
the right to non-disclosure of personal information.6 7 The opinion
foreclosed Due Process protection of informational privacy unless
unauthorized disclosure threatens the exercise of "fundamental"
rights. Rather, Justice Rehnquist suggested the respondent seek re-
lief via his state's tort laws. 68
In a contrasting opinion issued a year later, Whalen v. Roe,69
Justice Stevens wrote that "[tihe right to collect and use [personal]
data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures ....
[I]n some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Con-
stitution ... ."70 The opinion recognized that the privacy which the
Due Process Clause safeguards includes two different types of inter-
ests: "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters, and.., the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions. '71
Read together, the Davis and Whalen opinions bear out one
commentator's conclusion that "the Supreme Court suffers from a
severe case of schizophrenia. '72 Justice Stevens' acknowledgment
in Whalen of Due Process Clause protection for "disclosure of per-
sonal matters" contradicts Justice Rehnquist's denial in Davis of the
Due Process right to informational privacy. The second right noted
by Justice Stevens, however, the right to autonomy in personal deci-
sion-making, is consistent with the Griswold line of cases, and with
64. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 711-12.
67. Id. at 713.
68. Id. at 712.
69. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
70. Id. at 605.
71. Id. at 599-600.
72. Michael P. Seng, The Constitution and Informational Privacy, or How So-Called
Conservatives Countenance Governmental Intrusion into a Person's Private Affairs, 18 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 871, 875 (1985).
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Davis's protection against unauthorized disclosure when such dis-
closure threatens the exercise of "fundamental" rights.
This reasoning is bolstered by the Court's decision in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services.73 In that case, the Court held
that President Nixon's assertions of informational privacy in his of-
ficial records were outweighed by a public interest in the docu-
ments. The Court's use of a balancing test implies that the Court
recognized a Constitutional right to informational privacy. If Presi-
dent Nixon did not have such a right, such balancing by the Court
would have been unnecessary.74
The Court has also employed a balancing test to weigh "the
right of every person 'to be let alone' ... [against] the right of [busi-
nesses] to communicate. ' 75  In Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Depart-
ment,76  mailing list brokers brought suit to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute77 which required removal of consum-
ers' names from mailing lists at the consumers' request. 78  The
Court found that the statute violated neither the First Amend-
ment's "right to communicate' 79 nor the Due Process Clause.8"
The Court affirmed the consumer's right to control the contents of
her mailbox and the use of her name and address because "[t]o hold
less would tend to license a form of trespass," and because
"[n]othing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view any
unwanted communication."" Thus Chief Justice Burger's opinion
found the right to privacy, in the context of prohibiting pandering
73. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). "One element of privacy has been characterized as 'the indi-
vidual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters ....... Id. at 457 (quoting Whalen,
429 U.S. at 599).
74. William C. Lindsay, When Uncle Sam Calls Does Ma Bell Have to Answer?; Recog-
nizing a Constitutional Right to Corporate Informational Privacy, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
915, 920 (1985).
75. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
76. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
77. Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, 39 U.S.C. § 4009
(1964, Supp. IV).
78. 39 U.S.C. § 4009 ... provides that
a person who has received by mail "a pandering advertisement which offers for
sale matter which the addressee in his sole discretion believes to be erotically
arousing or sexually provocative," may request the Postmaster General to issue
an order "directing the sender and his agents or assigns to refrain from further
mailings to the named addressee." Such order would also require the sender to
delete the addressee's name from his mailing lists and would prohibit him from
trading in lists from which the deletion has not been made.
397 U.S. at 728.
79. Id. at 735.
80. Id. at 738.
81. Id. at 737.
[Vol. 9
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
advertisements in the mails, greater than businesses' right to
communicate.
The Rowan decision provides a basis for individual control
over the exploitation of personal information. The opinion clearly
finds that one aspect of commercial solicitation is not necessarily
protected under the First Amendment. Despite the limited focus of
the statute challenged in Rowan, the Court found Congress' intent
to be quite broad:
In operative effect the power of the householder under the statute
is unlimited; he may prohibit ihe mailing of a dry goods catalog
because he objects to the contents - or indeed the text of the lan-
guage touting the merchandise. Congress provided this sweeping
power not only to protect privacy but to avoid possible constitu-
tional questions that might arise from vesting the power to make
any discretionary evaluation of the material in a governmental
official.
In effect, Congress has erected a wall - or more accurately
permits a citizen to erect a wall - that no advertiser may pene-
trate without his acquiescence.8 2
Although the Court has not found informational privacy to be
a fundamental right, its decisions support the notion that the indi-
vidual's right to informational privacy exists, and must be balanced
against the public interest.
As new technologies make collection of information about in-
dividuals easier and more insidious, the Court will increasingly be
faced with decisions whether to allow intrusion into what Justices
Warren and Brandeis termed the "inviolate personality" of the pri-
vate individual.8 3 To allow such intrusion will further limit individ-
ual liberty, will discourage personal autonomy and will surely usher
in an era of "Big Brother," where the individual is unable to con-
tribute to the greater human good for fear of incurring the govern-
ment's wrath.
Although statutory protection (as urged by this article) is es-
sential to ensure that businesses and individuals know their rights
and responsibilities regarding informational privacy, such rights
will be secure only if they are Constitutionally protected. One way
82. Id. at 737-38.
83. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 205, 207, 213 (1890). Warren and Brandeis also noted that "[i]f we are correct in this
conclusion [the existence of a right to privacy based on an inviolate personality], the existing
law affords a principle which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from
invasion either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other
modem device .. " Id. at 206.
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to overcome the Court's selective application of the right to privacy
is to amend the Constitution to acknowledge that its protections
apply regardless of the technologies which threaten our freedoms.
Professor Laurence H. Tribe has proposed the following 27th Con-
stitutional Amendment to address the threats to the Constitution's
core values in the technological age.
This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of speech, press,
petitions, and assembly, and its protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the deprivation of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law, shall be construed as fully appli-
cable without regard to the technological method or medium
through which information content is generated, stored, altered,
transmitted, or controlled. 4
Professor Tribe's proposed Amendment is necessary to guaran-
tee that the values of freedom, privacy and equality protected by the
18th century Bill of Rights continue unfettered. It would be more
comforting if the Supreme Court itself were to consistently interpret
the terms of the Constitution so that, for example, the right to pri-
vacy found in the Due Process Clause applied equally whether one
freely provided a personal phone number, or it was acquired with-
out one's permission via Caller I.D. technology.
85
But the Court's decisions are not so consistent. For example,
while Roe v. Wade86 acknowledged a woman's right to choose how
she uses her body, Bowers v. Hardwick '7 deprived homosexuals of
that same right. Though these cases are based on physically-ori-
ented rights, the rights we have in intangible personalty, like our
personal information, are no less precious and no less deserving of
protection.
In the context of achieving consistency in the protection of fun-
damental rights across technologies, acceptance of Professor Tribe's
proposal is appropriate. But in the context of non-fundamental
rights such as informational privacy, it is insufficient. Protection of
informational privacy requires legislation tailored to the reality of
the marketplace. Such legislation will not merely assert the exist-
ence of such rights regardless of technology, but will also satisfy the
84. John Markhoff, Remember Big Brother? Now He's a Company Man, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1991, at E7.
85. Caller I.D. is a technological service provided by telephone companies in 22 states
which "allows a subscriber to identify and record the telephone number of an incoming call,
and therefore presumably to determine the caller's identity." Anthony Ramirez, New York
State Approves Caller-Identification Service, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1992, at Dl.
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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commercial need for information in a manner that is fair to the
consumer.
B. Legislative Basis for Protecting Informational Privacy
If the Supreme Court has stopped short of expressly recogniz-
ing the right to informational privacy, Congress has not been so
timid. Congress' recognition of privacy rights is manifest in the
proliferation of legislation protecting the individual from govern-
mental intrusion88 and from the exploitation of personal data by
private organizations.
For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 197089 prohibits
consumer reporting agencies from disclosing consumer data except
in specified circumstances. 90 The Right to Financial Privacy Act of
197891 provides individuals with the right to notice of a request
before a financial institution may disclose records to government
agencies.92 The Cable Communications Policy Act of 198493 pro-
hibits cable operators from disclosing personal data regarding sub-
scribers without the consent of the subscriber.94 The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 198695 protects against the unau-
thorized interception of electronic communications.96 The Video
Privacy Protection Act of 198897 protects personal data held by
videotape service providers.98
These laws clearly express that Congress has perceived the
need to protect individual privacy. For example, included among
the Congressional findings regarding the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) is the following:
There is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exer-
cise their grave responsibilities with... a respect for the con-
sumer's right to privacy. 99
88. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988); Crime Control Act of 1973
§ 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3789g (1988); Privacy Act of 1974 § 3, 5 U.S.C. 552a (1988); Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 §§ 1101-22, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1988); Privacy Protection
Act of 1980 § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-I I to -12 (1988).
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1988).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
91. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1988).
92. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(a).
93. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (1988).
94. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(1).
95. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (1988).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).
98. Id.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4).
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Ironically, the FCRA focuses little on privacy, and primarily
on the accuracy of information held by consumer reporting agen-
cies. Although it restricts distribution of credit reports to certain
"permissible purposes," 1°° it does not prohibit general disclosure of
consumer data. 101 Thus, although Congress' intention in enacting
the FCRA, and the other legislation noted above, was to protect
consumer privacy, these laws fall short of this goal.
Congress has recognized the need for and demonstrated a de-
sire to protect personal privacy and commercial access to informa-
tion, but has thus far failed to enact legislation that accomplishes
both purposes in a comprehensive, effective manner. Satisfaction of
Congress' intentions requires a law that establishes privacy stan-
dards for all industries to follow, and a mechanism to ensure its
enforcement.
C. Common-Law Basis for Protecting Informational Privacy
1. Tort
Justice Rehnquist's assertion in Paul v. Davis 102 that individu-
als must look to state tort law to protect their privacy1°3 acknowl-
edges that such protection exists. Indeed, the common-law right of
privacy has traditionally given rise to a tort action for a violation of
that right.
Dean Prosser has identified four generally recognized state tort
actions for invasion of privacy:1 4 intrusion on physical solitude and
seclusion,10 5 public disclosure of private facts,1"6 false light in the
public eye, 10 7 and appropriation of one's name or likeness. 0 8 In the
context of informational privacy, two of the actions described by
Prosser are material: intrusion and public disclosure.
A tortious intrusion of an individual's privacy may stem from
the fact that corporations sell personal information without the au-
thorization of the individual from whom it was collected. The ini-
tial collecting of information may not constitute an intrusion on the
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
101. The allowable circumstances for furnishing a consumer report include "a legitimate
business need ... in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer." Id.
§ 1681b(3)(E).
102. 424 U.S. 693 (1976)
103. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
104. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971).
105. Id. at 807.
106. Id. at 809.
107. Id at 812.
108. Id. at 804.
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individual. In fact, the individual seeking a magazine subscription,
or insurance, or credit may initiate and volunteer information.
However, when the collecting corporation sells that information to
a third party, it provides the third party with unauthorized access
to personal facts regarding the individual and is thereby intruding
on the individual.
Prosser notes that this "form of invasion of privacy consists of
intrusion upon the [individual's] physical solitude or seclusion."1 9
In the context of informational privacy, courts have found a tor-
tious violation of this interest where there was prying into confiden-
tial records such as bank records.11°
Similarly, the selling or leasing of personal data constitutes a
public disclosure of private facts. While the sale of a list of con-
sumer data by one company to another may not appear to be "pub-
lic" disclosure, list brokers sell thousands of lists every year, and
such a distribution has been held to be public."' Also, consider the
Marketplace information product announced in April 1990 by Lo-
tus Development and Equifax, but never released. 1 2 By offering
the names, addresses and consumer habits of 120 million Americans
to small businesses, Marketplace assured a wide (public) disclosure
of private facts and therefore a tortious invasion of informational
privacy.
Despite the seemingly viable claim that the practice of selling
mailing lists is an invasion of privacy by intrusion into another's
seclusion, most such cases result in findings of nonliability.'13 It
appears that courts are very reluctant to find damage to the con-
sumer and resultant liability to the data collector/distributor based
on mere unauthorized disclosure of personal information. 1 4 This
result is unjust, but not unexpected, given a legal tradition which
provides for tort recovery only when some palpable damage can be
shown. The damage which results from an invasion of informa-
tional privacy is more commonly in the realm of lost opportunity
than in physical or mental suffering. Thus claims based on viola-
109. Id. at 807.
110. Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34 (N.J. Ch. 1929).
111. See STANDARD RATE & DATA SERVICE, DIREcT MAIL LIsT RATES AND DATA
(April 1993); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (holding the
distribution of a letter to a thousand men to be a public distribution).
112. See supra notes 20 - 25 and accompanying text.
113. Jeffrey F. Ghent, Unsolicited Mailing, Distribution, House Call, or Telephone Call as
Invasion of Privacy, 56 A.L.R.3d 457 §§ 8-16 (1974).
114. Id.
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tions of property rights and, more likely, breach of contract present
stronger bases for successful actions.
2. Property
Defining information as property and affording rights to infor-
mation "owners" makes for a prescient argument. American intel-
lectual property law has historically resisted conferring property
rights to the possessor of information." 5 Rather, its goal has been
the free circulation of information. Even more significantly, the ex-
isting statutory scheme for protecting intangible property does not
provide for the essential difference between information and tangi-
ble property. Specifically, tangible property decreases in value
when it is divided, while information does not." 6
As the concentration of wealth in information increases, a legal
scheme for protecting information rights will emerge of necessity.
Property laws have historically developed in response to new defini-
tions of wealth. Such laws will be based on an expanded definition
of property which will encompass claims of informational privacy.
Until these new laws are written, the copyright and patent schemes
provide an exceedingly insufficient model for protection of rights in
information.
The Constitutional clause on which the patent and copyright
laws are based grants Congress the power "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 1 7 The statutes based on this clause have sought to
balance the free dissemination of ideas against the state's interest in
encouraging authors and inventors to maintain the "Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts." Thus protection of author's and inventor's
rights is limited to providing a financial return on their expressions,
(not their ideas) for a limited time only. 1 8
In the case of copyright law, authors are granted the exclusive
115. See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of Inter-
national News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CM. L. REV. 411, 411 (1983) ("That informa-
tion once published should be presumptively free for all to use is a commonplace of
intellectual property law.").
116. Thomas Jefferson wrote of information's unique ability to be infinitely divisible
without losing value in 1813: "He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening
me." 6 WRrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180 (H. A. Washington ed., 1857).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
118. Current copyright law provides for rights to last for the life of the author plus 50
years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988). Patent rights are granted for 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1988).
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right to copy, distribute, perform, display and license their cre-
ations, 1 9 thereby protecting the author's right to profit from the
work. The information (ideas) contained in the work, however, are
essentially public domain material. 2 '
In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 2' the United
States Supreme Court asserted that facts are uncopyrightable be-
cause they are "discovered" by humans rather than "created."' 22
The Copyright Act of 1976 as amended'23 provides that copyright
protection does not extend to discoveries, even when embodied in a
copyrighted work. 12 4
Similarly, patent law grants to the inventor the right to exclude
others from making, using and selling a patented invention. 5
Although patents themselves "shall have the attributes of personal
property,"' 26 the information on which the invention is based is
public domain when the patent is granted.'2 7
In dramatic contravention of the intellectual property tradition
of denying property rights in information, two recent Supreme
Court decisions classified information as private property. 128  In
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,129 the Court held that research data
submitted to a federal agency could be considered 'property' within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 30 In
Carpenter v. United States,'3' the Court held that a newspaper "had
a property right in keeping confidential and making exclusive use,
119. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
120. Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides in pertinent part that "use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or... by any other means... for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching. . ., scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (emphasis supplied).
121. 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991).
122. Id. at 1287.
123. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
124. Id. § 102(b).
125. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
126. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 113 (1988) provides that: "[t]he applicant shall furnish a drawing where
necessary for the understanding of the subject matter sought to be patented." (emphasis sup-
plied). 35 U.S.C. § 10 (1988) provides that "[t]he Commissioner may furnish certified copies
of specifications and drawings of patents issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, and of
other records available either to the public or the person applying therefore." (emphasis
supplied).
128. For an in-depth analysis of these two cases and the issue of whether property rights
may exist in information, see Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus
and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L.
REv. 365 (1989).
129. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
130. Id. at 1003.
131. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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prior to publication," of the contents of a newspaper column.132
These two cases are the forerunners of a new concept about the
legal status of information, a concept more appropriate to the
changes wrought by the use of new technologies. If the informa-
tional rights of artificial persons like Monsanto 133 and the Wall
Street Journal 134 are protected, it follows that the personal data of
human beings is similarly deserving of protection.
Congress has clearly recognized the necessity that digitized in-
formation be considered "property." In the Senate Report on the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986,131 the Committee on the
Judiciary noted that a slew of enforcement problems had arisen in
response to criminal conduct related to computers. "Computer
technology simply does not fit some of the older, more traditional
legal approaches to theft or abuse of property. For example, com-
puter data may be 'stolen' in the sense that it is copied by an unau-
thorized user, even though the original data has not been removed
or altered in any way." 136 The Committee found that these enforce-
ment problems could be alleviated by recognizing computerized in-
formation as property. 137
Recognition of the need to classify information as property is
the first step towards protection of the bundle of rights that give
property its value. But that recognition has only begun to creep
into the minds of Justices and Congresspeople. Meanwhile, infor-
mational privacy is threatened by unregulated data merchants.
Therefore, a more ready basis for protection than property law must
be considered.
3. Contract
One of the primary tenets of informational privacy is that per-
sonal information collected for one purpose may not be disclosed
for another purpose without the data subject's consent. The fact
that an individual subscribes to a tennis magazine, for example, is
not an invitation to tennis equipment manufacturers to mail adver-
132. Id. at 25-26. Carpenter also references another Supreme Court case that recognizes
a property right in information, specifically the news: International News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
133. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
134. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
135. S. REP. No. 432, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479.
136. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 134, at 2491.
137. Id. at 2492 ("The Committee intends S.2281 to affirm the government's recognition
of computerized information as property.") The House bill was passed in lieu of the Senate
bill after amending its language to contain much of the text of the Senate bill. Id. at 2479.
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tisements to that individual. The danger is not in the receipt of
unwanted mail. Rather, there is danger in societal acceptance of
the idea that personal information is not subject to the individual's
control. An extreme result of such a system is that total strangers
may become privy to sensitive or (in the case of Rebecca Schaef-
fer)13' dangerous information.
When a consumer provides information in conjunction with a
purchase, there is an implicit contract. In the case of a magazine
subscription, the consumer pays a subscription fee and provides a
mailing address in order to receive a publication. The contract thus
entails an agreement that the consumer's information (her name
and address) will be used for the single purpose of delivering
magazines.
When the publisher sells its subscription list to a third party, it
does so in violation of the subscription "contract," and without the
consent of the subscribers. List purchasers receive not only the sub-
scriber's name and address, but also the information that each per-
son on the list subscribed to a particular publication. This
information can imply the financial position and social habits of the
subscribers.
But even though the sale of mailing lists is common, the con-
sumer is not implicitly consenting to the sale of her address when
she purchases a magazine. Publishers seem to recognize this and
occasionally provide a disclaimer enabling purchasers to be re-
moved from shared mailing lists upon request. 139 While the pres-
ence of such a disclaimer might defeat a breach of contract claim by
implying consent, disclaimers do not comprise actual consent, espe-
cially when hidden in the fine print, or when absent.
There are several reasons why basing an informational privacy
claim on a contract theory could prove difficult. In Shibley v.
Time,1 " the Ohio Court of Appeals found no invasion of privacy
where the subscribers/plaintiffs claimed the publisher's sale of mail-
ing lists amounted to the unconsented sale of individual "personal-
ity profiles," resulting in the publisher's unjust enrichment at the
subscribers' expense. 141
The Shibley opinion provides two significant reasons why any
common law action, including breach of contract, provides a weak
tool for pursuing an informational privacy claim. The primary diffi-
138. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
139. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 60-73.
140. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
141. Id.
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culty for such a claimant is that the right of informational privacy is
not widely recognized.14 2 Without a right to privacy, the right of
consent regarding that privacy is moot. Secondly, the court noted
that "the practice complained of here [the sale of subscription lists]
does not constitute an invasion of privacy even if appellants' unsup-
ported assertion that this amounts to the sale of 'personality
profiles' is taken as true because these profiles are only used to de-
termine what type of advertisement is to be sent."' 43 The court,
therefore, implies that the direct marketer's unauthorized used of
personal data is permissible.
State courts, therefore, provide no help to the individual dam-
aged by unscrupulous or careless data merchants. The actual dam-
age caused to individuals by privacy violations is hard to show in a
courtroom. To argue, as in Shibley, that "personality profiles" are
being appropriated without compensation to the individual sounds
a bit far-fetched. After all, no physical or economic damage is evi-
dent. Most people are not even aware that their personal informa-
tion is being regularly packaged and sold for a profit. Although the
common law provides the theoretical support, at least in the tort
and contract realms, for finding informational privacy rights, courts
can not usurp the legislature's responsibility to write the law neces-
sary to protect informational privacy.
D. Public Policy Basis for Protecting Informational Privacy
Perhaps the most obvious and impressive basis for protecting
personal data is the direct impact which lack of protection has on
people. In the Subcommittee' 44 hearing 145 regarding the DPB
bill, 146 a number of industry practices which impact on individuals
were exposed.147 These practices make clear that our current poli-
142. See id. at 339-40.
143. Id. at 339-40.
144. Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House
Committee on Government Operations.
145. The hearing was held on May 16, 1990.
146. Hearing Record, supra note 1.
147. Representative Wise notes that it costs more to have an unlisted phone number,
thereby causing the consumer to pay for privacy. Id. at 161.
Jerry Saltzgaber, Chief Executive Officer of Citicorp's Point-of-Sale (POS) Information
Services described a far-reaching consumer database. "Citicorp POS maintains control of all
names and addresses of our customers." Id. at 89.
David Czernik, Executive Director of the Louisiana Consumers League, described em-
ployers' information services which provide data about individuals' work and credit histories
to prospective employers. By collecting and selling this information, companies are able to
blacklist workers. Even if individuals are aware that these database records exist, it is very
difficult for them to access their own records, much less correct errors. Id. at 139-160.
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cies, which do not broadly regulate private use of personal data,
place profit ahead of personal self-determination and commercial
freedom before personal privacy rights.
For example, Caller I.D., a service made available through
communications technology, has recently been introduced in New
York State despite its negative impact on consumers.1 48 The service
is already available in 22 states and enables subscribers "to identify
and record the telephone number of an incoming call, and therefore
presumably to determine the callers' identity." '149 Advocates claim
the service can be used to deter annoying calls by, for example, ob-
scene callers. 150 But the more likely users of the service are busi-
nesses which will collect telephone numbers for commercial
purposes, such as the preparation of mailing lists.'
There is no legislation to protect the consumer from the on-
slaught of this technology. Certainly, Feist 52 made clear that a tel-
ephone number itself, especially when publicly available in a
telephone directory, is not protected. But when a woman calls an
abortion clinic, and that fact is captured through a Caller I.D. ser-
vice, her privacy has been violated. There should be a law protect-
ing her informational privacy in such a case.
Although the legal establishment is just beginning to recognize
the doctrinal changes that must occur to adapt to new technologies,
such awareness is in its earliest stage. Perhaps, though, we can note
that there is recognition for the importance of information protec-
tion for the economic health of the United States. Intellectual prop-
erty exports, for example, "are one of the few areas where the
United States enjoys a positive balance of trade."' 53 In this age
when information is a primary asset, when the effective manage-
ment of information is widely recognized as the linchpin to indus-
trial success,' 5 4 there need to be safeguards to protect the rights of
the developers and the possessors of information.
148. Anthony Ramirez, New York State Approves Caller-Identification Service, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1992, at Dl.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991). See supra note 122 and accompanying text for a discussion
of this case.
153. Samuelson, supra note 129, at 397.
154. Charles E. Cantu, Privacy, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 313, 315-16 (1988) (stating
that "the dissemination of information [has become] big business").
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III. WHY THERE IS A NEED FOR BROAD LEGISLATION
PROTECTING INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
A. To Protect Individuals
It is important to recognize that the interests in need of protec-
tion relative to the EC's proposed Directives are not merely those of
consumers, but also those of American businesses and the U.S. na-
tional economy. These interests are interdependent. Although leg-
islation which specifically protects personal data in the private
sector may appear to favor consumer interests, it would effectively
protect business and national interests as well.
At this point, however, developing technologies appear to be
rapidly reducing the power of the individual relative to large organi-
zations. The ability of credit card companies, for example, to iden-
tify a cardholder's whereabouts at specific times as on-line card
verification occurs 155 clearly demonstrates that the surveillance and
intrusive abilities of the private sector are beyond the self-protective
abilities of most consumers. The failure of Congress to establish
enforceable rights for personal data protection subjects the most in-
timate aspects of our personal lives to commercial sale. We need to
strike the "delicate balance," as described by the Privacy Protection
Study Commission"5 6 in 1977, between industry's right to access
and trade in information and the individual's right to maintain con-
fidentiality in and control over her personal records. 157
Despite agreement that there is a "need" for this legislation,
Congress has been reluctant to broadly protect 15 8 privacy rights in
this regard. As noted in the Senate Report on the bill preceding the
Privacy Act of 1974: 59
[T]he Committee 160 was persuaded to delay a decision on total
application [of privacy protection legislation to the private sec-
155. See John Markoff, American Express Goes High.Tech, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1988,
§ 3, at 1, 6.
156. The Commission was created by the Privacy Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5,
88 Stat. 1896, 1905 (1974). The Commission ceased to exist on September 30, 1977. Pub. L.
No. 95-38, 91 Stat. 179 (1977).
157. See THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT ON PERSONAL PRI-
VACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 5-6 (1977).
158. As noted earlier, narrow legislation to protect personal data in the private sector
has been enacted. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. For example, The Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988 § 2(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988), protects videotape rental
data.
159. S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916
[hereinafter Privacy Act Legislative History].
160. The Government Operations Committee, authors of the Senate Report on S. 3418
which was passed as P.L. 93-579, the Privacy Act of 1974.
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tor] by considerations of time and investigative resources for de-
veloping a full hearing record and for drafting the needed
complex legislative solution for information abuses in the private
sector .... 161
.T. [T]he decision to authorize.. . a study [on the data
banks, automated data processing programs, and information
systems of the private sector as well as of regional and other gov-
ernmental agencies] is based on the Committee deferral at this
time of legislation for abuses of privacy, due process, and confi-
dentiality in the private sector, a need particularly urgent with
the growth of national data banks, application of computer tech-
nology, and use of new information management practices.
1 62
Acting on the advice of industry lobbyists, Congress has
avoided imposing regulations on businesses that will protect the
consumer, in favor of protecting business.
The Committee has been advised by representatives of the
Direct Mail Marketing Association and by numerous prominent
direct mailers that this practice [of allowing consumers to re-
quest list merchants remove their names from mailing lists] cre-
ates more profitable lists by allowing for the removal of names of
individuals who are unlikely to purchase goods or services from
the soliciting organization.
The purpose of this provision is to extend this practice to all
organizations and to expand the protection to all individuals. It is
consistent with the best practice in American industry and with
the programs and standards of the Association representing
those companies with direct interest in this problem.
The Committee believes such a requirement is a simple and
fair one which will not necessitate a revision of private business
procedures.'63
Where lists are maintained by private companies, the Committee
believes that the decision as to who should be allowed to rent or
buy them is a decision best left up to each individual business-' 64
Although the Senate Report suggests an intention to protect
individuals, lack of regulation actually frees businesses to manipu-
late personal data at will. This practice can be dangerous for the
individual, as also acknowledged in the Senate report:
Mailing lists constitute such personal information when, for ex-
161. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6934 (emphasis supplied).
162. Id. at 6954 (emphasis supplied).
163. Id. at 6947 (emphasis supplied).
164. Id..
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ample, they represent a group of individuals possessing a certain
set of characteristics. The disclosure of this personal information
can be damaging to the individual.1 6 1
If it is true, as the Committee believed, "that the decision... is
best left up to each individual business," 166 it is counterintuitive to
regulate particular businesses as privacy threats arise, which is ex-
actly what Congress has done by regulating the videotape retail-
ing," cable television16 8 and credit reporting industries. 1
69
This piece-meal approach to personal data protection makes it
impossible for an individual to know her privacy rights. In the
present legislative scheme, the individual cannot be assured that a
given industry is required by law to protect the data she provides.
If, for example, one orders videotapes from a mail-order service,
one's records would be protected from disclosure.'70 But there is
no legislative protection for information provided for the mail-order
purchase of lingerie. Such data is exposed to unrestricted
exploitation.
The current lack of a single standard of protection not only
prevents the individual from effectively protecting herself, but pre-
vents effective monitoring by a Data Protection Board. Enforcing
the current legal scheme would require a DPB to oversee only those
select industries (e.g., videotape retailing and credit reporting) that
are regulated. The majority of businesses remain free to trade in
personal data and free of the proposed DPB's oversight.
In 1974, Congress passed comprehensive legislation to protect
personal data stored by federal agencies, thereby setting a precedent
for a comprehensive private sector law. The central concern of the
Privacy Act of 1974171 "was that information obtained for one pur-
pose may not be used for a different purpose without the individ-
ual's consent."' 17
2
Ironically, though, "the Act allowed disclosure of records for
165. Id. at 6946 (emphasis supplied).
166. Id. at 6947.
167. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 § 2(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).
168. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 §§ 601-39, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (1988).
169. The Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 601-22, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
172. S. REP. No. 599, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1,
4342-2 [hereinafter Video Privacy Protection Act Legislative History]. The Privacy Act "es-
tablishes certain minimum information-gathering standards for all agencies to protect the
privacy and due process rights of the individual and to assure that surrender of personal
information is made with informed consent.... Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note
160, at 6917 (emphasis supplied); see also supra note 6.
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'routine uses' 17 3 compatible with the purposes for which the records
were collected."174 Subsequent broad interpretations of this clause
have undercut the very privacy protections embodied in the Act. 175
The legislative and subsequent history of the Privacy Act of
1974 also make it clear that an enforcement mechanism must be
included with the protective measures in order to adequately pro-
tect personal data. Although the Senate Report on the Privacy Act
of 1974 indicated that a Privacy Protection Commission would be
created to enforce the Act,176 by the time of its passage, the com-
promised bill did not provide for a Commission. As a result, the
Privacy Act,
in comparison to data protection legislation in other countries
... is relatively meaningless .... The reason is there is nobody
in charge of the Privacy Act. There is a small group of people in
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs at OMB who
are supposed to do something to make the Privacy Act meaning-
ful .... [T]hey can't even generate annual reports on implemen-
tation of the Privacy Act, never mind go about auditing or
encouraging compliance or receiving complaints from
individuals. 177
At the 1983 Subcommittee hearings on the Privacy Act of
1974, the testimony by nongovernment witnesses was highly critical
of the implementation of the Privacy Act by federal agencies.17 1
Ronald Plesser, former general counsel to the Privacy Protection
Study Commission, 179 noted that the Act " 'is overly complex, over
bureaucratic, and contains really no effective enforcement mecha-
nism. It has become almost totally unavailable to most citizens be-
cause of the cumbersome and frustrating nature of its enforcement
remedies.' ,,lO
Although the Privacy Act of 1974 does provide for civil reme-
dies whenever any government agency fails to comply with the
173. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
174. Video Privacy Protection Act Legislative History, supra note 173, at 4342-2.
175. Id.
176. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6918.
177. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 79 (testimony of David H. Flaherty, Professor of
History and Law, University of Western Ontario, author of PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SUR-
VEILLANCE SocIETIES (1989)).
178. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 24.
179. The Study Commission was created by the Privacy Act of 1974 to make a "study of
the data banks, automated data processing programs, and information systems of governmen-
tal, regional, and private organizations, in order to determine the standards and procedures in
force for the protection of personal information .. " Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Stat. 1896,
1906 (1974).
180. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 24.
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Act,18 1 without a body like the Privacy Protection Commission or
Data Protection Board charged with enforcing the regulations and
without agency management prioritizing the issue, federal agencies
express little concern for the privacy interests of those who need
protection. As Professor Flaherty described:
The busy individuals in administrative agencies are already over-
worked. Moreover, those persons working on welfare issues, for
example, remain more concerned about achieving surveillance of
target populations than protecting anyone's privacy. Although
there are coordinators for the Privacy Act in each federal agency,
their role has been very limited.18 2
As Representative Wise has proposed the DPB, it will not be
authorized to investigate private sector violations, nor may it regu-
late the private sector. Rather, the DPB may:
investigate compliance with [the Privacy Act of 1974], and re-
port on any violation of any provision thereof.., to an agency,
the President, the Attorney General, and the Congress.183
The problem with this enforcement provision is that the Pri-
vacy Act of 1974 applies only to personal data within the control of
federal agencies. It does not apply to private companies which store
personal information.
Furthermore, Rep. Wise intends the DPB to be "a resource, a
consultant, a watchdog, and a facilitator... [, but not a] regula-
tor." 8 4 His reasoning stems from concern over heavily bureau-
cratic European registration requirements for databases containing
personal data.1 8 5 For example, the European Commission's pro-
posed Directive to protect personal data'8 6 requires Member States
to provide for a public register of public sector files' 87 and private
sector files'8 8 where the personal data are likely to be circulated
between the Member States. In the early years of the British Data
Protection Act of 1984, "the data protection registrar had 292 bags
of unopened mail which were simply registrations.., they happen
to have 100 staff to open the mail bags."'8 9
However, fears of an unwieldy database registration scheme in
181. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1988).
182. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 23-24.
183. H.R. 685, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., § 2(c)(2)(B) (1991).
184. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H756.
185. Id.
186. Draft Directive, supra note 41.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id. at 7.
189. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 8.
458 [Vol. 9
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
the U.S. are unfounded. The draft Directive will not require the
U.S. to register databases. Consistent with the purpose behind the
Privacy Act of 1974,190 draft Directive principles require that data
not be processed without the consent of the individual, except in
specific circumstances.1 91 Although Member States will be required
to provide for database registration, "third countries"19 like the
U.S. will not be held to such rigid standards. Rather, a third coun-
try will be required to "ensure an adequate level of protection," de-
monstrable by "the international commitments it has entered into
or... its domestic law." 193  Such a domestic law would likely be
acceptable if it is consistent with the principle of acquiring the indi-
vidual's consent to process personal data.
At present, though, the U.S. has no private sector analog to the
Privacy Act of 1974. Without a comprehensive private sector pri-
vacy law to enforce, or the ability to regulate the private sector, the
DPB's ability to "serve the interests of consumers, of government,
and of business"' 194 will be extremely limited. In addition, the ab-
sence of such private sector regulations will not satisfy the reciproc-
ity requirements of the draft EC Directive.
Similarly, courts cannot be expected to enable consumers to
protect themselves without legislation defining the unauthorized
disclosure of personal data as a privacy invasion. Although Con-
gress has recognized that "[t]he disclosure of... personal informa-
tion can be damaging to the individual,"1 95 courts have not reached
similar conclusions. The Ohio Court of Appeals, for example, holds
190. See supra note 173.
191. Draft Directive, supra note 41, at 7. Article 8 provides that:
1. The Member States shall provide in their law that, without the con-
sent of the data subject, the recording in a file and any other processing of
personal data shall be lawful only if it is effected in accordance with this Direc-
tive and if:
(a) the processing is carried out under a contract, or in the context of a quasi-
contractual relationship of trust, with the data subject and is necessary for
its discharge; or
(b) the data come from sources generally accessible to the public and their
processing is intended solely for correspondence purposes; or
(c) the controller of the file is pursuing a legitimate interest, on condition that
the interest of the data subject does not prevail.
Id.
192. The draft Directive distinguishes between Member States (of which there are twelve
in the European Economic Community (EC): Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and
third countries. See Draft Directive, supra note 41, at 6, 10.
193. Id. at 10.
194. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 3.
195. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6946.
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that "[w]hen a magazine publisher sells subscription lists to direct
mail advertisers without the consent of the individual subscribers he
does not violate the subscribers' rights of privacy." '19 6
Furthermore, courts are a forum for compensating perceived
damage. The mailing list business, which comprises only one seg-
ment of industry which uses personal data, "exists largely without
the knowledge of the people who are providing the profit, the people
whose names and personal data keep this wheel turning."' 97 In ad-
dressing individual grievances, courts are not equipped to address
industry-wide violations of privacy rights. Whereas a data protec-
tion agency, specifically focused on investigating privacy abuses, ad-
vising government and private organizations, and enforcing privacy
legislation, can protect the individual without her needing to be
aware of the virtually invisible violation of her privacy rights.
Industry spokespeople argue that broad legislation protecting
personal data is unnecessary because industrial self-regulatory prac-
tices are sufficient to protect consumers." 8 This is simply untrue.
As described by Richard A. Barton, the Direct Marketing Associa-
tion's (DMA) Senior Vice President for Government Affairs, the
Association's "flagship program" is the Mail Preference Service,
which consists of a list of people who have requested that they not
receive direct marketing solicitations (aka junk mail).199 In DMA
parlance, the people on this list have executed their "negative op-
tion."2" But even Congress recognizes that "only some people
know about this service, and the distribution of information
through lists is so widespread that people who do manage to get off
lists through such a service, have no way of controlling what all the
other companies do."201 Furthermore, the very focus of the Associ-
ation, which is to "give the public every opportunity [to] get off
mailing lists,"202 is self-serving. The focus of consumer privacy pro-
tection should be that of the Privacy Act of 1974: "information ob-
tained for one purpose may not be used for a different purpose
without the individual's consent."20 3 Consumers are not merely
196. Shibley v. Time, 341 N.E.2d 337, 338 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
197. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6947 (statement of Senator
Hatfield).
198. See Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 44.
199. Id.
200. Nicholas di Talamo, Private Secrets; European Community Proposals for Data Pro-
tection, DIRECT MARKETING MAG., Vol. 53, April 1991, at 42, 43.
201. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6947.
202. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 44 (statement of Richard A. Barton, Senior Vice
President, Government Affairs, Direct Marketing Association)
203. Video Privacy Protection Act Legislative History, supra note 173, at 4342-2.
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concerned with removing names from mailing lists, or receiving less
junk mail. The concern is that people should be able to control how
and where their personal information is used.
It should not be the consumer's responsibility to remove her
name from a list, but rather, it should be industry's obligation to ask
the consumer's permission to use her name. The consumer should
not be required to execute a "negative option" to stop unwanted
mailings, or other use of personal data. Rather the business should
be required to acquire a "positive option" from the consumer per-
mitting access to and profit from that individual's name, address,
consumer habits, and an infinite variety of other collectable per-
sonal information. 2" Unless the individual explicitly provided her
name and address for inclusion on a mailing list and her consent for
its sale, disclosure of her information would constitute a breach of
the implicit contract she agreed to when providing the data for its
initial purpose.
Another important function that private sector privacy legisla-
tion would serve, then, is to codify the kind of principles and poli-
cies which need to be observed to protect privacy and ensure that
business standards are clear. An example of these principles and
policies is the "Code of Fair Information Practice." A report done
by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare recommended the enactment of a Federal Code such as this
for all automated personal data systems.205 The Code involves five
principles:
1. There must be no personal data record-keeping whose very
existence is secret.
2. There must be a way for a person to find out what informa-
tion about him is in a record and how it is being used.
3. There must be a way for a person to prevent information
about himself that was obtained for one purpose from being
used or made available for other purposes without his
consent.
4. There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about himself.
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or dissemi-
nating records of identifiable personal data must assure the
reliability of the data for their intended use and must take
precautions to prevent misuses of the data.2 ° 6
204. See di Talamo, supra note 201, at 43.
205. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6923.
206. Id. at 6924.
1993]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAWJOURNAL
Another industrial self-regulatory practice, one which does
seek to integrate the above principles, is termed the "consensual
database."20 7 As defined by Equifax, "[t]his is a list of people who
have expressed consent to be listed and who also offer information
that will be used to target them for different categories of mail."20
Although Equifax's recently instituted consensual program (called
Buyer's Market) satisfies privacy concerns that data not be used for
purposes other than for which it was provided, it is marketed to
consumers as a for-profit service.2"9 While Equifax is clearly seek-
ing to comply with pro-privacy legislation and address the con-
sumer hostility evidenced by the protests over its Marketplace
venture with Lotus,210 it "will profit handsomely if it can charge a
premium for its mailing list," and benefits further by charging con-
sumers a $15 fee to participate in Buyer's Market.211
Thus Equifax is able to charge consumers for their right to pri-
vacy due to the lack of legislative consumer protections.212 Consen-
sual databases appear to satisfy privacy concerns, but they must be
compulsory across the private sector and must guarantee the right
to privacy principles to protect against damaging business
practices.213
B. To Serve Business Interests
Broad private sector privacy legislation would protect busi-
nesses from financial loss and legal liability by providing guidance
in developing policies and procedures for handling personal data.
The destruction of Equifax's joint production plans (and associated
financial loss) for the Marketplace product 214 is only the most re-
cent example of what can happen when companies are not put on
notice of the privacy standards to which they must conform.
The Marketplace disaster is instructive because it demonstrates
an intensifying climate of hostility toward marketers who violate
207. Mark D. Uehling, Here Comes the Perfect Mailing List, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Aug.
1991, at 10.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Sullum, supra note 20, at 29.
211. Uehling, supra note 208, at 10.
212. Similarly, Representative Wise notes that it costs more to have an unlisted phone
number, thereby causing the consumer to pay for privacy. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at
161.
213. Congress noted the importance of such "negative options" in statements relative to
the Video Privacy Protection Act. See 134 CONG. REC. H10411 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988)
(statement of Mr. Moorehead).
214. Sullum, supra note 20, at 29.
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consumer privacy. According to a survey sponsored by Equifax,
seventy-six percent of the public feel that the sale of information
about income, home ownership and credit history to direct-mail
companies is "unacceptable." '15 Rising criticism from Congress,
state attorneys general and from consumer and privacy advocates
has motivated TRW to offer free credit reports as a "salve for con-
sumers' fears." '16 This growing sense of violation by consumers,
also recognized by Representative Wise in his remarks introducing
the DPB bill, 17 suggests a potential for consumer legal action
against companies perceived to be violating privacy rights. Such
liability can be protected against if the private sector moves to pro-
tect consumer data from unauthorized disclosure. Legislation
which compels such protection would thereby also protect busi-
nesses from liability.
Another cost-saving, and liability-avoiding benefit of establish-
ing standard privacy protections is to ensure that businesses can in-
vest with the security and knowledge that they are complying with
legal requirements. A broad privacy law would release the private
sector from carrying the cost of conforming to patch-work legisla-
tion and varying judicial standards of privacy. In the absence of
such a standard, technologies appear to be changing the traditional
legal definitions of trespass, property, and privacy faster than the
government's ability to keep pace. When basic definitional ground
rules shift, this threatens the stability on which sound business deci-
sions are based.
The current rapid evolution of technology makes it inevitable
that new threats to privacy will continue to arise. Therefore, a
broad standard of privacy protection is essential to ensure individ-
ual rights, as well as those of business. Justice Brennan noted that:
[the] [d]evelopment of... computers and other sophisticated in-
struments have accelerated the ability of government to intrude
into areas which a person normally chooses to exclude from pry-
ing eyes and inquisitive minds. Consequently judicial interpreta-
215. Uehling, supra note 208, at 12.
216. Peter Kerr, Big Credit Bureau to Let Consumers see Reports Free, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 1991, Al. The article notes that "critics have charged that [TRW, the Trans Union
Corporation and Equifax Inc.] maintain credit histories riddled with mistakes, sell private
data to companies that send out 'junk mail' and make it easy for practically anyone to pull up
confidential reports." Id.
217. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H755. ("Americans are
greatly concerned about threats to their personal privacy resulting from the increased use of
computers to collect, maintain, and manipulate personal information. Seven of ten Ameri-
cans agree that consumers have lost control over how personal information about them is
circulated and used by companies.")
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tions of the reach of the constitutional protection of individual
privacy must keep pace with the perils created by these new
devices. 218
Similarly, legislative clarification of the privacy parameters to
which businesses must adhere will not only protect the consumer,
but also the businesses which will be on notice of the rights which
government will protect.
Marketing industry lobbyists are predictably opposed to the
idea of personal data protection. Critics of the European Commis-
sion's proposed Data Protection Directives claim that if imposed,
the legislation could "leave Europe's electronic sales and marketing
machines crippled by legislative arthritis. '219
But data protection needn't mean governmental registration.2
It is, however, undeniable that data protection would require busi-
nesses to make significant modifications in their information-han-
dling practices.221 The costs for such modifications are difficult to
determine. Although Equifax will spend $10 million to create a
consensual database including roughly a quarter of the 80 million
people in its files,222 costs can also be saved when direct marketers
target their efforts (via consensual databases, for example) directly
to receptive consumers. By polling their listees regularly, marketers
can purge uninterested people from their computers, and save mail
production and postage costs. 223
Therein is the rationale for enforcement by the DPB of private
sector privacy legislation. The degree of behavior change required
to be made by businesses to protect individual liberties and personal
privacy is not likely unless compelled by legislation and administra-
tive oversight. Despite the arguments of industry spokespeople like
Citicorp's Jerry Saltzgaber that it is in marketers' self-interest to
protect consumer privacy,224 companies have an obligation to
stockholders to make money. Protecting privacy is expensive and
that cost deters innovation.
C. To Serve the United States' Interests
U.S. businesses will benefit from U.S. privacy legislation which
218. U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451-452 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219. Louella Miles, Feeling the Draft; European Community's Data Protection Directive
Data Protection, MARKETING, May 30, 1991, at 16.
220. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
221. See Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 35 (testimony of Professor David H. Flaherty).
222. Uehling, supra note 208, at 10.
223. Id.
224. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 88.
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ensures freedom to do business after 1992 throughout the single Eu-
ropean market. The reciprocal legislation requirements of the EC's
proposed Directive will effectively lock U.S. industries out of busi-
ness opportunities if adequate U.S. legislation is not in place. Par-
ticularly in dealing with international concerns, a data protection
board ought to have jurisdiction over private sector information
practices. Private companies transfer an enormous amount of per-
sonal data across international borders every day.225 The U.S.
economy can ill afford to have that pipeline constricted.
Such U.S. data protection legislation, enacted in tandem with a
provision for a privacy enforcement body, will also protect the in-
terests of U.S. businesses by providing for representation in interna-
tional forums where the international impact of privacy issues are
discussed. Although large U.S. corporations can represent their
own interests abroad, the concerns of smaller companies and indi-
viduals are currently not expressed in international privacy forums.
While other countries have set up independent government agencies
to represent domestic privacy,226 the U.S. has no such governmental
body. The DPB would serve the purpose of fostering all U.S. pri-
vacy interests, including those of all businesses, all citizens and the
U.S. Government.227
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The European Commission's proposed Directive 228 provides,
inter alia, comprehensive provisions for private sector protection of
personal data. The following proposed legislative text is a modifica-
tion of pertinent sections of the Directive. Adoption of legislation
modeled on the Directive's principles would not only protect per-
sonal and business interests, but would also satisfy the Directive's
Article 24 requirement for "adequate" reciprocal legislation.
A. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Private Sector Privacy Act"
(hereinafter the "Act").
225. Taking data relating to air travel as an example, some 27,000 messages are involved
in the passenger reservation process for a single 747 flight. Similarly, American Express
processes authorizations of a quarter million credit card transactions and for over $10 billion
in banking transactions daily. Christopher Millard, Data Protection and Privacy Considera-
tions in Transnational Distribution: A European Perspective, THE COMPUTER LAw ASS'N
BULL., Vol. 6, No. 1, 1991, at 17 n.l.
226. See Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 2.
227. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 76.
228. Draft Directive, supra note 41.
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B. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Act:
1. "Individual" means a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence;
2. "Personal Data" means any information relating to an iden-
tified or identifiable individual;
3. "Data Subject" means the individual(s) described by or re-
lating to personal data;
4. "Personal Data File" (file) means any set of personal data,
whether centralized or geographically dispersed, undergoing
automated processing or which, although not undergoing
processing, are structured and accessible in an organized col-
lection according to specific criteria in such a way as to facil-
itate their use or combination;
5. "Processing" means the following operations, whether or not
performed by automated means: the recording, storage, col-
lection or combination of data, and its alteration, use or
communication, including transmission, dissemination, re-
trieval, blocking and erasure;
6. "Private Sector Personal Data Processor" (PDP) means any
natural or legal person or association, including non-profit
and for-profit companies, corporations, organizations and
entities in so far as they carry on an industrial, commercial,
social, civic, political, philosophical, religious, cultural, trade
union, sporting or leisure activity who engages in processing
of personal data;
7. "Data Protection Board" (DPB) means the independent
public authority proposed in HR 685 and further empow-
ered as follows:
a. The DPB shall monitor the application of the national
measures taken pursuant to this Act and perform all the
functions that are entrusted to it by this Act.
b. The DPB shall have investigative powers and effective
powers of intervention against the creation and exploita-
tion of files which do not conform with this Act. To that
end, it shall have, inter alia the power to gather all the
information necessary for the performance of its supervi-
sory duties.
c. Complaints in connection with the protection of individ-
uals in relation to personal data may be lodged with the
DPB by any individual.
C. NON-DISCLOSURE PRINCIPLES
1. Without the consent of the data subject, the recording in a
file and any other private sector processing of personal data
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shall be lawful only if it is effected in accordance with this
Act and if:
a. the processing is carried out under a contract, or in the
context of a quasi-contractual relationship of trust, with
the data subject and is necessary for its discharge; or
b. the data comes from sources generally accessible to the
public and their processing is intended solely for corre-
spondence purposes.
2. No PDP shall disclose any personal information which
is contained in a file by any means of communication to
any person, or private or public entity, except pursuant
to a written request by, or with the prior written consent
of the data subject, unless disclosure of the file would be.
required for reasons relating to:
a. national security; or
b. public safety.
D. INFORMED CONSENT
1. Any giving of consent by a data subject to the processing of
personal data relating to that data subject within the mean-
ing of this Act shall be valid only if:
a. the data subject is supplied with the following
information:
i. the purposes of the file and the types of data stored;
ii. the type of use and the recipients of the personal
data contained in the file; and
iii. the name and address of the PDP;
b. it is specific and express and specifies the types of data,
forms of processing and potential recipients covered by
it; and
c. it may be withdrawn by the data subject at any time
without retroactive effect.
E. RIGHTS OF DATA SUBJECTS
1. Data subjects shall be granted the following rights:
a. To oppose, and, for legitimate reasons, cause the cessa-
tion of the processing of personal data relating to the
data subjects.
b. To know of the existence of a file and to know its pur-
poses and the identity and place of business of all PDP's
with access to that file.
c. To obtain at reasonable intervals, and without excessive
delay or expense, confirmation of whether personal data
relating to data subjects are stored in a file, and commu-
nication to him of such data in an intelligible form.
d. To obtain correction, or erasure, of such data, or block-
ing of access to particular PDPs of such data.
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e. To bring a civil action against the PDP if the rights guar-
anteed in this Act are infringed. Any individual whose
personal data has been stored in a file and who suffers
damage as a result of processing or of any act incompati-
ble with this Act shall be entitled to compensation from
the PDP.
F. RESPONSIBILITIES OF PDP's
1. Every PDP must assure the reliability of the personal data
held in its files by periodic disclosure to and approval of the
data by the data subjects.
2. Every PDP shall take appropriate technical and organiza-
tional measures to protect personal data stored in a file or
communicated in any way against accidental or unauthor-
ized or unconsented to destruction, or accidental loss and
against unauthorized access, modification or other
processing.
V. CONCLUSION
In certain hands, personal information can prevent an individ-
ual from securing employment or health insurance or from protect-
ing herself from a murderer. Perhaps the greatest danger we face
by failing to protect informational privacy is the unreversable weak-
ening of that privacy. By the time the majority recognizes how far
technology and commercial interests have intruded on the individ-
ual, it may be too late to reclaim her privacy. To prevent such a
threat, there is only one viable choice for government to make.
Congress must regulate the behavior of data collectors, and thereby
prevent discrimination against the subjects of personal data files.
The alternate, dangerous choices for dealing with the personal
data issue are either to maintain the status quo, that is to allow
those with the resources to collect and store data to profit from and
intrude on the privacy of people, or to ban the collection of poten-
tially threatening data altogether. This article has sought to illumi-
nate why regulation of private sector use of personal data is
essential to protect against damage to people, and the national
economy.
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LEGISLATIVE UPDATE-
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOFTWARE
PROTECTION IN CHINA:
THE COMPUTER SOFTWARE
PROTECTION REGULATIONS
Henry Hong Liut
This article examines the background and major contents of
the Chinese Regulations on Computer Software Protection, as well
as software administration in China.'
I. BACKGROUND
In the early 1980's, issues regarding whether and how com-
puter software should be protected were vigorously debated in
China. These discussions arose from the Chinese government's in-
decision regarding whether to provide this protection through the
patent or copyright laws, or whether to enact separate regulations.
Patent protection was deemed inadequate, as computer
software was not specifically protected under the Patent Law of
1984,2 nor the amended Patent Law of 1991. Indeed, the text of the
Patent Law implies that computer software is denied protection
under the Patent Law as "rules and methods of mental activities."3
As patent protection appeared to exclude software, the Chinese
Copyright 0 1993 by Henry Hong Liu.
t Mr. Liu received his legal and business education at a number of institutions includ-
ing Bejing University, Harvard and Stanford Law Schools. In addition to his business and
legal practice which focuses on China and Pacific Rim countries, Mr. Liu writes extensively
in the fields of international business law, technology transfers, and legal and business issues
between China and the United States.
1. The Regulations on Computer Software Protection of 1991 promulgated by the
State Council (hereinafter Regulations) were promulgated on June 4, 1991 and took effect on
October 1, 1991. These Regulations contain 40 articles. See Appendix for English text of
articles.
The Ministry of Machine-building and Electronics Industry (hereinafter, Ministry of M
& E or Ministry) is responsible for the registration and administration of software copyright
nationwide. The Ministry formulated and published the specific procedures for software re-
gistration; the Software Registration Center was established to fulfill this obligation.
2. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (1984). For an English translation,
see Hong Liu & Jun Wei, Technology Transfer to China: The Patent System, 5 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 363, 386-98 (1989) (hereinafter PRC Patent Law).
3. PRC Patent Law, supra note 2, at 390.
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government attempted to include protection for computer software
through the Copyright Law. This effort was abandoned primarily
due to the belief that the protection would be less effective and more
impractical than originally thought.4 Ultimately, the Chinese gov-
ernment's decision to enact separate regulations to protect software
lead to the enactment of the Computer Software Protection Regula-
tions in 1991. Until this time, computer software was protected in
China only through contractual non-disclosure provisions.5
China is not alone in providing special treatment for computer
software in its intellectual property law. The Model Provisions on
the Protection of Computer Software proposed by WIPO in 1978
advocate the formulation of new, independent laws and regulations
midway between patent and copyright law to protect computer
software.6 Some countries have enacted completely separate legisla-
tion, while others have created special sections in their copyright
law.
For example, Korea7 and Brazil' formulated separate regula-
tions on software, outside of the mode of protection provided by
their copyright laws.
In France, the French Author's Right Law of 1985,1 places
computer software in a class by itself located after "Neighboring
Rights" and far away from literary and artistic works in general.
Protection for this special class is limited to a term of 25 years and
may not be extended. Although France has long been known for its
protection of authors' rights, the law provides that the initial owner
of rights in a work under this special class need not be the author,
but may be the author's employer.
The Spanish Intellectual Property Law of 198710 follows the
4. The Chinese were persuaded by arguments similar to those set forth in the U.S.
decision in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987), which suggested that, unlike patents, copyright law
does not protect the novelty and content of a work, but rather the manner in which the work
is expressed.
5. Liu & Wei, supra note 3.
6. The Model Provisions suggest a three-point definition of computer software: com-
puter program, program description and supporting material. The exclusive rights include
the right to keep secret, the right to copy and the right to use.
7. South Korea Computer Program Law, Law No. 3920 (1986).
8. Brazil Law No. 7646 (1987). See Brazil, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW PRAC-
TICE, § 2[d][iii] (Nimmer & Geller eds., 1992) (hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
LAW).
9. France Law No. 85-660, 1985 J.0. 7495.
10. Ley de Propiedad Intelectual (1987). See Spain, 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
LAW, supra note 7. Computer Software Protection is found in Title VII of Part I of the Act
from articles 96-100.
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French practice by isolating software from works in general. Pro-
tection for software is included within a separate section. In this
section, the previously abolished registration systems are restored.
It also provides that the principle of "fair dealing," applicable to
works in general, is applicable to software. However, the provision
regarding reproduction for personal use is not applicable to
software.
The 1988 Copyright Act of the United Kingdom,11 though list-
ing computer programs side by side with works in general, provides
different definitions applicable only to programs. Also, in the provi-
sions which deal with moral rights, authors of works such as com-
puter programs are not provided the same rights enjoyed by authors
of literary and artistic works in general.
Under the Copyright Law of Japan (as revised after 1985),12
article 47, section 2 is a special, separately inserted provision appli-
cable to computer programs. Like many countries, Japan also pro-
vides optional registration for computer programs.
When the United States listed computer programs among the
objects of copyright in 1980, section 11713 was specifically added to
provide limitations on rights applicable only to computer programs.
The European Community Directive of May 14, 199114 on
computer software protection, provides that as of January 1993 all
computer software within the boundaries of the European Commu-
nity will enjoy the same copyright protection as that enjoyed by
literary works, the term of protection being 50 years.
Thus, enactment of the Computer Software Protection Regula-
tions (Regulations) places China in a position which is very similar
to that of other countries with respect to recognition of the need for
legislation to protect software. Importantly, the Regulations are
supplementary to the Copyright Law, as article 53 of the Copyright
Law stipulates that "[r]egulations for the protection of computer
software shall be formulated separately by the State Council."' 15
II. SOFTWARE PROTECTION AS A SUPPLEMENT TO COPYRIGHT
LAW
Software is expressly included under Chinese Copyright Law,
which protects "works of literature, art, natural science, social sci-
11. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, § 3(1) (Eng.).
12. Copyright Law of Japan, reprinted in 2 Japan Bus. L. (CCH Int'l) 60-120 (1993).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
14. Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. (1,122).
15. Copyright Law of 1990, art. 53.
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ence, engineering and technology, etc., which are expressed in the
following forms:... Computer Software."16
Because of the many similarities between traditional copyrights
and software protection, there are several important reasons for in-
corporating software within the protection provided by copyright.
A. Similarities Between Copyright Protection and Software
Protection.
First, software is similar to a written work. A piece of com-
puter software is a coded sequence of logical procedures which may
be expressed by numerals, words and/or symbols. In a manner
analogous to traditional written works, the mode of software ex-
pression (i.e., the coded representation) may be fixed on such physi-
cal carriers as paper, magnetic disks and magnetic tapes.
The mode of expression of a program fixed on a carrier may be
easily copied. As with literary works, this copying of the program's
mode of expression is precisely the principal means of infringing the
interests of the owner of the rights to the program. Therefore, it is
reasonable to list computer software as a class of works within the
protection of Copyright Law.
Second, the principles of copyright law give protection to the
reasonable rights and interests of the authors, so that they are en-
couraged to publish their works, thereby allowing society to benefit
from them. To this end, the work already created should be pro-
tected for a certain period of time against reproduction, plagiarism,
alteration, dissemination, and distribution of reproductions of such
works without the copyright owner's authorization.
On the other hand, the scope of the protection should be con-
fined to the expression of a work, not the ideas and concepts con-
tained within the work. Thus, copyright law should not restrain
anyone from giving play to the intelligence and wisdom which re-
sults in newer, more complete expressions of the idea, concept or
theme of the work of another person. Because progress and innova-
tion are encouraged through the cumulative efforts of many, society
is benefitted by these new expressions.
The Regulations follow these principles. As with copyright,
originality is important. The Regulations provide that "software
being protected under these regulations must be developed indepen-
dently by the developers and borne by physical objects."17 The sub-
16. Id. art. 3.
17. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 5.
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ject matter of software is also limited to certain types of protectable
expression. In a manner somewhat similar to the provisions of U.S.
laws regarding software protection, under the Regulations, protec-
tion "cannot be extended to cover the ideas, concepts, discoveries,
theories, algorithms, processing and operating methods used in
software development."18
Article 10 provides that under ordinary circumstances, the
copyright of a piece of software is owned by the software devel-
oper. Article 9 of the Regulations enumerates the rights enjoyed
by software copyright owners, including: (1) the right of making
public; (2) the right of the developer's authorship; (3) the right of
exploiting the software (e.g., by copying, display, distribution, revi-
sion, translation, and annotation); (4) the right to authorize use of
the software by others and receive renumeration therefor; and (5)
the right of assigning these rights.20
B. Differences Between Copyright Protection and Software
Protection.
Although there are many similarities, there are also several im-
portant differences between copyright protection and software pro-
tection. First, computer software has a series of features which are
not shared with literary works. The most fundamental of these
characteristics is that a piece of computer software, unlike a literary
work, is also expressed as an electric impulse sequence capable of
driving computer hardware to accomplish a certain task. Software
is a practical tool at the user's disposal which may be put directly to
functional use. We may say that its capability for direct, functional
uses is precisely the reason for its being. Literary works, on the
other hand, can only present ideas, viewpoints, methods, or knowl-
edge to those who then may use these ideas, viewpoints, methods or
knowledge presented. But, unlike software, these literary works
cannot themselves be put to direct, functional use.
Also, software development is often an industrial production
activity which is conducted by an organized, cooperative group of
people operating in accord with certain technical standards. There-
fore, software is a type of industrial product. Although the repro-
duction process of literary works may be an industrial production
activity engaged in by a collective (e.g., the printing and publishing
18. Id. art. 7.
19. Id. art. 10.
20. Id. art. 9.
19931
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4W JOURNAL
of books), the creative process of literary works involves personal
activity and certainly is not an "industrial production activity."
Prior to the software development and production, these
unique features had not been encountered in issues surrounding
protection of traditional works grounded in copyright. In adopting
copyright law to protect computer software, various aspects, such
as the provisions for the objects of protection, the contents and sub-
jects of rights, etc., must necessarily involve resolution of these in-
compatibilities. Essential adjustments must be made in certain
traditional clauses within the copyright law in order to meet the
needs of software copyright protection.
The Regulations take into consideration the differences be-
tween software and works traditionally protected by copyright. For
example, in the protection of objects, the Regulations stipulate that
computer programs include source programs and object programs.
Under the Regulations, the source text and object text of the same
program are deemed to beone and the same copyrighted piece. The
recognition of software as a type of industrial product is reflected in
the rights pertaining to the assignability of software.
In light of the needs of users who have lawfully obtained the
software for functional use, article 31 of the Regulations imposes a
number of limitations on the rights of the software copyright owner,
which include allowing a lawful user to input a program into the
internal storage of a computer, make necessary revisions, or make
back-up copies, according to the user's needs.21 It may be seen
from a comparison between article 22 of the Copyright Law and
articles 21 and 31 of the Regulations that the limitations on eco-
nomic rights differ in respect to software copyright and copyright of
works in general.
With regard to the subjects of the rights, article 3 of the Regu-
lations stipulates that software copyright owners may be either citi-
zens, legal persons or "non-legal person" entities. There are
corresponding conditions attached to these designations. For exam-
ple, articles 11-14 of the Regulations explicitly distinguish between
the ownership of copyright in software developed through coopera-
tion, on commission, in fulfillment of a task assigned by a higher
entity, and software developed in the line of duty.
As software is a type of industrial wealth, the question of attri-
bution of rights is even more sensitive as compared with traditional
works. In order to lend assistance to the determination of the attri-
21. Id. art. 31.
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bution of rights, chapter 3 of the Regulations provides for a copy-
right registration system established in respect to software. The
organ for registration and administration (i.e., the Center for
Software Registration) has been given the mandate to develop and
publish procedures for software registration and administration.
III. EXAMINATION OF THE COMPUTER SOFTWARE
PROTECTION REGULATIONS OF 1991
Under the Regulations, protection for software refers to "the
enjoyment by a copyright owner of a piece of software or his as-
signee of the various rights under software copyright prescribed by
these regulations."
22
A. Definitions.
In the Regulations, "computer software" refers to "computer
programs" and their relevant "documentation."2 A computer pro-
gram refers to "a coded instruction sequence which may be exe-
cuted by devices with information processing capabilities such as
computers, or a symbolic instruction sequence or symbolic state-
ment sequence which may be automatically converted into a coded
instruction sequence for the purpose of obtaining certain expected
results."'24 As indicated previously, computer programs include
"source programs" and "object programs;" the source text and ob-
ject text of the same program are deemed to be one and the same
copyrighted piece.25
"Documentation" refers to "literal descriptions and charts
compiled and written in natural language or formal languages and
used to describe the content, structure, design, functional perform-
ance, historical development, test results and usage, such as pro-
gram design instructions, flowcharts, and users' manuals."26
Under the Regulations, "software being protected under these
Regulations must be developed independently by the developers and
borne by physical objects."27 This principle is basically the same as
that for works protected under the Copyright Law.2' The Regula-
tions also require that protected software possess "originality." 29 In
22. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 4.
23. Id. art. 2.
24. Id. art. 3(1).
25. Id. art. 3(1).
26. Id. art. 3(2).
27. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 5.
28. Copyright Law of 1990, art. 3.
29. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 5.
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addition, the software must be borne by "physical objects."
Although a "physical object" could be interpreted as a hard copy,3"
it is unclear whether "hard copy" also refers to magnetic disks.
Under the Regulations, persons eligible to receive protection
for their software include entities, citizens, and foreigners. 31 The
term "software copyright owners" refers to "entities and citizens
enjoying the copyright of software in accordance with the provi-
sions of these Regulations. ' 32 "Entities" refers to "legal persons or
non-legal person entities" (hereinafter referred to as entities) actu-
ally organizing and carrying out development work, providing
working facilities for accomplishing software development, and as-
suming responsibility for the software. The term "citizens" refers
to those "accomplishing software development by relying on their
own facilities and assuming responsibility for the pieces of
software." "Software developers" encompasses entities and
citizens.33
With respect to software developed by a Chinese citizen or an
entity, "regardless of whether or where the said software has been
made public, he or it shall enjoy the copyright."'3a In contrast, the
Computer Protection Regulations provide that foreigners may en-
joy copyright protection in China in two situations. The first is
where a piece of software "developed by a foreigner is first made
public in China." In this case, the foreigner may enjoy the copy-
right in accordance with the Regulations.35 Secondly, copyrighted
software owned by a foreigner "made public outside China" may be
protected under the Regulations "in accordance with agreements
concluded between his country and China or with international
conventions acceded to by his country and China."36
This is generally in accord with the principles of national terri-
torial treatment and reciprocity in copyright laws of other coun-
tries. However, it should be noted that unlike Chinese entities or
citizens, foreigners must "make their software public" before being
eligible for copyright protection in China. The exact translation of
"make public" in the Chinese text of the Regulations is "publish., 37
30. Id. art. 3(5). "Copying refers to acts of transferring software onto physical objects."
31. Id. arts. 3(3), 3(4), 6.
32. Id. art. 3(4).
33. Id. art. 3(3).
34. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 6. The territorial requirement is not limited to China
proper.
35. Id. art. 6.
36. Id. art. 6.
37. "The right of making public" refers to making the software available to the public.
Id. art. 9(1).
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However, it is unclear what exactly constitutes "make public" or
"publish." In later promulgated Computer Software Registration
Procedures, "make public" is defined as "the act of making
software available to the public, including the issue of the software
to the public through sales or by other means of providing copies or
through public demonstration of the software undertaken with a
view to further distributing copies." 38
With respect to software developed by two or more entities or
citizens in cooperation, the copyright of the software is jointly
owned by the developers who cooperated to produce the software.39
In the case where a written agreement is made in advance, the
software copyright is owned by the cooperating developers accord-
ing to that agreement. In cases where there is no written agree-
ment, but the software developed in cooperation may be partitioned
and used, the developers may separately enjoy the copyright to the
respective portions they developed. However, the exercise of this
copyright may not be extended to the copyright of the jointly devel-
oped software as a whole.
If the software developed in cooperation cannot be partitioned
and used, the copyright is to be exercised by the cooperating devel-
opers, upon reaching unanimity through consultation. If unanimity
cannot be reached through consultation, none of the parties may
prevent the other party or parties from exercising the rights other
than the right of assignment. The proceeds are reasonably distrib-
uted to all cooperating developers.4
The copyright of software developed on commission is gov-
erned by written agreement between the commissioning and com-
missioned parties. Where there is either no written agreement, nor
an explicit stipulation made in the agreement, copyright ownership
is attributed to the commissioned party. 1
There are two situations under which the ownership of
software developed by a citizen while working for an entity becomes
an issue.42 In the first situation, the software is developed in ac-
cordance with a development objective explicitly assigned in the line
of an employee's duty, or is a foreseen or natural result of his carry-
ing out activities in the line of duty. In this case, the software copy-
right is attributed to the entity. In the second situation, where a
38. Measures for Computer Software Copyright Registration, 2 China Laws for For-
eign Bus. (CCH Austi. Ltd.) 11-706(3) (1992) (hereinafter Registration Procedures).
39. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 11.
40. Id. art. 11.
41. Id. art. 12.
42. Id. art. 14.
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piece of software developed by a citizen is not a result of performing
his or her duty, and is not directly related to the content of the work
engaged in by the developer in the entity, nor has the developer
utilized the material and technical facilities of the entity, the
software copyright is attributed to the developer. In reality, the cri-
teria for making these distinctions regarding the line of duty remain
to be determined.
Under article 13, the rights to copyrighted software developed
in fulfillment of a task assigned by a higher entity or government
department, the rights are normally stipulated within a letter of
work assignment or contract. Where no explicit stipulation is made
in the letter of work assignment or contract, the copyright of the
piece of software is attributed to the entity which accepts
assignment.43
B. Characteristics of Software Copyrights.
A computer software copyright owner enjoys both personal
rights and property rights. The personal rights are inherent rights
which are not limited by the duration of the protection. The two
major types of personal rights, the "right of making public" and the
"right of authorship," refer to the protection of the honor and repu-
tation of the computer software developer.
The right of making public refers to the right to decide whether
to make the software available to the public.' This means that the
software developer enjoys the right to decide whether, where, when
and in what form, to publish or make public of his or her software.
The right of authorship refers to the right of the developer to
make his identity known and to have his name indicated on the
software.4" The duration of the protection for the right of "author-
ship" is "unlimited."46
The other bundle of rights, the "property rights," refer to the
exclusive rights of the software copyright owner to exploit his
software and to obtain renumeration. Unlike the personal rights,
these property rights are limited.
The "right of exploitation" refers to the right of the software
copyright owner to exploit his or her software in such a manner as
copying, displaying, distribution, revision, translation, and annota-
43. Id. art. 13.
44. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 9(l).
45. Id. art. 9(2).
46. Id. art. 15.
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tion, on the premise that the public interest is not damaged. 7
The "right to authorize use" and the "right to renumeration"
refer to the right to authorize others to use or exploit the software
and to receive renumeration therefor.4
The "right of assignment" refers to the right to assign to others
the right of exploitation and the right of authorization for use.49 In
addition, software copyrights are inheritable, as the Regulations
provide that within the duration of protection for the copyright of a
piece of software, the successor to the software copyright is entitled
to the rights of exploitation, authorization for use, and renumera-
tion, according to the law of succession." However, there is no
provision regarding the inheritance of the right of assignment.
Article 9 provides the basis for the right of assignment of
software copyright. Within the duration of protection for the copy-
righted software, the copyright owner (or the assignee) has the right
to authorize others to exercise the right of exploitation.5" As part of
this authorization agreement, the copyright owner or his assignee
may charge royalty fees.5 2 The period of validity of a licensing con-
tract must not exceed ten years. However, a contract may be re-
newed on expiration.
To ensure the validity of these agreements, licensing agree-
ments pertaining to these software rights should be executed in a
written contract in accordance with the relevant laws and regula-
tions of the People's Republic of China. The licensee should exer-
cise the right of exploitation by adhering to the manner, conditions,
scope and duration stipulated in the contract.5 3 Where the licensed
rights pertaining to the software are not explicitly stipulated in the
contract as exclusive, they are deemed to be non-exclusive. 4 Im-
portantly, these licenses do not change the ownership of the copy-
righted software.
In the case where the software copyright owner is an entity, if
the entity's ownership changes within the duration of the copyright
of the software, the various rights pertaining to that piece of
software are owned by the lawful succeeding owner to the entity. In
this situation, the duration of protection for the rights pertaining to
47. Id. art. 9(3).
48. Id. art. 9(4).
49. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 9(5).
50. Id. art. 16.
51. Id. art. 18.
52. Id. art. 18.
53. Id. art. 18.
54. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 18.
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the software do not change."5
When a Chinese software copyright owner licenses or transfers
the rights of a piece of software developed in China to a foreigner,
the copyright owner must report the transaction to the relevant
governmental department under the State Council for approval, and
to the Software Registration Center for software registration and
administration.56
C. Duration of Protection.
The duration of protection for the copyright on a piece of
software is twenty-five years, ending on the 31st day of December of
the twenty-fifth year after the software is first made public. Before
the expiration of the duration of protection, the software copyright
owner may apply to the organ for software registration and admin-
istration (i.e., the Software Registration Center) for an extension of
twenty-five years. The maximum duration of protection is fifty
years.57
Under article 20, after expiration of copyright protection, the
rights, other than the right pertaining to the developer's authorship,
are terminated .5  The duration of protection for the right of the
developer's authorship of the software is unlimited. 9
As indicated above, where there is a change in copyright own-
ership, or there is an assignment, the duration of protection for the
rights pertaining to the software do not change.6'
Other than the rights of the developer's authorship, the various
rights pertaining to a piece of software enter the public domain
before the expiration of the duration of protection when either (1)
the entity owning the copyright of the software has been dissolved
and there is no lawful successor, or (2) the citizen owning the
software copyright dies and there is no lawful successor.6 '
D. Limitations on Protection.
Within the Regulations, there are several limitations on the
protection provided to owners of copyrighted software. First, a
piece of software may be copied "in small quantities to serve such
55. Id. art. 17.
56. Id. art. 28.
57. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 15.
58. Id. art. 20.
59. Id. art. 15.
60. Id. art. 17, 19.
61. Id. art. 20.
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non-commercial purposes as education, scientific research, or gov-
ernment business without the consent of or renumeration to, the
copyright owner of the software or his or her lawfud assignee."'62
Since many business enterprises in China are state-owned compa-
nies, a phrase such as "government business" is very vague and in-
cludes a majority of the businesses within China.
Second, uses in which it is necessary to implement "the rele-
vant policies, laws, regulations and rules of the state," to implement
"the technical standards of the state," or where there is "a limited
number of available options in the forms of presentation," do not
infringe the software copyright holder's property rights. These ex-
tremely broad provisions may result in liberal interpretations of
"free use," which could present potential problems for software de-
velopers. If a large number of companies which would otherwise be
infringers fit within this exception, the software developers risk los-
ing a large proportion of their investment.
In addition, with respect to software which is developed by
"entities under ownership of the whole people" within their respec-
tive sectors or under their jurisdiction, if such a software is of great
significance to national interests and public interests, the "relevant
departments" under the State Council and "the People's Govern-
ment of the various provinces, autonomous regions and municipali-
ties" have the right to decide whether to allow such a software to be
exploited by "designated entities." The exploiting entities then pay
exploitation fees to the developing entities in accordance with the
relevant laws of the State.63
E. Infringement.
If any acts defined within the term "infringement" occur, ac-
cording to the circumstances, the infringer must stop infringing,
eliminate the adverse effects, make a public apology, and compen-
sate the copyright owner for any damages incurred due to the in-
fringement. In addition, the State administrative authorities for
software copyright protection may impose administrative sanctions
on the infringer, including confiscation of the unlawful income and
imposition of a fine.64 Article 32 defines the following acts as
"infringing:" '
62. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 22.
63. Id. art. 13.
64. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 30.
65. Id. art. 32.
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(1) making a piece of software public without the consent of
the copyright owner;
(2) making public as one's own work a piece of software
developed by others;
(3) making public as a work completed on one's own, a
piece of software developed in cooperation with others without
the consent of the collaborators;
(4) having one's own name indicated on a piece of software
developed by others or obliterating the name indicated on a piece
of software developed by others;
(5) altering, translating or annotating a piece of software
without the consent of the copyright owner or the lawful
assignee;
(6) copying in whole or in part, a piece of software without
the consent of the copyright owner or the lawful assignee;
(7) distributing or disclosing to the public a copy of a piece
of software without the consent of the copyright owner or the
lawful assignee;
(8) conducting business concerning licensing or transfer of
a piece of software to any third party without the consent of the
copyright owner or the lawful assignee; 66
(9) supplying an infringing piece of software to others,
while fully knowing that the software infringes another's
copyright.
There are many acts which do not constitute infringement.
For example, entities or citizens who lawfully hold copies of
software enjoy the following rights, without the requirement of con-
sent of the software copyright owner:
(1) installation and storage of software on a computer ac-
cording to the user's need and for the purpose of using it;
(2) making backup copies for filing;67 and
(3) making necessary revisions to the software in order to
implement it in an actual environment of computer application,
or to improve its function and performance. 68
As stated above, software may be copied in small quantities to
serve such non-commercial purposes as education, scientific re-
search, or government business without the consent of, or remuner-
66. Id. art. 30.
67. Backup copies must not be supplied in any way for use by others. Once the holders
lose the right to hold the software lawfully, all backup copies must be destroyed.
68. Except as otherwise agreed, the holder must not supply the revised version to any
third party without the consent of the software copyright owner or the lawful assignee. Reg-
ulations, supra note 1, art. 21.
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ation to, the copyright owner of the software or his lawful assignee.
However, in exploiting the software in such a manner, the title and
developer of the piece of software are to be made known, and the
various other rights enjoyed by the copyright owner or his lawful
assignee in accordance with the Regulations must not be infringed.
In addition, the copies should be properly stored, returned or de-
stroyed after use, and must not be used for other purposes, nor sup-
plied to others.6 9
Similarity between a piece of software developed by one person
and an existing piece of software may not constitute copyright in-
fringement of the existing software. For example, where a particu-
lar piece of software is necessary to implement the relevant policies,
laws, regulations and rules of the State or it is necessary to imple-
ment the technical standards of the State, or where there is a limited
number of available options in the forms of presentation, there is no
infringement.70
Where the holder of a piece of software has no knowledge of,
or has no reasonable basis for having knowledge of, the piece of
software as infringing, liability for infringement is borne entirely by
the supplier of the infringing piece of software. The term "supplier
of an infringing piece of software" covers those who supply an in-
fringing piece of software to others in the full knowledge that it
infringes.71 Where the rights and interests of the copyright owner
of the software would not be sufficiently protected without the de-
struction of the software held by the holder, the holder is obligated
to destroy the software. However, the holder may demand compen-
sation from the supplier of the infringing piece of software for the
losses suffered by the holder.
Due to recognition that disputes involving contract issues (e.g.,
failure to perform contracts) and infringement may arise during the
term of copyright protection, the Regulations include provisions re-
garding disputes which arise from transactions involving software.72
As discussed previously, administrative sanctions may be im-
posed in infringement cases.73 However, if the software is registered
and the software rights are assigned, the assignee must report the
transaction to the organ for software registration and administra-
tion for the record within three months of the official signing of the
69. Id. art. 22.
70. Id. art. 31.
71. Id. art. 32.
72. See Regulations, supra note 1, art. 33-35.
73. Id. art. 30.
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assignment contract in order to protect their rights. For example,
unless the transaction is reported within the required time period,
the assignee will not be able to counter the infringing activities of a
third party.74
Where a party is not satisfied with the administrative sanction
imposed by the administrative authority of the State for software
copyright affairs, it may institute proceedings in the People's Court
within three months from the date of receipt of the relevant notifica-
tion. Where the party neither executes the fulfills the requirements
of a sanction decision, nor institutes proceedings in the People's
Court within the time limit, the appropriate administrative author-
ity may apply to the People's Court for compulsory execution.75
An infringement dispute over software copyright may be set-
tled through mediation. Where mediation fails or where one of the
parties changes its mind after an agreement has been concluded
through mediation, proceedings may be instituted in the People's
Court. Proceedings may also be instituted directly in the People's
Court if the parties do not wish to settle the dispute through
mediation.76
Contract disputes over software copyrights may also be settled
through mediation. Or, the parties may apply for arbitration by the
software copyright arbitration organ of the State. These arbitration
proceedings are conducted in accordance with the arbitration clause
in the contract or a written arbitration agreement subsequently
concluded.
Parties to the arbitration may bring their case to a court under
three circumstances. First, if one party fails to execute the arbitral
award, the other party may apply to the People's Court for execu-
tion. Second, if the People's Court finds the arbitral award illegal, it
has the right to prevent execution of the award. In this circum-
stance, the party may institute proceedings in the People's Court
regarding the contractual dispute. Third, when the parties do not
have an arbitration clause in the contract, nor is there a subse-
quently concluded a written agreement, either party may directly
initiate proceedings in the People's Court. 77
In cases where an interested party fails to perform their con-
tractual obligations, or fails to perform the obligations in a contract
in conformity with the conditions stipulated, it may result in civil
74. Id. art. 27.
75. Id. art. 36.
76. Id. art. 34.
77. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 35.
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liability in accord with the relevant provisions of the General Prin-
ciples of the Civil Law.7" Thus, in addition to the situations dis-
cussed above, civil litigation is sometimes an option.
F. Summary of Copyright Protection for Software.
Thus, while computer software protection in China has pri-
marily been enacted through the Regulations, computer software
may also be protected under other legal theories, with contracts
playing a particularly important role.
IV. CONTRACT AND PATENT LAW APPLIED TO SOFTWARE
An important consideration in protection of software is that
although contract law can provide protection by itself, the Patent
Law and Copyright Law often cannot effectively protect software
without some contribution from contract law.
A. Contract Law.
The Technical Contract Law of the People's Republic of
China79 recognizes that any technology capable of bringing some
sort of benefit to the other party may be taken as the object of a
contract. 80 For example, such contracts include those for individ-
ual and joint software development, sales of software and software
data, and software testing and security. Moreover, the protection
provided to computer software by contract law is very flexible.
Through specific clauses within the contract, a software developer
may fix his desired method and degree of protection in legalized
form.
B. Patent Law.
The form of expression of computer software is as a work con-
sisting of a group of sentences or instructions protectable under
copyright law. However, software is also the crystallization of
mathematics, information, control, and engineering (i.e., software
engineering), the contents of which should also be patentable.
Due to the difficulties presented by problematic rules regarding
mathematical algorithms and mental activity, the intellectual prop-
erty circles in various countries initially excluded software from the
78. Id. art. 33.
79. Law of the People's Republic of China on Technology Contracts, 1 China Laws for
Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 5-577 (1987).
80. Id. 5-577(3)-(4).
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scope of patent law protection. However, in recognition during the
1980s of the needs for industry development, many countries re-
interpreted the relevant legal provisions and revised their examina-
tion standards. These changes were based on guiding cases and led
to provisions for software patent protection.
Most countries have displayed great flexibility in the matter.
Since China began implementation of its patent law in 1985, its
practice in this respect is consistent with the international trend. In
accordance with the provision in article 25(2) of the Chinese Patent
Law,81 no patent right is granted for rules and methods of mental
activities.8 2 Also, computer software per se is not regarded as an
object of protection by patent law.83
However, where an invention containing computer software
has technical effects considered a complete technical solution, it
may be granted patent rights, regardless of whether it is a computer
program which involves the handling of a technological process by
automation, or operation of a computer system in a new mode.
This is true even if the inventive point lies in the computer program.
Examples include (1) the encoding of Chinese characters as an in-
put method of the processing of Chinese characters by a computer
system, (2) a method of processing information in Chinese charac-
ters, and (3) installation of new software on a publicly known com-
puter, to improve its performance. This has made it possible for
such processes and products to receive the high degree of protection
provided by patent law.84
V. ADMINISTRATION AND REGISTRATION OF COMPUTER
SOFTWARE IN CHINA
The "organ for software registration and administration" men-
tioned in the Regulations is the Ministry. The grant of power re-
garding computer software administration and registration is
contained within article 6 of the Computer Software Registration
Procedures, which states: "With the authorization of the State
Council, the Ministry of M & E is in charge of the registration and
administration of the copyright of software nationwide." The Min-
istry entrusted the Software Registration Center of China with the
routine work of registering computer software copyrights.8"
81. PRC Patent Law, supra note 2, at 390.
82. Id.
83. See Liu & Wei, supra note 2.
84. Id.
85. Procedures, supra note 38, 11-706(6).
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The Ministry of M & E is also charged with designating, ac-
cording to need, appropriate agencies to assist the Software Regis-
tration Center in handling software registrations. The functions
and responsibilities of these agencies is determined separately by the
Ministry of M & E according to specific, publicly announced condi-
tions. 6 As discussed below, this presumably includes the Software
Registration Reexamination Board.
The Software Registration Center has various functions, in-
cluding: (1) implementation of the provisions in the Regulations
concerning registration and these procedures; (2) submitting pro-
posals for improving or perfecting the registration process; (3) ac-
cepting and examining applications for software registration; (4)
publication and distribution of the software registration announce-
ments; (5) setting up, classifying and storing the software registra-
tion files; (6) providing the public with facilities for reading the
registrations; (7) attending to public inquiries; and (8) completion of
other tasks related to the registration work which are entrusted to
the Center by the Ministry of M & E.8 7
Article 25 of the Regulations stipulates that "the specific ad-
ministrative procedures and schedule of charges for software regis-
tration shall be published by the organ for software registration and
administration.,1 8 The Ministry formulated and published Proce-
dures for the Registration of Copyright in Computer Software on
April 6, 1992. The Ministry of M & E and the Software Registra-
tion Center of China, as organs of the State Council are responsible
for implementation of the Regulations and the Procedures for the
Registration of Copyright in Software.89
The Regulations require that a registration application be filed
with "the organ for software registration and administration"
namely, the Software Registration Center. The Software Registra-
tion Center began accepting applications for registration on May 1,
1992. After the application for registration is approved, a registra-
tion certificate is granted and an announcement is made to the pub-
lic by the organ for software registration and administration.9" The
Center is also required to seal the checklists for the source programs
deposited for safekeeping. 91
It may be seen from these provisions that applying for registra-
86. Id. art. 39.
87. Id. art. 38.
88. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 25.
89. Id. art. 39; Procedures, supra note 38, 11-706(49).
90. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 23.
91. Id. art. 14. Removal of this seal requires the applicant's consent or a court decision.
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tion is a voluntary act on the part of software owner and not a pre-
requisite for obtaining a copyright. However, the software must be
made public before or at the same time as it is registered. A piece of
software not intended to be made public cannot be registered.
The owner of the software enjoys the copyright, whether or not
the software is registered. The applicant may be the software copy-
right owner, successor to the original owner, or an assignee.92
Where the assignment of the rights is to be put on record, an assign-
ment contract authenticated according to law and the original cer-
tificate of registration should be submitted. Where the rights are
assigned to a foreigner, the document of approval issued by the rele-
vant responsible department of the State Council must be
submitted.93
When registering a software for which one of the copyright
owners is a foreigner, the application is to be handled in accordance
with "the relevant provisions of international conventions acceded
to by the country to which he belongs and by China or in bilateral
agreements concluded between the country he belongs to and
China." If the relevant provisions do not require a registration pro-
cess, the formalities may be dispensed with. However, if an applica-
tion for registration is filed voluntarily, these Procedures apply.9 4
In January 1992, China and the United States signed a memo-
randum of understanding on the mutual protection of each other's
intellectual property including software copyright. In July 1992,
China approved a proposal to accede to the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the Universal
Copyright Convention in cooperation with other countries to pro-
vide copyright protection in member countries.
If certain provisions in the agreements are signed, or if interna-
tional copyright conventions commonly acceded to by the Chinese
and foreign governments differ from the provisions in the Regula-
tions on Computer Software Copyright Protection of China, the
compliance will be based on the provisions in the international
agreements signed or conventions acceded. The only exception to
this is where the Chinese government has stated its reservations.
In order to be eligible for registration, the software must have
been "made public" after the promulgation of the Computer
Software Regulations.9" Software which has not entered the public
92. Procedures, supra note 38, 1 11-706(4).
93. Id. % 11-706(18).
94. Id. 11-706(5).
95. Id. 1 11-706(2).
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domain may be registered, as long as it registration is completed
within one year after the Procedures take effect.96
Under the Regulations, to apply for registration, the software
copyright owner should submit a completed software copyright re-
gistration form, and a "written appraisal."97 Furthermore, an ap-
plication for software copyright registration is limited to one piece
of software which has been made public independently and is capa-
ble of independent operation.98 The application will not be ac-
cepted if it does not comply with the application procedures and/or
if there are missing application materials. 99
When registering co-developed software, the co-owners may,
through consultation, decide on one of the copyright owners as
their representative.i"° If the various copyright owners fail to reach
unanimity through consultation, each copyright owner has the right
to apply for registration on the premise that the interests of the
other copyright owners will not be damaged, and the names of the
other copyright owners are to be listed in the registration
documents. 101
The Procedures include detailed requirements regarding the
application. 1 2 The principal certifying documents that should be
submitted for copyright registration include: (1) a legal personal
certificate of identity; (2) a written agreement on the attribution of
the copyright if applicable; (3) consent or authorization of the copy-
right owner or owners, in the case of revised or integrated software
developed based on the software of others; and (4) a certifying doc-
ument of the succession to or assignment of the rights, in the case
where a successor or assignee of rights applies for registration.10 3 A
letter of consent or a power of attorney should be submitted as well.
Where the rights are assigned to a foreigner, the document of ap-
proval issued by the relevant responsible department of the State
Council should be submitted. 1"
The written appraisal should demonstrate that the software
was independently developed, contain a program appraisal, and a
96. Id.
97. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 25.
98. Procedures, supra note 38, 11-706(7).
99. Id. 7 11-706(25)-(27).
100. Id. 11-706(8).
101. Id.
102. Id. 11-706(9).
103. Procedures, supra note 38, 11-706(10).
104. Id. 11-706(18).
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program description for identification of the software. 105 The pro-
gram description appraisal "should be the appraisal of at least one
software description."' 10 6
A registration certificate granted by the "organ for software
registration and administration" is the initial certification of the
copyright validity for a piece of software, and may be the verifica-
tion and proof of the facts stated in the application document for
registration.'0 7 A registered software copyright may be cancelled
when there is a final judicial judgment, or if the principal informa-
tion provided in the application for registration is confirmed to be
untrue. 1
08
Under the Regulations, registration of the copyrighted
software with the Software Registration Center is the basis for sub-
mission of a request for administrative intervention or instituting
legal proceedings to resolve disputes. The Procedures further state
that where software rights are transferred, the following parties
should report the transfer to the Software Registration Center for
recordation in order to permit the countering of infringing activities
conducted by third parties:0 9
(1) the successor to the rights referred to in Articles 16 and
17 of the Regulations;
(2) the assignee of the rights referred to in Article 27 of the
Regulations; and
(3) the licensor or the transferring party of the right re-
ferred to in Article 28 of the Regulations. 10
Any party may file an opposition with the Software Registra-
tion Center against software for which the principal information
provided at registration was untrue and/or the software is not in
conformity with the provisions of the Regulations and Procedures.
The opponent should submit, in duplicate, a request for opposition
and a relevant certifying document. ' Where an opposition is held
to be tenable after examination, the Ministry of M & E will cancel
the registration, notify the opponent and the software registrant in
writing, and make an announcement regarding the cancellation. If
the opposition is found to be untenable, it is rejected.12
105. Id. 11-706(11).
106. Id. 1 11-706(13).
107. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 24.
108. Id. art. 26.
109. Procedures, supra note 38, % 11-706(16).
110. Id.
111. Id. 11-706(28).
112. Id. 11-706(31).
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In conformity with article 26,113 the Ministry of M & E can
cancel the registration on the basis of the "relevant documents" and
request that the software registrant return the original registration
certificate. 114 However, it is unclear what comprises the "relevant
documents."
Where a party is opposed to the rejection of a registration ap-
plication, or if the registration for a piece of software is cancelled
because an opposition is found to be tenable, the aggrieved party
may petition the Software Registration Reexamination Board. The
Board was set up by the Ministry of M & E for the purpose of
reexamining registration applications.115 Thus, it is composed of
personnel conversant with the law, or software technology. The pe-
titioner should submit, in duplicate, a request for reexamination and
all relevant certifying documents.'1 16 This request should be submit-
ted within 60 days after receipt of the relevant notification regard-
ing the rejection or cancellation of a registration application.
VI. SUMMARY
Although the level of development of China's software indus-
try was taken into consideration in the formulation of the Computer
Software Protection Regulations, China's software industry is still
evolving. For a variety of reasons, there is little sophisticated com-
mercial software currently produced in China, even though China
has fairly good software scientists, technicians and programmers.
However, the sale of computers in China is rapidly growing
with sales of computers greater than 100,000 computers/year. This
will undoubtedly stimulate a parallel call for the rapid development
of commercial software. The Regulations "must be capable of en-
couraging a larger number of pieces of software as commodities to
be developed faster which will meet the needs of users, and normal
channels of their circulation to be formed as soon as possible." '117
While the Chinese government desires to provide protection for
computer software against copyright infringement, it does not want
the protection to be a strict tool which will hurt the economic devel-
opment of the country.
113. Regulations, supra note 1, art. 26. The registration of the copyright of a piece of
software may be cancelled based on a final judicial judgment or if the principal information
provided in the registration application is confirmed to be untrue.
114. Procedures, supra note 38, 11-706(32).
115. Id. 11-706(33).
116. Id. 11-706(34).
117. Ying Ming, China's Regulations on Computer Software Protection, CHINA PATENTS
& TRADEMARKS, No. 4, 1991, at 86.
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Another indication of the legislative intent is represented by
the prohibition against copying and plagarizing of the results of
other people's software development, and provisions which safe-
guard the reasonable rights and interests of software developers. In
addition to the breadth of protection provided to software, the
depth of the protection should also be controlled appropriately.
For example, it is inadvisable to impose excessive restrictions on the
legitimate development and circulation of software, in order to pre-
vent the situation where those working in the software industry
continuously live in fear of being held liable for violating the Regu-
lations on protection at every turn.118
In conclusion, China may not currently protect computer
software as effectively as many industrial countries. Nonetheless,
despite their shortcomings, the Regulations have helped to advance
China's intellectual property law. It is likely that these Regulations
will continue to play an significant role in the continued develop-
ment of this important body of law.
118. Id.
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APPENDIX
REGULATIONS ON COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Promulgated by the State Council, effective as of October 1,
1991)
Chapter I
General Provisions
ARTICLE 1 These Regulations are formulated in accordance
with the provision of the Copyright Law of the People's Republic of
China with a view to protecting the rights and interests of copyright
owners of computer software, regulating the interests generated in
the development, dissemination and use of computer software, en-
couraging the development and circulation of computer software
and promoting the application of computers.
ARTICLE 2 Computer software (hereinafter referred to as
software for short) as mentioned in these Regulations refers to com-
puter programs and their relevant documentation.
ARTICLE 3 The meaning of the following terms in these Reg-
ulations are as follows:
(1) A computer program refers to a coded instruction se-
quence which may be executed by devices with information process-
ing capabilities such as computers, or a symbolic instruction
sequence or symbolic statement sequence which may be automati-
cally converted into a coded instruction sequence for the purpose of
obtaining certain expected results.
Computer programs include source programs and object pro-
grams. The source text and object text of the same program shall be
deemed to be one and the same copyright piece.
(2) Documentation refers to literal descriptions and charts
compiled and written in natural language or formal languages and
used to describe the content, structure, design, functional perform-
ance, historical development, text results and usage, such as pro-
gram design instructions, flowcharts, and users' manuals.
(3) Software developers refer to legal persons or non-legal per-
son entities (hereinafter referred to as entities) actually organizing
and carrying out development work, providing working facilities for
accomplishing software development, and assuming responsibility
for the software, and citizens accomplishing software development
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by relying on their own facilities and assuming responsibility for the
pieces of software.
(4) Software copyright owners refer to entities and citizens en-
joying the copyright of software in accordance with the provision of
these Regulations.
(5) Copying refers to acts of transferring software onto physi-
cal objects.
ARTICLE 4 Protection for software as mentioned in these
Regulations refers to the enjoyment by a copyright owner a piece of
software or his assignee of the various rights under software copy-
right prescribed by these Regulations.
ARTICLE,5 Software being protected under these Regulations
must be developed independently by the developers and borne by
physical objects.
ARTICLE 6 In respect of a piece of software developed by a
Chinese citizen or entity, regardless of whether or where the said
software has been made public, he or it shall enjoy the copyright in
accordance with these Regulations.
Where a piece of software developed by a foreigner is first
made public in China, he shall enjoy the copyright in accordance
with these Regulations.
The copyright of the software of a foreigner made public
outside China shall be protected by these Regulations in accordance
with agreements concluded between his country and China or with
international conventions acceded to by his country and China.
ARTICLE 7 The protection of software under these Regula-
tions cannot be extended to cover the ideas, concepts, discoveries,
theories, algorithms, processing and operating methods used in
software development.
ARTICLE 8 The organ for software registration and adminis-
tration authorized by the State Council shall be in charge of
software registration throughout the country.
Chapter II
Copyright of Computer Software
ARTICLE 9 A software copyright owner shall enjoy the fol-
lowing rights:
(1) The right of making public, i.e., the right to decide whether
to make the software available to the public;
(2) The right of the developer's authorship, i.e., the right to
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make known his identity as developer and the right to have his
name indicated on his piece of software;
(3) The right of exploitation, i.e., the right to exploit his
software in such manners as copying, display, distribution, revision,
translation, and annotation on the premise that the public interest is
not damaged;
(4) The right of authorization for use and the right of being
remunerated, i.e., the right to authorize others to use his piece of
software in some or all of the manners stipulated in (3) of this arti-
cle and to receive remuneration therefor;
(5) The right of assignment, i.e., the right to assign to others
the right of exploitation and the right authorization for use as stipu-
lated in (3) and (4) of this article.
ARTICLE 10 The copyright of a piece of software shall be
owned by the software developer. Where there are special provi-
sions in these Regulations, the provisions shall apply.
ARTICLE 11 In respect of a piece of software developed by
two or more entities or citizens in cooperation, the copyright of the
software shall be jointly owned by the developers who have cooper-
ated in its development.
The software copyright owned by the cooperating developers
shall be exercised according to a written agreement concluded in
advance. Where there is no written agreement while the software
developed in cooperation may be partitioned and used, the develop-
ers may separately enjoy the copyright to the respective portions
developed by them, but the exercise of such copyright may not be
extended to the copyright of the jointly developed software as a
whole. Where the piece of software developed in cooperation cannot
be partitioned and used, the copyright shall be exercised by the co-
operating developers after reaching unanimity through consulta-
tion. Where unanimity cannot be reached through consultation, nor
is there any justified reason, none of the parties shall prevent the
other party or parties from exercising the rights other than the right
of assignment, but the proceeds shall be distributed reasonably to all
cooperating parties.
ARTICLE 12 The attribution of the copyright of a piece of
software developed on commission shall be stipulated by the con-
clusion of a written agreement between the commissioning party
and the commissioned party. Where there is no written agreement,
nor is an explicit stipulation made in the agreement, the copyright
shall be attributed to the commissioned party.
ARTICLE 13 The attribution of the copyright of a piece of
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software developed in fulfilling a task assigned by a higher entity or
government department shall be stipulated by a letter of work as-
signment or contract. Where no explicit stipulation is made in the
letter of work assignment or contract, the copyright of the piece of
software shall be attributed to the entity accepting the assignment.
The relevant departments under the State Council and the Peo-
ple's Government of the various provinces, autonomous regions and
municipalities have the right to decide, in respect of software which
is developed by entities under ownership of the whole people within
their respective sectors or under their jurisdiction and which is of
great significance to national interests and public interests, to allow
such pieces of software to be exploited by designated entities, and
the exploiting entities shall pay exploitation fees to the developing
entities in accordance with the relevant enactments of the State.
ARTICLE 14 In respect of a piece of software developed by a
citizen while working in an entity, where such a piece of software is
a result of performing his assigned duty, i.e., where it is developed
in accordance with a development objective explicitly assigned in
the line of duty, or a foreseen result or natural result of his carrying
out activities in the line of duty, the copyright of the software shall
be attributed to the entity.
Where a piece of software developed by a citizen is not a result
of performing his duty, and is not directly related to the content of
the work engaged in by the developer in the entity, nor have the
material and technical facilities of the entity been utilized, the copy-
right of the software shall be attributed to the entity.
ARTICLE 15 The duration of protection for the copyright of a
piece of software shall be twenty-five years, ending on the 31st day
of December of the twenty-fifth year after the software is first made
public. Before the expiration of the duration of protection, the
software copyright owner may apply to the organ for software regis-
tration and administration for an extension of twenty-five years, but
the total duration of protection shall not exceed fifty years at the
longest.
The duration of protection for the right of the developer's au-
thorship of the software shall be unlimited.
ARTICLE 16 Within the duration for protection for the copy-
right of a piece of software, the successor to the software copyright
shall be entitled to the rights stipulated in Items (3) and (4) of Arti-
cle 9 of these Regulations in accordance with the relevant provi-
sions of the Law of Succession of the People's Republic of China.
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The occurrence of succession shall not change the duration of
protection for the rights pertaining to the software.
ARTICLE 17 After the occurrence of a change of the entity
owning the copyright of a piece of software within the duration of
protection for the copyright of that piece of software, the various
rights pertaining to that piece of software shall be owned by the
lawful succeeding entity.
Where there is a change of the entity owning the copyright of a
piece of software, the duration of protection for the rights pertain-
ing to that piece of software shall not change.
ARTICLE 18 Within the duration of protection for the copy-
right of a piece of software, the copyright owner of the piece of
software or his assignee has the right to authorize others to exercise
the right of exploitation stipulated in Item (3) of Article 9 of these
Regulation. In authorizing others to exercise the right of exploita-
tion, the copyright owner or his assignee may charge fees according
to an agreement.
The licensing of software rights should be conducted in the
manner of concluding an executing a written contract in accordance
with the relevant laws and regulation of the People's Republic of
China. The license should exercise the right of exploitation by ad-
hering to the manner, conditions, scope and duration stipulated in
the contract.
The period of validity of a licensing contract shall not exceed
ten years each time. A contract may be renewed on expiration.
Where the licensed rights pertaining to the software are not
explicitly stipulated in the contract as exclusive, they should be
deemed as non-exclusive.
The occurrence of the above-mentioned licensing activities
shall not change the attribution of the copyright of the software.
ARTICLE 19 Within the duration of protection for a piece of
software, the owner of the right of exploitation and the right of au-
thorization for use stipulated in Items (3) and (4) of Article 9 of
these Regulations may assign to others the right of exploitation and
the right of authorization for use.
The assignment of rights pertaining to a piece of software
should be conducted in the manner of concluding and executing a
written contract according to the relevant laws and regulations of
the People's Republic of China.
The occurrence of assignment activities shall not change the
duration of protection for the copyright of the piece of software.
ARTICLE 20 After the duration of protection for the copy-
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right of a piece of software expires, the rights, other than the right
of the developer's authorship, pertaining to the software shall be
terminated.
In one of the following events, the various rights, other than
the rights of the developer's authorship, pertaining to a piece of
software shall enter the public domain before the expiration of the
duration of protection:
(1) the entity owning the copyright of the software having
been dissolved and there having been no lawful successor;
(2) the citizen owning the copyright of the software being dead
and there having been no lawful successor.
ARTICLE 21 Entities or citizens lawfully holding copies of a
piece of software shall enjoy the following rights without the con-
sent of the copyright owner of the software:
(1) to install and store the piece of software on a computer
according to its/his need and for the purpose of using it.
(2) to make backup copies for filing. However, such backup
copies shall not be supplied in any way to others for their use. Once
the holders lose the right to hold the software lawfully, all the said
backup copies must be destroyed.
(3) to make necessary revision in the piece of software in order
to implement it in an actual environment of computer application,
or to improve its function and performance. However, except
otherwise agreed, the holder shall not supply the revised version to
any third party without the consent of the copyright owner of the
software or his lawful assignee.
ARTICLE 22 A piece of software may be copied in small
quantities to serve such non-commercial purposes as education, sci-
entific research, or government business without the consent of, or
remuneration to, the copyright owner of the software or his lawful
assignee. However, in exploiting the software in such a manner, the
title and developer of the piece of software should be made known,
and the various other rights enjoyed by the copyright owner or his
lawful assignee in accordance with these Regulations must not be
infringed. The copies should be properly stored, redeemed or de-
stroyed after use and must not be used for other purposes or sup-
plied to others.
Chapter III
The Registration and Administration of Computer Software
ARTICLE 23 In respect of a piece of software being made
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public after the issuance of these Regulations, an application for its
registration may be filed with the organ for software registration
and administration. After the application for registration is ap-
proved, a registration certificate shall be granted and an announce-
ment shall be made to the public by the organ for software
registration and administration.
ARTICLE 24 The registration of the copyright of a piece of
software with the organ for software registration and administration
is the premise to submitting a request for the administrative inter-
vention in, or to instituting legal proceedings for, a software dis-
pute. A registration certificate granted by the organ for software
registration and administration is the initial certification of the va-
lidity of the copyright of a piece of software or of the verification
and proof of the facts stated in the application document for
registration.
ARTICLE 25 In applying for registration, the copyright owner
of the piece of software should submit:
(1) a software copyright registration form to be filed in as
prescribed;
(2) a written appraisal of the piece of software conforming to
the prescribed rules;
The copyright owner of the software should also pay a registra-
tion fee as prescribed.
The specific administrative procedures and schedule of charges
for software registration shall be published by the organ for
software registration and administration.
ARTICLE 26 The registration of the copyright of a piece of
software may be cancelled in one of the following events:
(1) in accordance with a final judicial judgement;
(2) the principal information provided in the application for
registration having been confirmed to be untrue.
ARTICLE 27 In respect of a piece of software already regis-
tered, where the software rights are assigned, the assignee should
report the transaction to the organ for software registration and ad-
ministration for the record within three months of the official sign-
ing of the assignment contract, other wise the assignee will not be
able to counter the infringing activities of a third party.
ARTICLE 28 Where a Chinese software copyright owner
licenses or transfers to a foreigner the rights of a piece of software
developed in China, the copyright owner shall report the transac-
tion to the relevant department under the State Council for ap-
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proval, and to the organ for software registration and
administration for the record.
ARTICLE 29 Personnel engaging in software registration and
those who have worked in this capacity shall not make use of or
divulge to others, within the duration of protection for the copy-
right of the software, the filed material and related information that
applicants submit on registration except for the purpose of perform-
ing the duties of registration and administration.
Chapter IV
Legal Liabilities
ARTICLE 30 Where any of the following acts of infringement
occurs, the infringer should, according to circumstances, bear such
civil liabilities as stopping the infringement, eliminating the adverse
effects, making a public apology and compensating for the damages,
and the administrative authorities of the State for software copy-
right may inflict administrative sanctions on the infringer such as
confiscating the unlawful income and imposing a fine:
(1) to make a piece of software public without the consent of
the copyright owner of the software;
(2) to make public as one's own work a piece of software de-
veloped by others;
(3) to make public as a work completed on one's own, a piece
of software developed in cooperation with others without the con-
sent of the cooperators;
(4) to have one's own name indicated on a piece of software
developed by others or to obliterate the name indicated on a piece of
software developed by others;
(5) to alter, translate or annotate a piece of software without
the consent of the copyright owner of the software or its lawful
assignee;
(6) to copy, or copy in part, a piece of software without the
consent of the copyright owner of the software or its lawful
assignee;
(7) to distribute or disclose to the public a copy of a piece of
software without the consent of the copyright owner of the software
or its lawful assignee;
(8) to conduct business concerning the licensing or transfer of
a piece of software to any third party without the consent of the
copyright owner of the software or its lawful assignee.
ARTICLE 31 Similarity between a piece of software developed
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by oneself and an existing piece of software caused by one of the
following events shall not constitute infringement on the copyright
of the existing piece of software:
(1) where it is necessary to implement the relevant policies,
laws, regulations and rules of the State;
(2) where it is necessary to implement the technical standards
of the State;
(3) where there is a limited number of available options in the
forms of presentation.
ARTICLE 32 Where the holder of a piece of software has no
knowledge of, or has no reasonable basis for having knowledge of,
the piece of software being an infringing object, the liability for in-
fringement shall be borne by the supplier of the infringing piece of
software. However, where the rights and interests of the copyright
owner of the software will not be sufficiently protected without that
piece of software held by the holder being destroyed, the holder has
the obligation to destroy the piece of software it holds, and the
holder may demand compensation from the supplier of the infring-
ing piece of software for the losses the holder suffers in this
connection.
The term "supplier of an infringing piece of software" men-
tioned in the preceding section covers one who supplies an infring-
ing piece of software to others fully knowing that it is an infringing
piece of software.
ARTICLE 33 Where an interested party fails to perform the
obligations in a contract or fails to perform the obligations in a con-
tract in conformity with the conditions stipulated, it should be civil
liabilities according to the relevant provisions of the General Princi-
ples of the Civil Law.
ARTICLE 34 An infringement dispute over software copy-
right may be settled through mediation. Where mediation fails or
where one of the parties changes its mind after an agreement has
been concluded through mediation, proceedings may be instituted
in the People's Court. Proceedings may also be instituted directly
in the People's Court where the parties do not wish to settle the
dispute through mediation.
ARTICLE 35 A contract dispute over software copyright may
be settled through mediation, or the parties may apply to the
software copyright arbitration organ of the State for arbitration in
accordance with the arbitration clause in the contract or a written
arbitration agreement subsequently concluded.
The parties should execute the arbitral award. Where one
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party fails to execute the arbitral award, the other party may apply
to the People's Court for execution.
Where the People's Court which is applied to finds the arbitral
award illegal, it has the right not to execute the award. Where the
award is not executed by the People's Court, a party may institute
proceedings in the People's Court in respect of the contractual
dispute.
Where the parties have not inserted an arbitration clause in the
contract, nor have they concluded subsequently a written agree-
ment, either of the parties may directly institute proceedings in the
People's Court.
ARTICLE 36 Where a party is not satisfied with the adminis-
trative sanction imposed by the administrative authority of the State
for software copyright affairs, it may institute proceedings in the
People's Court within three months from the date of receipt of the
relevant notification. Where the said party neither executes the de-
cision on sanction nor institutes proceedings in the People's Court
within the time limit, the administrative authority of the State for
software copyright may apply to the People's Court for compulsory
execution.
ARTICLE 37 Where a staff member of the organ for software
registration and administration contravenes the provision of Article
29 of these Regulations, administrative sanctions shall be imposed
on him by the organ for software registration and administration or
a superior department in charge; where the circumstances are so
serious as to constitute an offence, he shall be prosecuted for his
criminal liability by the judicial organs according to law.
Chapter V
Supplementary Provisions
ARTICLE 38 Acts of infringement which occur before these
Regulations come into effect shall be dealt with in accordance with
the relevant enactments in effect when the said acts of infringement
occur.
ARTICLE 39 The administrative authority in charge of
software copyright affairs as well as software registration and ad-
ministration under the State Council shall be responsible for inter-
preting these Regulations.
ARTICLE 40 These Regulations shall come into effect as of
October 1, 1991.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) granted a to-
tal of 487 patents which contained the terms "software" or "com-
puter program" in either the patent title or the patent abstract.,
While a computer program (program) is clearly an important sub-
ject for patents, there remain uncertainties regarding the patentabil-
ity criteria of claims involving programs. This article illustrates the
statutory subject matter requirements for PTO allowance of a claim
implementing a program.
A patent may be obtained for "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof .... 2 Subject matter not meeting
this definition is nonstatutory and thus not eligible for patent pro-
tection.3 Since a program is not a process, machine or manufacture
in the conventional patent sense, it is not always clear under which
conditions a program meets the statutory subject matter require-
ment. Judicial decisions during the past twenty years have resolved
many of the issues, particularly those involving mathematical algo-
rithms,4 methods of doing business5 and the mental steps doctrine.6
However, there remains uncertainty, as illustrated by the 1989 re-
versal by the Federal Circuit of a PTO rejection of a claim including
1. The results of the author's keyword search using the PTO's computerized patent
search system is described infra, Part V, at B.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
3. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981).
4. A mathematical algorithm per se is not patentable because it is nonstatutory subject
matter. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
5. A method of doing business per se is nonstatutory subject matter, while "a method
of operation on a computer to effectuate a business activity" is statutory subject matter.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F.
Supp. 1358, 1369 (D. Del. 1989).
6. Mental steps requiring computer implementation are statutory subject matter. In re
Bernhardt, 417 F.2d 1395, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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a mathematical algorithm program.7 The reversal has resulted in a
split between the Federal Circuit and the PTO regarding the use of
the specification to limit the scope of a "means-plus-function" claim
involving a program.'
The emphasis in this article is on (1) understanding the PTO
classification system as used for programs; (2) analyzing what
makes a program claim allowable; (3) developing guidance to assist
in drafting program claims; and (4) determining program patenta-
bility certainties and uncertainties.
II. PATENT PROTECTION
A. Patents in General
The U.S. Constitution provides for patent rights in Article I,
section 8, clause 8: "The Congress shall have Power To... ; pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."
In 1952, Congress enacted the Patent Act which is codified in
title 35 of the U.S. Code. This Act grants the inventor "for the
term of seventeen years, ... the right to exclude others from mak-
ing, using, or selling the invention."9 The Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks is charged with "all duties required by law respect-
ing the granting and issuing of patents." 10 Patent regulations are
contained in title 37, Part I of the Code of Federal Regulations.
PTO procedures for the examination of patent applications are de-
tailed in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP). In
order to obtain patent protection, the applicant must submit a pat-
ent application which fully discloses and claims the invention.11 To
be patentable, the invention must meet the utility and subject mat-
ter requirements,12 be novel,13 and be non-obvious. 14
B. Patentability Problems Involving Programs
The utility, novelty and non-obviousness requirements are all
troublesome for patent applications relating to programs. The U.S.
7. See infra Part IV, at D.
8. Id.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
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Office of Technology Assessment has concluded that the lack of
availability of prior art and the use of secrecy to protect commer-
cially available computer programs make it difficult to determine if
an application meets the novelty and non-obviousness standards.' 5
The most difficult issue for program patentability concerns the
utility requirement under title 35, section 101 of the U.S. Code, in
which subject matter may be patented only if it is one of the enu-
merated statutory classes of "process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter."' 6 Any claim which consists of nonstatu-
tory subject matter is unpatentable. A program is eligible for patent
protection under section 101 as a process.' 7 However, the courts
have found certain types of programs to be statutory while others
have been nonstatutory. Some programs appear to be in the uncer-
tain "gray area" between statutory and nonstatutory. The uncer-
tainty continues to be a topic of study and debate.' 8
III. CLAIM REJECTION AND THE APPEALS PROCESS
A patent is granted only if the patent application is allowed by
the examiner, or the examiner's rejection is reversed at one of the
subsequent levels of appeal. Following a rejection, the applicant has
the option to pursue appeals in the following sequence:' 9
(i) appeal to the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences (Board);20
(ii) request reconsideration by the Board;2 1
(iii) appeal to the Federal Circuit,22 or file a civil action in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,23 followed by
an appeal to the Federal Circuit;
15. Mark F. Radcliffe, The Future of Computer Law: Ten Challenges for the Next Dec-
ade, The Computer Lawyer, Aug. 1991, at 5 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BACKGROUND PAPER 17, at 19
(1990)).
16. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974).
17. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64
(1972).
18. 1 RICHARD L. BERNACCHI, ET AL., BERNACCHI ON COMPUTER LAW §§ 3.7.1-.7.2
(Nov. 1992); 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 1.03[6] (1993); 3 ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB III,
WALKER ON PATENTS § 11:13 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. Oct. 1992); Richard H. Stem, Tales
from the Algorithm War: Benson to Iwahashi, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 371 (1991); Michael P. Flem-
ing, Patentability of Claims Involving Mathematical Algorithms and Computer Programs: An
Examiner's Perspective (Nov. 15, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Santa Clara
Computer and High Technology Journal).
19. 4 PATENT PRACTICE 15-48 (PRI 1989).
20. 37 CFR § 1.191(a) (1992).
21. 37 CFR § 1.197(b) (1992).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1988).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1988).
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(iv) file a writ of certiorari;24 and
(v) appear before the U.S. Supreme Court.
The prosecution histories of five important program patents
which were allowed following appeals to the Federal Circuit or its
predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A.), revealed that the appeals process causes a delay of sev-
eral years in the issuance of a patent." Currently, the delay due to
appeals in cases involving computer program technology, following
rejection by the examiner, is estimated at several years.26 In fast
changing technologies such as computer programs, the long delay
makes the appeals route unattractive to many inventors and assign-
ees. While the delay effectively adds time to the seventeen year
term of patent protection, it has the serious disadvantage of adding
uncertainty as to whether a patent will ultimately be granted and
increasing the cost of obtaining a patent. It is thus vitally important
to obtain patent allowance by the examiner. The split between the
PTO and the Federal Circuit regarding the interpretation of claim
scope in certain "means-plus-function" types of claims27 also in-
creases the desirability of obtaining patent allowance from the ex-
aminer rather than resorting to an appeal.
IV. PTO CRITERIA FOR ALLOWANCE OF PROGRAM CLAIMS
The PTO has published procedures, policies and guidelines
concerning allowable computer program subject matter.28 The
guidelines are based on a detailed interpretation of all significant
court decisions relating to the statutory subject matter of computer
programs and algorithms, ending with In re Iwahashi.29 A recent
paper by a PTO Supervisory Patent Examiner is entirely consistent
with the published PTO guidelines.3 °
A summary of the PTO guidelines follows.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2101 (1992).
25. See Appendix.
26. Letter from Ronald L. Yin, Patent Attorney, Limbach & Limbach, to Albert J.
Dalhuisen (Apr. 29, 1992) (on file with the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law
Journal).
27. See infra Part IV, at D.
28. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PAT-
ENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2106-2106.02 (5th ed. rev. Oct. 1989) [hereinafter MPEP];
James E. Denny, Notice Interpreting In Re Iwahashi, 1112 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 16-17 (Mar.
13, 1990); Fred E. McKelvey, Patentable Subject Matter, 1106 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 5-12
(Sept. 5, 1989).
29. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
30. Fleming, supra note 18.
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A. Definitions
* Computer programs, computer processes and software are
equivalent, referring to "both the series of steps performed by a
computer, and the software directing those steps."31
* A mathematical algorithm is distinguished from an al-
gorithm. A mathematical algorithm is "a procedure for solving a
given type of mathematical problem."32 An algorithm is "a step-
by-step procedure to arrive at a given result."'33
* "No distinction is made between mathematical algorithms
invented by man, and mathematical algorithms representing discov-
eries of scientific principles and laws of nature which reveal a rela-
tionship that has always existed." 34
B. Statutory Nature of Computer Programs
The guidelines strongly infer that the PTO considers computer
programs statutory subject matter unless they fall within a judi-
cially determined exception (e.g., mathematical algorithm pro-
grams). The PTO has made the following statements concerning
programs:
* "[T]he Supreme Court has not ruled on the patentability of
computer programs;" 35
* "[the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals] has held that
computer processes are statutory unless they fall within a judi-
cially determined exception;" 36
e "[tihe major (and perhaps only) exception in the area of com-
puter processes is the mathematical algorithm;" 37
e "[i]f a computer process claim does not contain a mathemati-
cal algorithm in the Benson sense, the second step of the Free-
man-Walter-Abele test38 is not reached and the claimed subject
matter will usually be statutory;" 39
e "[t]he C.C.P.A. [has] ... held that a computer algorithm, as
opposed to a mathematical algorithm, is patentable subject mat-
31. McKelvey, supra note 28, at 11-12 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65
(1972)).
32. McKelvey, supra note 28, at 6 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981);
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 n.1 (1978); and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65
(1972)).
33. MeKelvey, supra note 28.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Also note explanation infra Part IV, section C.
39. McKelvey, supra note 28, at 11.
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ter;"' 4 and
0 "laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas" are
considered nonstatutory subject matter.41 "Mathematical algo-
rithms are nonstatutory because they have been determined not
to fall within the section 101 statutory class of a process." 42
Also, "'while a method of doing business' per se is non-statutory
subject matter, 'a method of operation on a computer to effectu-
ate a business activity' has been held to be statutory subject
matter."
43
C. Mathematical Algorithms
Even though a mathematical algorithm per se is unpatentable,
it does not necessarily mean that any patent claim containing a
mathematical algorithm is therefore unpatentable. Whether or not
a claim is eligible for patent protection depends on a determination
of the patentability of the claim as a whole.44 A distinction is drawn
between inventions claiming a mathematical algorithm per se, and
inventions which claim an application of the algorithm. Claiming a
mathematical algorithm is analogous to claiming the application of
a law of nature, 45 and as such, is patentable subject matter under
section 101.46 The PTO and the courts use the two-part Freeman-
Walter-Abele test to ascertain whether a claim containing a mathe-
matical algorithm meets the section 101 requirement for statutory
subject matter.47 The first part of the test determines whether the
claim directly or indirectly recites a mathematical algorithm.48 If it
does not, the program will usually be statutory. If it recites a math-
ematical algorithm, the PTO (and the courts) then employ the sec-
ond part of the test. In the second part, the claim will pass muster
under section 101 only if the mathematical algorithm is applied in
any manner to physical elements or process steps.49 Some exam-
ples of algorithm applications which are deemed insufficient to meet
the section 101 requirements are: nonessential post solution activ-
ity of the program (e.g. printing the result), field of use limitations
40. Id.
41. Id. at 6 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
42. Id. at 6 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972)).
43. Id. at 11 (citing Paine, Webber v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1369 (D. Del.
1983)).
44. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
45. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1978).
46. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
47. In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905; McKelvey, supra note 28, at 6-10.
48. In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905.
49. Id.
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of the mathematical algorithm, data gathering steps interacting
with the algorithm, and physical transformations which are mere
manipulations of data. Court decisions provide guidance in judging
whether the manner in which a mathematical algorithm is applied
results in statutory subject matter.50 However, predictability re-
garding allowance of claims reciting a mathematical algorithm re-
mains uncertain because the criteria are not clearly defined.5
The first step in the two part test requires a determination as to
whether the claim recites a mathematical algorithm. In Ex parte
Logan, 2 the Board provided the following test for a mathematical
algorithm:
[W]e believe a claim should be considered as reciting a mathe-
matical algorithm only if it essentially recites, directly or indi-
rectly, a method of computing one or more numbers from a
different set of numbers by a series of mathematical equations.
Consequently, a claim which essentially recites another type of
method does not recite a mathematical algorithm, even though it
incidentally requires, either directly or indirectly, the perform-
ance of some mathematical computations.5 3
Logan passed muster under section 101 because the computa-
tions are "essentially directed to detecting the occurrence of events
... by determining when a time-varying respiration signal crosses
an adjustable trigger level," rather than "computations to [com-
pute] one or more numbers from a different set of numbers."5 4
D. Interpretation of In re Iwahashi
In In re Iwahashi,55 the Federal Circuit reversed the PTO's re-
jection of a claim reciting a mathematical algorithm. The PTO
agreed with the court's decision finding it to be "consistent with
precedent and PTO policy"56 since a read-only memory (ROM) is
used in implementing the algorithm. 7 The ROM satisfies the sec-
ond test of the Freeman- Walter-Abele test.5  As a result, the claim
as a whole satisfies the section 101 requirement. 9 This case re-
50. Fleming, supra note 18, at AD 9-14.
51. Id. at AD 9.
52. 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1465 (1991).
53. Id. at 1468 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
56. Denny, supra note 28, at 16.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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vealed an important split between the Federal Circuit and the PTO
regarding claim scope interpretation. The Iwahashi court in dicta
stated that a "means-plus-function" limitation can be read into the
claim from the specification even if this is not recited in the claim.'
It is the PTO's position that the scope of a claim for a section 101
determination should be interpreted as broadly as possible from the
recitation in the claim without reference to the specification.61 The
disagreement between the Federal Circuit and the PTO is likely to
add to the uncertainty in predicting whether a claim containing a
mathematical algorithm will be allowed under section 101.
E. In re Iwahashi and In re Grams Distinguished
Both In re Iwahashi and In re Grams62 involve a claim reciting
a mathematical algorithm. The Grams claim was rejected by the
Federal Circuit for failure to meet the statutory subject matter re-
quirement.63 One week later, the same court allowed the Iwahashi
claim.64 Grams is not mentioned in the PTO guidelines. The PTO
position can be inferred from PTO Supervisory Patent Examiner
Fleming's paper.65 In that paper, Grams is used as an example of a
claim in which the only limitation of the mathematical algorithm is
in the data gathering steps.66 Apart from the text of claim 1, Flem-
ing cites only one sentence from the opinion: "The presence of a
physical step in the claim to derive data for the algorithm will not
render the claim statutory. ' 67 The PTO concludes that Iwahashi is
allowable because the mathematical algorithm is applied to a physi-
cal element (the ROM) in the claim. In Grams, the physical ele-
ment is used in the data gathering step to which the mathematical
algorithm is applied. 68 Fleming's analysis suggests that the PTO
would reject the Grams claim for failing to satisfy the second step of
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, since the physical element is used
only in the data gathering step.
The author considers it significant that Fleming does not cite
other important language from Grams (Le., "The specification does
not bulge with disclosure on these tests. To the contrary it focuses
60. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
61. Denny, supra note 28, at 17.
62. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
63. Id. at 841.
64. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1375.
65. Fleming, supra note 18.
66. Id. at AD 11-12 (quoting Grams, 888 F.2d at 836-37).
67. Id. at AD 12 (quoting Grams, 888 F.2d at 840).
68. In re Grams, 888 F.2d at 839.
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on the algorithm itself, although it briefly refers to, without describ-
ing, the clinical tests that provide data."69). Since the applicant
claimed that "the invention is applicable to any complex system,"
the court concluded that the mathematical algorithm itself was
claimed.7 ° The Federal Circuit appears to leave the door open to
allow a Grams type of claim if the applicant provides copious test
data and limits the use of the algorithm to a specific narrow applica-
tion area, e.g., clinical testing. The PTO, however, would probably
not inquire into the adequacy of the data or the limited use, but
would reject the claim because the physical element is present only
in the data gathering step.
V. PTO CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
A. Classification System in General
The primary purpose of the classification system is to provide
for patentability searches by patent examiners.71 Statutory author-
ity for the classification system is provided in title 35, section 9 of
the U.S. Code. Classification is the basic method used to describe a
patent's subject matter. It provides one of the most important
search tools for the PTO, the inventor and the patent practitioner.
The classification system derives much of its utility from the PTO's
extensive use of cross-reference classifications. This is particularly
true for programs.
The PTO assigns each new patent an original classification and
usually one or more cross-reference classifications. The patent's
original classification identifies the claimed subject matter on the
basis of its industry or use, function, effect or product, or structural
features. Cross-reference classifications may identify the patent's
other claimed subject matter and may be used to describe un-
claimed art or technology which is disclosed but not claimed. Each
of the more than three hundred classes is divided into subclasses to
narrow the scope of the subject matter. The number of subclasses
within a class ranges from a few to hundreds.
B. Search Techniques
As a first step in a search, the searcher can locate the main
classes of interest through the alphabetical listings of common and
technical terms in the Index to the U.S. Patent Classification Sys-
69. Id. at 840.
70. Id.
71. MPEP § 903.02 (rev. Nov. 14, 1992).
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tem.7 2 Next, the Manual of Classification is used to further define
the search classes.7 3 The manual lists all subclasses for each main
class in an ordered arrangement of titles. Once the most likely
class/subclasses are identified, the proper field of search is obtained
by using the definitions of these classes. The PTO provides exten-
sive information and documentation on the classification system
and its use in searching.74 The PTO Classification and Search Sup-
port Information System (CASSIS) is available on CD-ROM for
use with a personal computer. CASSIS is essentially a computer-
ized version of the various manual search techniques. It also pro-
vides for keyword searches. CASSIS can be used to: (i) define a
field of search; (ii) search patents by words in their titles or ab-
stracts; (iii) search and display definitions of all classes and sub-
classes; (iv) combine keyword searches with class searches; (v) find
current classifications of recent patents; (vi) find patents assigned to
a company; (vii) search patents by date, status, inventor's residence;
(viii) find all patents issued to an inventor; and (ix) display individ-
ual chapters of the MPEP.
CASSIS provides options to search and print by patent
number, title, classification, date, inventor, assignee and abstract.
However, it is limited in the sense that the text of the specification
and the claims cannot be searched. Nonetheless, it is a good prelim-
inary screening tool for retrieving most of the relevant patents. One
of the most straightforward CASSIS or manual search techniques is
a search of the classifications of patents which the searcher knows
are relevant to the particular field of search.
C. Classification of Program Patents
1. Search Techniques and Database
A patent search was conducted for patents issued from April 3,
1990 through May 27, 1991. The 131,234 patents granted during
this period form the database for a keyword search of the abstracts
and titles. The April 3, 1990 date was chosen because the PTO's
most recent policy regarding patentability of program claims was
published on March 13, 1990.7 1 Various manual, microfilm and
72. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INDEX TO THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
(Dec. 1992).
73. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF CLASSIFICATION.
74. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF THE U.S. PATENT CLAS-
SIFICATION SYSTEM FOR PATENT DEPOSITORY LIBRARIES (Sept. 1988).
75. Denny, supra note 28.
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computer-assisted search techniques were used, relying primarily on
CASSIS.7
6
2. Keyword Search
Keyword searches of patent abstracts and titles were con-
ducted in order to use the applicant's description of the patent, and
to correlate this with the classification issued by the PTO. Classifi-
cation searches were utilized to determine the examiner's character-
ization of the claimed invention. The CASSIS keyword search
"SOFTWARE" OR "COMPUTER PROGRAM*' ' 77 produced the
desired dragnet effect of identifying patents in a great variety of pro-
gram contexts. The broad search of the sample period resulted in a
total of 596 patents. 78 The results include patents in which the pro-
gram is the main element of the claimed subject matter as well as
those in which the program is not part of the actual invention (e.g.,
a cardboard package designed for software storage79). This particu-
lar search is unsuitable for identifying patents in which a program is
an element of a claim since the results are both over-inclusive as
well as under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because it includes
many patents where a program is not an element of a claim. It is
under-inclusive because it does not identify program patents which
do not have the word "program" or "software" in either the ab-
stract or the title. A keyword search of abstracts is much more
effective when the keywords have a narrow meaning (e.g., "ARTI-
FICIAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM*") or when the keyword
search is executed within a specific classification. The PTO and pat-
ent practitioners use the terms "SOFTWARE" and "COMPUTER
PROGRAMS" synonymously. However, a key-word search for the
one term does not identify patents or classifications in which the
other term is used. To retrieve all references relating to programs,
both terms must be used connected with an "OR" operator. Trun-
cation as "PROGRAM*" is essential to retrieve all references relat-
ing to "program," "programs," "programmable," "programmed,"
or "programming."
76. The author conducted the research at the Sunnyvale Patent Information Clearing-
house, PTO Patent Depository Library, Sunnyvale, California.
77. The "" represents a wildcard character.
78. Search of CASSIS, Sunnyvale Patent Information Clearinghouse, Sunnyvale, Cali-
fornia (Apr. 2, 1993)(search of BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION file for records con-
taining "SOFTWARE" or "COMPUTER PROGRAM*" in TITLE OR ABSTRACT field).
79. One-piece, self-locking computer software container, U.S. Patent No. 5,012,930,
Hansen, inventor (May 7, 1991).
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3. Classification Search
The "SOFTWARE" OR "COMPUTER PROGRAM*"
keyword search resulted in patents classified under more than three
hundred different class/subclass designations, indicating the use of
programs in a wide variety of patented inventions. The great major-
ity of program-related patents are classified under class numbers
36480 or 395.81 Class 364/300, which was specifically for "com-
puter programs per se," was abolished in August 1990. Patents
which were originally classified under 364/300 are now reclassified
under a variety of 364 or 395 subclasses. The classification system
is a dynamic system. New classes are formed and existing classes
are re-defined to accommodate developments in technology. In re-
cent years there have been several extensive revisions of classifica-
tions relating to programs.82 A classification revision is followed by
a reclassification of all patents which are affected by the change.8 3
Searchers need to be alert to these changes because the text of a
printed patent does not reflect reclassification. Conducting a search
in reliance on the classification printed on the patent may lead to
the wrong search results. Patent reclassifications are updated in
CASSIS and the PTO's classification cross reference system on
microfilm.
A computer program may be classified according to its func-
tion or its interaction with other components. Examples are as
follows:
i. The function of the program: class/subclass No. 395/70084
definition "system utilities: subject matter under the class defini-
tion relating to functions performed by an operating system (i.e.,
80. "Class 364, Electrical computers and data processing systems... This is the generic
class for electrical apparatus and corresponding data processing operations, in which there is
a significant change in the data or for performing calculation operations." Class 364, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT CLASSIFICATION DEFINITIONS, 364-1 (June 1992).
81. "Class 395, Information processing system organization... This is the generic class
for digital processing systems and corresponding methods for performing information
processing functions and methods for controlling operations of such processing systems."
Class 395, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT CLASSIFICATION DEFINITIONS, 395-1 (Dec.
1991).
82. E.g., class 395 was created from class 364 subclasses 200, 513, 513.8, 518-523 and
900. Id. at 395-2.
83. Eg., U.S. Patent 4,924,408, Highland, inventor (May 8, 1990), issued under classifi-
cation 364/513 and subsequently reclassified under 395/50. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
PATENT CLASSIFICATION DEFINITIONS, 395-22 (Dec. 1991).
84. See, eg., Customization of a system control program in response to initialization of
a computer system, U.S. Patent No. 4,979,106, Schneider, inventor (Dec. 18, 1990).
1993]
516 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9
software for controlling computer operation)."85
ii. The physical object or procedure with which the program
interacts: class/subclass No. 360/6086 definition "subject matter
under subclass 55 including sensing or indicating the existence of
an earlier recording on a record carrier and preventing erasure or
double exposure of the carrier." 8
7
The classification system is capable of identifying a specific
type of program, or specific use of a program, if the searcher uses a
four stage search:
1. Start with a keyword search of the classification definitions;
2. Conduct patent searches within the classifications which
were identified through the definitions search;
3. Select patents which are relevant to the field of search;
4. Search the original classifications of the patents which are
selected in the third stage. 88
The primary focus was on program classifications where the
program itself is claimed without interaction with other compo-
nents in the system, since section 101 problems are most likely to
arise in this context. These classifications were identified through a
two-stage search. The first stage consisted of a keyword search of
the classification definitions to identify all classes in which a pro-
gram is part of the definition. These classifications were reviewed to
select classifications which are most likely to include a program
claim per se. That is a claim wherein the program itself is claimed
as the embodiment of a particular computer process.89 Patents is-
sued under classifications defining a program per se were examined
to determine which types of program claims are allowed. 90
V1. ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM PATENTS
A. Proposed Scheme for Analysis
The author proposes an analytical technique for examining
85. Class 395, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT CLASSIFICATION DEFINITIONS,
395-22 (Dec. 1991).
86. See, eg., Software protection and identification system, U.S. Patent No. 4,980,782,
Ginkel, inventor (Dec. 25, 1990).
87. Class 360, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT CLASSIFICATION DEFINITIONS,
360-11 (Dec. 1991).
88. Caveat: a search is likely to lead to incomplete or erroneous results if the searcher
limits the search to only a few classifications when still in one of the early stages.
89. E.g., the definition of subclass No. 395/600 "Database or file management system:
Subject matter under the class definition relating to the addressing, retrieval or manipulation
of information contained within the database of a digital processing system." Class 395, U.S.
DEF'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT CLASSIFICATION DEFINITIONS, 395-21 - 395-22 (Dec. 1991).
90. See infra Part V, at C.
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program claims to aid in understanding what is deemed allowable
by the PTO. In addition, this technique might be useful for drafting
program claims. The scheme is intended to clarify the distinctions
between allowable and rejectable program claims under section 101.
The following three categories are proposed to define program pat-
ents through an analysis of the claims: (i) program-related claim
(narrow claim scope); (ii) de facto program claim (intermediate
claim scope); and (iii) program per se claim (broad claim scope).
An additional separate test is proposed to assess whether the pro-
gram's subject matter meets the requirements of section 101. In this
analysis the claim is considered as a whole, and its scope is defined
by the language in the claim without reference to the specification.9"
1. Program-related Claim
A claim is deemed program-related92 where the program as
claimed is applied in any manner to a nontrivial physical element or
process step which itself constitutes statutory subject matter under
section 101. The following elements or steps are trivial: (i) non-
essential post solution activity; (ii) field of use limitations; (iii) data
gathering steps; (iv) a physical step which is a mere manipulation of
data; (v) merely labeling the data in the memory; and (vi) rewriting
a nonstatutory method claim into apparatus format.93
2. De Facto Program Claim
A claim is deemed a de facto program claim94 where the pro-
gram as claimed is applied in any manner to a trivial95 physical
element or process step which itself constitutes statutory subject
matter.
91. Defining the scope solely by the language in the claim itself is consistent with PTO
guidelines and avoids the conflict between the Federal Circuit and the PTO, see supra Part IV
at D, while not affecting the Federal Circuit criteria for claim allowance expressed in In re
Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
92. Examples of program-related claims: U.S. Patent No. 4,344,142, Diehr, inventor
(Aug. 10, 1982) in which the program controls and operates a rubber vulcanization press, and
U.S. Patent No. 5,007,101, Iwahashi, et al., inventors (Apr. 9, 1991) in which a mathematical
algorithm program is applied to a ROM.
93. As used in the "second step" of the Freeman- Walter-Abele test, see supra Part IV at
D, and as interpreted by Fleming, supra note 18.
94. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,398,249, Pardo, et al., inventors (Aug. 9, 1983) where
the claimed program converts a source program into an object program. The trivial steps in
the claims are the program's interaction with storage areas of the data processor, and the fact
that program execution merely results in data.
95. As defined in "Program-Related Claim", supra Part VI, at A.l.
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3. Program Per Se Claim
A claim is deemed a program per se claim96 wherethe program
is not applied to any physical element or process step, and program
execution results merely in data or non-essential post solution
activity.
4. Program Subject Matter Test
De facto or per se program claims must be analyzed for statu-
tory subject matter. PTO policies and guidelines show that this
type of patent claim is unpatentable if it consists of a mathematical
algorithm because such a claim fails to meet the Freeman- Walter-
Abele test. Analysis of the PTO guidelines in total leads to the con-
clusion that this type of claim is unpatentable if it consists of non-
statutory subject matter, not just if it concerns a mathematical
algorithm. 97 The following Computer Program Statutory Subject
Matter test (CPSSM test), which is consistent with PTO guidelines,
is proposed.
Using the CPSSM test, one first determines whether the claim
is a program-related, de facto or per se program claim. If the claim
is program-related, it is eligible for patent protection under section
101. If the claim is a de facto or per se program claim, it is statu-
96. E-g.,
A method of converting both a knowledge base and an inferencing technique
into compilable program code forming a knowledge based system, said knowl-
edge base including rules on data items, said rules being arranged in a network
of nodes and links between such nodes, said nodes representing tests, logical
operators, actions and data items, said network being in a form convenient for
interpretive inferencing, said method comprising the steps of:
(a) partitioning said network into a plurality of subnetworks;
(b) labelling each node within each respective subnetwork with a unique
identifier;
(c) generating a segment of compilable, procedural, program code for infer-
encing which is equivalent to each respective sub-network when combined with
said inferencing technique, said identifiers locating the respective code for each
node within each respective sub-network, said inferencing code comprising a
node sub-segment that implements the function of each node in said respective
sub-network based on the rules specified in said knowledge base and that con-
ditionally invokes other sub-segments using said identifiers, and a control sub-
segment which provides access to each node sub-segment using said identifiers
and provides for repeated execution of each node sub-segment as necessary;
and
(d) generating for each data item a segment of compilable procedural, pro-
gram code for the distribution of such data item which invokes the appropriate
program inferencing code by means of said identifiers when such data item is
modified during execution of the knowledge based system.
U.S.Patent No. 4,924,408, Highland, inventor (May 8, 1990), claim no. 1.
97. See supra Part IV, at B.
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tory subject matter under section 101, unless the claim falls within a
judicially determined exception for statutory subject matter.
At present time, a mathematical algorithm and a method of
doing business are the only judicially determined exceptions for
program claims in connection with statutory subject matter. It is
conceivable that future programs might consist of laws of nature,
physical phenomena or abstract ideas which are not mathematical
expressions. These types of programs would most likely be deemed
unpatentable in de facto or per se claims because they consist of
nonstatutory subject matter. The program in a program-related
claim need not be examined for statutory subject matter since the
claim as a whole is deemed statutory due to the physical element or
process with which the program is interacting, by analogy with
Iwahashi,98 Diehr,99 and PTO guidelines." °
B. Analysis Results
The most important test categories for the analysis are the de
facto and per se program claims. Classifications which were most
likely to contain patents with these claims were selected based on
the class title and definition. 1 ' The patents obtained from the
CASSIS search 0 2 were reviewed, and those in the original and
cross-referenced classifications (Le., 364/274.1, 364/474.23, 364/
927.82 and 395/700) were selected for further study. A total of 59
patents were selected. These patents were reviewed and subjected
to the CPSSM Test. The test results are categorized as follows:
1. program-related claims: 52 patents (including mathematical
algorithm patents);
2. de facto program claims: 6 patents;10 3 and
3. program per se claims: one patent. °4
The de facto and per se claims meet the proposed CPSSM Test.
The claim in Grams,10 5 which was rejected by the Federal Circuit
and the PTO, is similarly deemed nonstatutory by the test. The
98. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
99. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
100. McKelvey, supra note 28.
101. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
103. U.S. Patent Nos. 5,028,923, Seki, et al., inventors (July 2, 1991); 4,961,141, Hop-
kins, et al., inventors (Oct. 2, 1990); 4,939,635, Seki, et al., inventors (July 3, 1990);
4,931,935, Ohira, et al., inventors (June 5, 1990); 4,916,633, Tychonievich, et al., inventors
(Apr. 10, 1990); and 4,914,590, Loatman, et al., inventors (Apr. 3, 1990).
104. U.S. Patent No. 4,924,408, Highland, inventor (May 8, 1990), claim no. 1. See
supra note 96 for the text of claim no. 1 of this patent.
105. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 836-37 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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results indicate that this test provides an effective method to deter-
mine claim allowance under section 101. The test was not applied
to patents issued or rejections appealed prior to April 3, 1990. The
proposed CPSSM test uses the same criteria as the Freeman- Walter-
Abele test but applies them in a different manner. The first inquiry
in the CPSSM test is to determine whether the claim is a program-
related, de facto or per se program claim. A review of patents in
this database showed that the great majority of patents are in the
program-related category. There are relatively few cases where it is
difficult to draw a distinction between a program-related and a de
facto or a per se program claim. If the claim is program-related, it
is deemed statutory subject material regardless of the type of com-
puter program (e.g., a mathematical algorithm). Only in a rela-
tively few de facto or per se program claims is it necessary to
determine if the program constitutes statutory subject matter. The
first inquiry in the Freeman- Walter-Abele test is to ascertain
whether the program is a mathematical algorithm. It is difficult to
judge whether a program is an algorithm or a mathematical al-
gorithm because the courts have not provided a clear distinction.
With the CPSSM test, it is only necessary to differentiate between
the two types of algorithms in relatively few instances, thus result-
ing in fewer doubts regarding statutory subject matter.
When used to aid in drafting claims, the CPSSM test assists in
developing a claim strategy with an improved likelihood of drafting
allowable claims because the three categories have a different claim
scope. The claims in a patent can be drafted in accordance with the
three categories. The program should be claimed as a per se pro-
gram claim in the broadest claims in the patent. Claims of interme-
diate scope would constitute de facto program claims, while
program-related claims have the narrowest claim scope by claiming
an interaction between the mathematical algorithm and statutory
subject matter. This strategy maximizes the possibility that at least
the narrowest claims will pass muster under section 101. Overall,
the CPSSM test is a more effective test than the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test although both are based on the same criteria. The
CPSSM test is applicable for use with programs which fall into any
judicially determined exception for statutory subject matter while
the Freeman- Walter-Abele test applies only to mathematical algo-
rithms as judicially determined exceptions.
Another potential use of the analytical technique is the devel-
opment of a "library" of allowed program claims. Information for
this library can be developed by analyzing patents in many of the
520 [Vol. 9
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classifications which use the terms "software" or "computer pro-
gram" in the class definitions. Once the claims are categorized as
program-related, de facto, or per se, they can be indexed by type of
claim (product, process, means-for, etc.) and type of program. This
can be used by the patent practitioner as an effective guide in pro-
gram claim drafting, and as a basis for responding to section 101
rejections.
VII. CERTAINTIES AND UNCERTAINTIES
Court decisions, PTO policies and a review of recent program
patents are summarized below.
A. Certainties
1. Computer programs per se are patentable subject matter
unless they fall within a judicially determined exception.
2. Judicially determined exceptions for program patents are
mathematical algorithms and methods of doing business. Judicially
determined exceptions for patentable subject matter in general in-
clude "... laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas ' 101 as well as a mathematical formulae. 107
3. Mathematical algorithm programs per se are nonstatutory
subject matter and, thus, unpatentable.
B. Uncertainties
1. The Board has provided a test to determine whether a
claim recites a mathematical algorithm, as applied in the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test. It is not certain whether the courts will adopt
the same test.
2. There is no clear dividing line between statutory and non-
statutory subject matter for mathematical algorithm program
claims.
3. The protective strength of some mathematical algorithm
program patents is questionable because others may be able to use
the program without infringing the patent.l1a
106. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
107. Id. at 186.
108. Following is a hypothetical example similar to U.S. Patent No. 5,007,101, Iwahashi,
et al., inventors (Apr. 9, 1991), to illustrate the vulnerability of some types of computer
claims. The claim in a hypothetical patent recites the application of a mathematical al-
gorithm to a ROM for implementing the squaring terms of the algorithm. A third party can
use the algorithm without infringing by incorporating the ROM information in the program,
thus eliminating the ROM. Removal of the ROM means that the new program is nonstatu-
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4. The list of currently enumerated classes of nonstatutory
subject matter is probably not all-inclusive. It is likely that this will
be subject to further definition as programs find application in even
more varied uses.
VIII. PATENTABILITY COMPARISONS BETWEEN PROGRAMS
AND DNA
Both DNA and computer program technologies require new
and highly specialized methods for describing and claiming the in-
vention.1 9 Although the technologies are very different, there is a
similarity in patentability problems, particularly in regard to statu-
tory subject matter issues.
A. Statutory Subject Matter Concerns
Both DNA in its natural state and a mathematical algorithm
are per se unpatentable. Naturally occurring DNA is unpatentable
because "manifestations of ... nature"1 10 are nonstatutory subject
matter under section 101. A mathematical algorithm is nonstatu-
tory subject matter since the algorithm "is like a law of nature." 11
DNA isolated from its natural state, or manipulated within a cell
without isolating it, results in statutory subject matter.'12 DNA is
thus statutory subject matter when it is subjected to significant
human intervention. Similarly, a mathematical algorithm may
meet the section 101 requirements once it is subjected to human
invention through interaction between the algorithm and statutory
subject matter, Le., a human-made object (e.g., a ROM).
B. Novelty and Non-obviousness Concerns
There is no complete catalog of naturally occurring DNA se-
quences. As a result, it is impossible to determine with certainty
nature's prior art. Furthermore, DNA mutates constantly, thus
tory subject matter since it is a mathematical algorithm per se. Nonstatutory subject matter
is unpatentable and as such incapable of infringing any patent. Program execution with a
ROM is usually faster than a program which incorporates the information in the program
itself. If high execution speed is essential, the use of a ROM may offer an important advan-
tage (Telephone interview with Ronald L. Yin, Patent Attorney, Limbach & Limbach, San
Jose, California (Apr. 22, 1992)). The subject of the Iwahashi patent is speech recognition
which is a computer application where high speed is essential.
109. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.96, 1.821 - 1.825 (1992); MPEP §§ 608.05, 706.03(a), 708.02 (VII),
2106, 2106.01-.02 (rev. Nov. 14, 1992).
110. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
111. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981).
112. Interview with Lauri Terlizzi, Patent Attorney, Skjerven, Morrill, MacPherson,
Franklin & Friel, in San Jose; California (Jan. 13, 1992).
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forming new natural DNA sequences.' 13 DNA questions concern-
ing sections 102 or 103 are thus difficult to answer. Secrecy and
rapid development of programs have made it difficult to determine
if a claimed program is novel and non-obvious.
IX. CONCLUSION
A computer program per se claim is patentable subject matter
unless the claim falls within a judicially determined exception as
shown by court decisions, patents issued by the PTO, and PTO clas-
sification definitions. A mathematical algorithm is a judicially de-
termined exception, consequently a mathematical algorithm
program per se is unpatentable because it fails to meet the statutory
subject matter requirement of title 35, section 101 of the U.S. Code.
However, application of a mathematical algorithm program to stat-
utory subject matter may result in patentable subject matter de-
pending on the type of interaction with the statutory subject matter.
Court and PTO criteria used to determine whether a program claim
is allowed under section 101 are uncertain due to lack of a clear
distinction between an algorithm and a mathematical algorithm,
and imprecise guidelines for ascertaining the conditions under
which a mathematical algorithm claim constitutes statutory subject
matter. Also, there is disagreement between the Federal Circuit
and the PTO regarding the scope of a "means-plus-function" pro-
gram claim. A new analytical scheme is proposed to more effec-
tively predict whether a program claim is likely to meet the
statutory subject matter condition. Use of the scheme will assist in
drafting allowable program claims. The analytical method is not
affected by the disagreement between the Federal Circuit and the
PTO concerning claim scope.
113. Id.
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APPENDIX
Prosecution Histories of Selected Program Patents
A. Patent No. 5,007,101, Iwahashi, et al., inventors
1. Application filed in Japan on 12/29/81. t4
2. U.S. application (claiming the filing in Japan as the priority
date) filed on 12/28/82.115
3. The examiner rejected the claim under 35 U.S.C. § 101.16
4. The applicant appealed to the PTO Board. The Board sus-
tained the rejection on 5/24/88.117
5. The applicant then appealed to the Federal Circuit. The court
reversed the Board's decision and allowed the claim on 11/7/8911 8.
6. The patent issued on 4/9/91.119
B. Patent No. 4,706,212, Toma, inventor
1. Application filed on 8/31/71.120
2. The Board rejected a number of claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.121
3. The applicant appealed to the C.C.P.A. The court reversed the
Board's rejection and allowed the claims on 5/18/78.122
4. The patent issued on 11/10/87.12
C. Patent No. 4,398,249, Pardo, et al., inventors
1. Application filed on 8/12/70.124
2. The examiner allowed all claims on 7/28/72, but did not issue a
notice of allowance. 125
3. PTO reopened the prosecution following the Gottshalk v. Ben-
son 126 decision and rejected the claims, under 35 U.S.C. § 101.127
4. The Board sustained the rejection. 12 8
114. U.S. Patent No. 5,007,101 at 1, Iwahashi, et al., inventors (Apr. 9, 1991).
115. Id.
116. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1375.
119. U.S. Patent No. 5,007,101 at 1, Iwahashi, et al., inventors (Apr. 9, 1991).
120. In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 873 n.I (C.C.P.A. 1978).
121. Id. at 873-74.
122. Id. at 878.
123. U.S. Patent No. 4,706,212 at 1, Toma, inventor (Nov. 10, 1987).
124. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 914 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
125. Id.
126. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
127. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912.
128. Id.
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5. The applicant appealed to the C.C.P.A. which reversed the
Board's rejection, the claims were allowed on 8/5/82.129
6. The patent issued on 8/9/83.130
D. Patent No. 4,344,142, Diehr, et al., inventors
1. Application filed on 8/6/75, as a continuation of an abandoned
application filed 5/23/74, which was a continuation-in-part of an
abandoned application dated 9/26/73.131
2. The claims were rejected by the examiner, pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 101.132
3. The applicant appealed to the Board. The Board sustained the
rejection. 133
4. The applicant then appealed to the C.C.P.A. The court re-
versed the rejection and allowed the claims on 8/9/79.134
5. The PTO requested a rehearing by the C.C.P.A. which was de-
nied on 10/19/79.135
6. The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks appealed to the
Supreme Court. The court affirmed the C.C.P.A. judgment and al-
lowed the claims on 3/3/81.136
7. The patent issued on 8/10/82.131
E. Patent No. 4,195,338, Freeman, inventor
1. Application filed on 5/6/70. 13
2. The examiner rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.139
3. The Board affirmed the rejection.14
4. The applicant appealed to the C.C.P.A. The court reversed the
board's judgment and allowed the claims on 3/30/78.141
5. The patent issued on 3/25/80.142
129. Id. at 917.
130. U.S. Patent No. 4,398,249 at 1, Pardo, et al., inventors (Aug. 9, 1983).
131. Application of James R. Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 983, n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
132. Id. at 983.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 989.
135. Id. at 982.
136. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193 (1981).
137. U.S. Patent No. 4,344,142 at 1, Diehr, et al., inventors (Aug. 10, 1982).
138. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1238 (1978).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1247.
142. U.S. Patent No. 4,195,338 at 1, Freeman, inventor (Mar. 25, 1980).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The computer software industry, like many other high-tech in-
dustries, is extremely competitive. Development costs of computer
programs are far greater than the cost of their duplication., As
computers become more commonplace and their potential uses
more numerous, the level of competition can only increase. To
compete in this industry many software companies have resorted to
analyzing their competitor's programs by reverse engineering,
which leads to copying of portions of code and in some instances,
whole programs.' Reverse engineering allows the second company
to cut its development costs at the expense of the first company.
Another method used by companies to capture a share in this com-
petitive market is to copy only the most valuable aspects of a pro-
gram, such as the interface between the program and the user.3
Understandably, software manufacturers who are developing
programs wish to protect their investment and ingenuity. Copying
of computer programs not only deprives the author of the chance to
recover expenses and gain a reward for his hard work and creativity
but also serves to detract from the value of such programs.4 While
copyright law will protect some aspects of computer programs, in-
dependent creation is still an affirmative defense to an infringement
claim.' But there seems to be disagreement about just how far a
company can go in the reverse engineering process and how much
of the original program can legally be utilized in a subsequent
program.
From the beginning, programmers have incorporated other
peoples' ideas and adapted them for specific projects.6 It is this in-
teraction and free exchange of ideas that has allowed the American
software industry to become the best in the world.7 But, because
1. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 26 (1978).
2. Some examples which have resulted in litigation include: Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp.
of America, 623 F.Supp. 1485 (D.C. Minn. 1985); and Lotus Development Corp. v. Paper-
back Software International, 740 F.Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
3. In Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37, 70 (D. Mass.
1990), Paperback developed a spreadsheet program very similar to Lotus' 1-2-3, and even
went so far as to copy the user interface and commands from Lotus' program.
4. William W. Toole, "Even If A Stranger Could Create Such A Work..." Software,
Piracy, And Implications Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith: Has The SAS Court Gone
Too Far?, 9 COMPUTER LAW JOURNAL, 145 (1989).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
6. Keith Hammonds, Don't Bury Software's Promise In A Legal Bug, BUSINESS
WEEK, May 22, 1989, at 86.
7. Mitch Kapor, Litigation vs. Innovation, BYTE, Sept. 1990, at 520.
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the industry has become very competitive, software companies are
realizing that to survive, it is necessary to protect their investment
and enforce their copyrights."
Reverse engineering is a process in which a finished program is
dissected, decompiled, or downloaded.9 The code is then analyzed
and flow charted to discover the method and technique that was
utilized in the creation of that program. When a computer program
is reverse engineered, it is taken from its finished state and analyzed
until it is determined how the program was put together, and why it
was done that way.10 A company's reasons for reverse engineering
include investigating new innovations used by competitors and the
desire to achieve compatibility with a competitor's product. The
clean-room is a technique used by a company to attempt to insulate
itself from the legal liability that may follow from using portions of
another's program. A company employing this technique will
have a first group of employees reverse engineer a program, in order
to obtain the specifications and method of that program. These
specifications and technique will then be given to a second group of
employees who utilize those specifications to write a new program.
This comment addresses the legal concerns created by reverse
8. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990); see
infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text for discussion of E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp.
of America, 623 F.Supp. 1485 (D.C. Minn. 1985).
9. One court has explained the reverse engineering of computer programs by the
following:
Computer programs are written in specialized alphanumeric languages, or
"source code." In order to operate a computer, source code must be translated
into computer readable form, or "object code." Object code uses only two
symbols, 0 and 1, in combinations which represent the alphanumeric charac-
ters of the source code. A program written in source code is translated into
object code using a computer program called an "assembler" or "compiler,"
and then imprinted onto a silicon chip for commercial distribution. Devices
called "disassemblers" or "decompilers" can reverse this process by "reading"
the electronic signals for "0" and "1" that are produced while the program is
being run, storing the resulting object code in computer memory, and translat-
ing the object code into source code. Both assembly and disassembly devices
are commercially available, and both types of devices are widely used within
the software industry.
Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2D 1561, 1563 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1992).
Another way to decompile a program is by "peeling" a silicon chip after the program is
imprinted. The layers of the silicon chip are peeled back and analyzed under microscope, one
at a time. From these peeled-back layers the object code is discovered, but each "1" and "0"
must be deciphered one bit at a time. This type of decompilation was at issue in Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2D 1016, 1017-1018 (CAFC 1992).
10. E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F.Supp. 1485, 1490 (D.C. Minn.
1985).
11. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2D 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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engineering of software. Specifically addressed are the legal con-
cerns and protections of companies which write original programs,
and the methods useful in preventing reverse engineering. The as-
pects of a computer program that a company which has a reverse
engineering policy can legally use from another's program are also
addressed. Finally, given the vagueness of this area of copyright
law, the author proposes that specific legislation should be enacted
to deal with the complexity of issues involving the legal protection
of computer programs.
II. BACKGROUND
The Constitution granted Congress the power to create copy-
right protection and confer a limited monopoly on the author's cre-
ation.12 This protection is given in exchange for the author's
disclosure of his work to the world, which in theory will ultimately
benefit the public in general.
The goal of copyright law is the advancement of the public
welfare by encouraging development and disclosure.13 In exchange
for this disclosure to the public, the author is given a monopoly over
their work for their lifetime plus 50 years.14 "Congress has granted
copyright monopolies to serve the public welfare by encouraging
authors to generate new ideas and disclose them to the public, being
free to do so in any uniquely expressed way they may choose." 5 In
regards to computer programs the monopoly should be given very
carefully,
Drawing the line too liberally in favor of copyright protection
would bestow strong monopolies over specific applications upon
the first to write programs performing those applications and
would thereby inhibit other creators from developing improved
products. Drawing the line too conservatively would allow
programmer's efforts to be copied easily, thus discouraging the
creation of all but modest incremental advances.' 6
12. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, clause 8: "The Congress shall have the power to...
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
13. See Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., I ll S.Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991).
"The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but "to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
14. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
15. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
16. Peter S. Menell, An Analysis Of The Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs, 41 STANFORD LAW REViEW, 1045, 1047 (1989).
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However, as the Supreme Court has said,
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Con-
gress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that en-
couragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance the public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in science and useful arts.17
In 1976 Congress revised the copyright law so that all original
works are covered by federal law and state common law protection
would be preempted." Copyrightable subject matter is defined in
17 U.S.C. § 102 as "original works of authorship fixed in any tangi-
ble medium of expression." Section 102(b) serves to limit copyright
protection to expressions, not ideas or processes.1 9 The Lotus2'
court explained it in this way: "The interplay between sections
102(a) and 102(b), illumined by the related legislative history,
manifests that the statute extends copyright protection to expressive
elements of computer programs, but not to the ideas; processes, and
methods embodied in computer programs."21 Original works of au-
thorship refer to works that have been independently created by an
author, regardless of their literary or aesthetic merit, ingenuity, or
qualitative value.22
A. CONTU and the Addition of § 117
In 1980, Congress following the advice of the National Com-
mission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU), added section 117 to the Copyright Act.23 Under copy-
17. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) ". . .Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State."
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work."
20. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
21. Id. at 53.
22. 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5664.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 117 reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step
in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued posses-
sion of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
1993]
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right law, computer programs are presently included in the cate-
gory of literary works24 and are defined as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order
to bring about a certain result."25
B. Extension of Copyright Protection to Computer Programs
As indicated above, copyright protection has been extended to
computer programs, both object code26 and source code,27 and also
to operating system programs.28 In Apple v. Franklin 29 the court
said, "The legislative history of § 102(b) was intended to make clear
that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable
element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or
methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the
copyright law."'30
Copyright law does not give protection to the idea of a com-
puter program, just the expression of that idea in the program.31
This doctrine, which was ultimately codified as § 102(b), originated
in the case of Baker v. Selden.32 In this famous case, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff could copyright the expres-
sion of his accounting method which was embodied in his book, but
copyright protection would not be extended to the actual account-
ing method itself.33 "Congress chose to extend copyright protection
to original expression embodied in computer programs, but not to
any idea, method, or process described by the expression. ' 34 Thus,
the underlying idea of a computer program will not be afforded
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be
leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies were pre-
pared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. Adapta-
tions so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
24. Literary works are defined in § 101 as:
works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes,
disks, or cards, in which they are embodied. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
26. Object code uses only two symbols, 0 and 1, in combinations which represent alpha-
numeric characters. See supra note 9.
27. Computer programs are written in specialized alphanumeric languages, or "source
code." See supra note 9.
28. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 1252.
30. Id. at 1253, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 57.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
32. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 25 L. Ed. 841 (1879).
33. Id.
34. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37, 54 (D. Mass. 1990).
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copyright protection, but the original expression of that idea will
be.35
Copyright law will also not protect useful articles36 or the utili-
tarian aspects of such articles. Computer programs could be con-
sidered useful articles because they do have an "intrinsic utilitarian
function."37 But "elements of expression, even if embodied in use-
ful articles, are copyrightable if capable of identification and recog-
nition independently of the functional ideas that make the article
useful."'38 Furthermore "[i]f, however, the expression of an idea has
elements that go beyond the obvious, and if there are numerous
other ways of expressing the non-copyrightable idea, then those ele-
ments of expression, if original and substantial, are
copyrightable. ' '39
Copyright protection begins once a work is created.4 To be
granted copyright protection, a work must also be fixed in a tangi-
ble medium of expression.41 While it is true that ownership and
copyright protection vest in the owner once the work is fixed, the
work must also be registered as a copyrightable work with the copy-
right office before an infringement action can be filed.42
Because computer programs are included in the category of lit-
erary works, when determining the applicable case law to apply, a
court does not have to be confined to decisions in which there has
been alleged copying of a computer program. Many non-technical
decisions have issues which can be applied to computer programs.
For example, in the very famous case of Nichols v. Universal Pic-
35. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986). This case involved a computer program designed to aid in the business of a dental
laboratory. The infringer had taken this program and adapted it so that it could be used on
another computer. The court in this case decided that, "the idea is the efficient organization
of a dental laboratory," anything else was considered to be expression, such as the structure
of the program, and thus was protectible by copyright law. Id.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines useful articles as "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.
An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a useful article."
37. Id.
38. Lotus, 740 F.Supp. at 58.
39. Id.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) "Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, sub-
sists from its creation ......
41. 17 U.S.C. § 101 "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."
42. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) "no action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall
be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this
title."
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tures Corp.,43 Judge Learned Hand said, "Even if an infringer does
not copy the words or dialogue of a book or play, or the score of a
musical work, infringement may be found if there is copying of the
work's expression of setting, characters, or plot with a resulting sub-
stantial similarity."'  This same general idea can also be applied to
infringement cases involving computer programs.
C. Copyright Infringement
To establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement a
plaintiff must prove two elements: 1) ownership of a valid copy-
right, and 2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original.4 5 Ownership of a valid copyright in a computer program
is proven by establishing the originality and copyrightability of the
program, as well as compliance with statutory formalities,4 6 includ-
ing registering the work with the Copyright Office.47 The issued
certificate of registration will then the give the author a presump-
tion of validity in an infringement action.48
To be eligible for copyright protection, a work must be "origi-
nal" and "fixed in some tangible medium of expression. ' 49 A com-
puter program is fixed once it is stored onto a disk or written down
on a piece of paper.5 0 A work is original according to the Supreme
Court if "the work was independently created by the author, and it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity." 51
The second element of infringement, copying, is sometimes dif-
ficult to prove without an admission by the allegedly infringing
party. Since direct copying is very difficult to prove, this element
can be shown by circumstantial evidence of access to the copy-
righted work and substantial similarity between that work and the
allegedly infringing work. 52 In Sid & Marty Krofft Television v.
McDonald's Corp.,53 the court described two tests that can be used
43. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
44. Id. at 121.
45. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985).
46. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1988).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) "ITihe certificate of a registration made before or within five
years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of
the copyright .. "
49. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
51. Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991).
52. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corporation, 562
F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
53. Id.
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to prove substantial similarity. The first of these tests labeled "ex-
trinsic," asks the question of whether or not there is a similarity of
ideas between the two works at issue.54 The second test, labeled
"intrinsic," looks at whether there are substantial similarities be-
tween the forms of expression used in the competing works.55 Both
the intrinsic and the extrinsic test are to be determined by the trier
of fact.56 If the trier of fact first determines that there are substan-
tial similarities in ideas, the trier of fact "must decide whether there
is substantial similarity in the expression of the ideas so as to consti-
tute infringement. '57
Substantial similarity can be found between the actual pro-
grams; between the structure of the programs;5 8 or as a similarity in
the "look and feel" of the nonliteral expressions of the computer
programs.59 In Whelan 6 the court stated that the concern should
be whether there are "overall similarities between the programs"
and "whether the most significant steps of the programs are simi-
lar."' 61 In this case, the court concentrated not on the quantity of
copying but rather on the quality of the items that were copied.62
D. Protection of Computer Programs By Patent
Computer programs can also potentially be protected under
the patent laws.63 Patentable subject matter is defined as "any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter."64 Usually, patented computer programs are deemed patenta-
ble subject matter as "processes." A process is "a mode of
treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act,
or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be trans-
formed and reduced to a different state or thing. 65
A computer program will not be given patent protection if it is
54. Id. at 1164.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Krofft, at 1164.
58. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986).
59. Lotus, 740 F.Supp. at 62.
60. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1222.
61. Id. at 1246.
62. Id. at 1245. "Because we are concerned with the overall similarities between the
programs, we must ask whether the most significant steps of the programs are similar."
63. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 174, 187 (1981). "[A] claim drawn to subject matter
otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula, computer program, or digital computer."
64. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
65. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
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determined to be merely a mathematical algorithm.66 A reason for
this policy is that patent protection awards a monopoly for seven-
teen years, 67 and this protection should not be given to mathemati-
cal algorithms or formulas, otherwise the patentee could preclude
others from using these formulas for the statutory time period. The
Supreme Court stated the rule this way, "Phenomena of nature,
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific
and technological work.",61
In the case of In re lwahashi,69 the applicant had been denied a
patent for his auto-correlation unit, a device used to obtain a neces-
sary coefficient by taking the square of the sum of two factors in the
equation instead of using multiplication which was more expensive.
The court in this case overruled the examiner and awarded the ap-
plicant a patent stating, "It is no ground for holding a claim is di-
rected to nonstatutory subject matter to say it includes or is directed
to an algorithm. This is why the proscription against patenting has
been limited to mathematical algorithms and abstract mathematical
formulae which, like the laws of nature, are not patentable subject
matter.
70
If the program uses an algorithm in its method, it will be neces-
sary to determine if the algorithm is merely a mathematical formula
or scientific truth.71 If the algorithm is not a mathematical formula
or scientific truth, and it somehow transforms the subject matter to
a different state or thing, it is patentable subject matter. The court
in Iwahashi72 used the "Freeman- Walter test" to determine if a
claim defines nonstatutory subject matter. The court stated the test
this way:
Determination of whether a claim preempts nonstatutory subject
matter as a whole, in the light of Benson, requires a two step
analysis. First, it must be determined whether the claim directly
or indirectly recites an "algorithm" in the Benson sense of that
term, for a claim which fails even to recite an algorithm clearly
cannot wholly preempt an algorithm. Second, the claim must be
66. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 201 (1981). "fN]ew mathematical procedures
that can be conducted in old computers, like mental processes and abstract intellectual con-
cepts, are not patentable processes within the meaning of § 101."
67. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
68. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
69. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
70. Id. at 1374.
71. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989). "[Mlathematical algorithms join
the list of non-patentable subject matter not within the scope of section 101."
72. Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1374.
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further analyzed to ascertain whether in its entirety it wholly
preempts that algorithm.73
Apart from algorithms, it is now also possible to obtain a pat-
ent on a graphical user interface. For example, a patent entitled "A
System and Method for Managing Graphic Images" was recently
issued to Hullot et al. and assigned to NeXT Computer, Inc.74 The
abstract of this patent reads:
A graphic user interface for a computer is provided in which rep-
resentations of application programs can be placed on the display
in a specified area reserved for such a purpose in which area they
could not be so readily obscured and forgotten, and which in-
cludes a facility for controlling the placement of such representa-
tions within the reserved area. The graphic images are guided
into specific locations, or "docks" in the reserved area, and their
removal from the docks is restricted to prevent accidental
withdrawal.75
Because the validity of this type of patent has yet to be tested in
court, companies which invest in this type of patent do so at their
own risk and should realize such patents may be invalidated in in-
fringement litigation.
Also, unless a computer program is somehow working in con-
nection with some kind of hardware, then patent protection is not
applicable. Because of this limitation, the majority of computer
programs will find optimal protection from infringement in the
copyright laws.
III. THE CLEAN ROOM
Companies use a "clean room" in order to make the proof of
the copying element more difficult for plaintiffs to prove in infringe-
ment cases. The "clean room" serves to insulate the first group of
employees who reverse engineer the competitor's program, from the
second group of employees who then use the information acquired
from the first group to write a similar program.
A step-by-step approach is useful to analyze exactly how a
"clean room" situation works. This example involves a hypotheti-
cal situation where one company (Company A) desires to achieve
compatibility with another company's (Company B) program.
First, a group of employees from Company A analyzes Company
B's program. Their task is to reverse engineer or take apart the
73. Id.
74. U.S. Patent No. 5,146,556 issued on Sept. 8, 1992.
75. Id.
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program to learn the method, structure, and specifications of Com-
pany B's program. Once this is done, that information is turned
over to a second group of Company A employees. The task of this
second group is to take the information acquired by the first group
and use it to write a new program that will be compatible with
Company B's original program. Copying in this case is difficult to
prove, because the second group of employees never actually had
access to the original program, they only had access to the informa-
tion that the first group of employees learned and recorded from
Company B's program. So, when they wrote the new program, it
was not copied from the original, but only utilized the specifications
from that program.
There are some who think that the very act of decompiling a
program could be considered unlawful. Section 117 of the Copy-
right Act allows the owner of a software program to make a copy so
long as "such a new copy of adaptation is created as an essential
step in the utilization of the computer program... or that such new
copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only."'76 However, there
is a split in the circuits regarding the meaning of the statutory lan-
guage. At least one court has declared that it is legally permissible
for a copy to be made in order to reverse engineer a program, 77
while another has stated that this type of copying is not permitted
by Section 117.78
Most copyright cases do not stop at section 117. After copying
is found it is also necessary to determine if the programs at issue are
indeed substantially similar.79 One court has extended copyright
protection in computer programs "beyond the programs' literal
code to their structure, sequence, and organization."80 The ques-
tion of substantially similarity is one of fact. The general test is
whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy
76. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
77. In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (1988), the court stated that "[S]ection
117(1) contains no language to suggest that the copy it permits must be employed for a use
intended by the copyright owner, and, absent clear congressional guidance to the contrary,
we refuse to read such limiting language into this exception."
78. In Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450,
456 (D. Idaho 1983), the court stated "this expanded definition makes clear that the input of
a work into a computer results in the making of a copy, and hence that such unauthorized
input infringes the copyright owner's reproduction right."
79. Because direct copying is difficult to prove, courts have allowed this element of the
prima facie case of infringement to be proven by showing that the defendant had access to
and there is substantial similarity between the competing works. See Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
80. Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir.
1986).
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as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work."1
IV. CASE DECISIONS INVOLVING REVERSE ENGINEERING
A. E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America
Reverse engineering of a program by employees of a company
does not automatically mean that they have violated the copyright
laws. It is what that company does with the code that determines if
there has been copyright infringement. In E.F. Johnson Co. v.
Uniden Corp. of America, the court stated it this way:
The mere fact that defendant's engineers dumped, flow charted,
and analyzed plaintiff's code does not, in and of itself, establish
pirating. As both parties' witnesses admitted, dumping and ana-
lyzing competitor's codes is a standard practice in' the industry.
Had Uniden contented itself with surveying the general outline
of the EFJ program, thereafter converting the scheme into de-
tailed code through its own imagination, creativity, and in-
dependent thought, a claim of infringement would not have
812arisen.
In this case, the plaintiff, Johnson, had developed a logic trunked
radio system program of mobile radios.8 3 In order to make a com-
patible radio, the defendant, Uniden, disassembled and copied the
program to use with its radios, even going so far as copying the
errors and unnecessary information in the program.84 Direct evi-
dence of copying was not available to the plaintiff but was inferred
from proof of access and substantial similarity. 5 Johnson was
aided in the proof of infringement by the fact that the same errors
and unnecessary information appeared in both programs, "The
existence of the identical unnecessary instructions in both codes is
strong proof of substantial similarity."86 The presence of identical
errors in copyrighted and infringing computer programs has also
been held to be evidence of copying in other cases as well.8 7
81. E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America, 623 F.Supp. 1485, 1492 (D.C. Minn.
1985).
82. Id. at 1501 n.17.
83. Id. at 1488.
84. Id. at 1495.
85. Id. at 1492.
86. Johnson, 623 F.Supp. at 1496.
87. Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Arctic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 (3d Cir.
1982).
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B. Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assistance
Incorporated
In Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assistance In-
corporated,88  Management Assistance Incorporated (MAI)
designed and copyrighted an operating system program which al-
lowed access to memory on its memory boards.89 MAI would place
governors on these memory boards to restrict access to the memory
in some cases, in order to provide a less expensive system. 90 Hubco
developed "The Nilsson Method II," which disassembled, located,
and removed the governors on MAI's system, allowing the cus-
tomer to upgrade.9 The court in this case said that Hubco could
have independently developed, manufactured, and sold its own ob-
ject code and operating system legally, but that it was infringement
for Hubco to copy MAI object codes and sell them in the form of
operating systems to MAI computer owners. 92
C. Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.
In this recent Ninth Circuit case the issues centered on com-
patibility between video games.93 Accolade copied a Sega video
game to obtain compatability with the Sega Genesis game system.94
Accolade decompiled the machine-readable object code from a Sega
game in order to achieve compatability with the Sega system for
games that it wished to independently create and market.95 Acco-
lade then created a manual containing only the functional specifica-
tions of this decompiled code and not any of Sega's actual code.96
Accolade next created its own games for the Sega Genesis system
using only the functional specifications. 97 The first issue in the case
was whether or not this intermediate copying by Accolade consti-
tuted copyright infringement or was it a fair use of the code.98
Another issue the court decided was whether a screen display
of Sega's trademark by the Accolade games was a Lanham Trade-
88. Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q.. 450 (D.
Idaho 1983).
89. Id. at 452.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 455.
93. Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2D 1561 (9th Cir. 1992).
94. Id. at 1563.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1562.
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mark Act violation.99 Sega included a trademark security system
which was required on the game cartridge in order for the system to
recognize the particular game." Accolade found this code during
its reverse engineering of the Sega game and added it to their man-
ual as a standard header to be included in all games.10 1 Thus, when
Accolade games are inserted into the Sega Genesis system, the con-
sole reads this trademark security system initialization and the Sega
trademark is flashed up on the screen.102 The district court ruled
that this trademark security system code was not functional and
Accolade could not use such a defense to the trademark infringe-
ment claim.10 3 The district court also ruled in favor of Sega on the
copyright claim and issued an injunction against Accolade, also re-
quiring the recall of all of Accolade's infringing games.' 4 The
Ninth Circuit then stayed the injunction and recall order, and de-
cided to hear the case.10 5
As to the trademark issue, the appeals court ruled in Acco-
lade's favor stating that "when there is no other method of access to
the computer that is known or readily available to rival cartridge
manufacturers, the use of the initialization code by a rival does not
violate the [Lanham] Act even though that use triggers a misleading
trademark display."'1 6
The appeals court also ruled in favor of Accolade on the copy-
right issue ruling that "when the person seeking the understanding
has legitimate reason for doing so and when no other means of ac-
cess to the unprotected elements exists, such disassembly is as a
matter of law a fair use of the copyright work."10' 7 Accolade raised
four arguments in its defense, but fair use was the only one accepted
by the court.
10 8
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1564.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1565.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1562.
107. Id.
108. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1565-1566. 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides that:
.... In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the purpose and character of the use in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
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Analyzing the first fair use factor, "the purpose and character
of the use," the appeals court observed that the fact that Accolade
copied for a commercial use weighs against a finding of fair use.109
But, because the copying by Accolade was only at an intermediate
level the court decided that any "commercial 'exploitation' was in-
direct or derivative" and of "minimal significance. The court ruled
that this first factor weighed in favor of Accolade."'
In its analysis of the second fair use factor, "the nature of the
copyrighted work,",the court notes that not all copyrighted works
are entitled to the same degree of protection, and no protection ex-
tends to the functional or factual aspects of a work."' The court
stated that "computer programs are, in essence, utilitarian articles
.... they contain many logical, structural, and visual display ele-
ments that are dictated by the function to be performed, by consid-
erations of efficiency, or by external factors such as compatibility
requirements and industry demands.""' 2 The court further notes
that if Accolade was to understand the functional requirements of
the Sega system, then disassembly of the object code was necessary.
Because the Sega video games contain functional aspects which are
unprotected by copyright law and cannot be understood without
copying, they are afforded a lower degree of protection than other
traditional literary works.' ' 3 The court then decided that the sec-
ond factor also weighed in favor of Accolade." 4
The court decided that the third fair use factor, the purpose
and character of the use, weighed against Accolade because they
copied and disassembled the entire game.' '5 The fact that Accolade
did copy and disassemble the entire game did not preclude an ulti-
mate finding of fair use however, because the ultimate, as opposed
to the direct, use by Accolade was limited and therefore the court
put very little weight on this third factor." 6
Finally, the court decided that the fourth fair use factor, the
effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work, weighed in
favor of Accolade because any loss Sega would suffer would be a
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
109. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1569.
110. Id. at 1569-1570.
111. Id. at 1571.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1572-1573.
114. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1573.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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minor economic lOSS. 1 17 The court put great weight on the fact that
if competitors like Accolade were not able to develop their own
games and make them compatible, then Sega would enjoy a monop-
oly of the market and such a monopoly would "run counter to the
statutory purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot con-
stitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair
use doctrine."11
The Sega court then put these four fair use factors together and
decided that as a matter of law, Accolade was entitled to a fair use
defense to its copying.119 In its summary of this-issue, the court
stated that "[u]nder the Copyright Act, if a work is largely func-
tional, it receives only weak protection. 'This result is neither un-
fair nor unfortunate. It is the. means by which copyright advances
the progress of science and art.",120
V. APPLICATION OF THE LAW
For a company desiring compatibility with another company's
hardware or software, the law is clear. The desire to achieve com-
patibility or standardization does not take precedence over the
rights of the author's monopoly in dissemination of their work.121
For example in Apple v. Franklin,122 the defendant, Franklin, cop-
ied Apple's operating system in order to achieve compatibility with
the Apple II system.1 23 In this case the court said, "If other pro-
grams can be written or created which perform the same function as
Apple's operating system program, then that program is an expres-
sion of the idea and hence copyrightable." 24 A company desiring
to achieve compatibility can do this legally by anything but direct
copying. 12 5
A. What can a company, which develops and manufactures
software do to protect its programs from being copied?
A company should first take steps outside of the legal realm to
117. Id. at 1570-1571.
118. Id. at 1571.
119. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1574.
120. Id., quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1290
(1991).
121. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.Supp. 37, 67 (D. Mass. 1990).
122. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
123. Id. at 1243.
124. Id. at 1253.
125. "Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility with independently developed
application programs written for the Apple II." Apple v. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253.
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prevent others from reverse engineering its programs. As many
safeguards as possible should be implemented within the program in
order to protect against the disassembly and copying of the pro-
gram. But, "hackers" have become very creative and there are few
programs that cannot be disassembled.' 26
Next, some legal action may be taken to deter would-be "copi-
ers." First, a copyright notice should be placed on the disk that
contains the program, on the package in which the disk is sold, in
the software manual, and most importantly, copyright notice
should be placed in the actual code of the program. 127 Extraneous
and unneeded instructions and subroutines should be hidden in the
code very carefully. The idea is to make them appear like useful
instructions to the casual observer. If they show up in the alleged
copy they will be prima facie evidence of copying, 2  because it is
highly unlikely that two independently created programs would
contain the same errors or unneeded instructions. This also makes
the would-be copier's task more difficult if they try to search for
unnecessary code or subroutines. If the would-be copier has to ana-
lyze every line of computer code and determine its function in the
program, the process becomes very time consuming and expensive.
Finally, a company should aggressively enforce its copyrights in
court when it becomes evident that their work product has been
directly copied by a competitor.
B. What can a company which practices disassembly do to
protect itselfl
A company which regularly disassembles programs may also
protect itself from litigation. The key is to utilize and incorporate
as much independent creation as possible into the new program.
Anything that has been independently created, although it may be
based on someone else's idea will not constitute infringement. It is
important to separate the idea and function of a program from the
expression of its code. Ideas and functions may be used to create a
126. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) "Vault had a
disklock program which prevented unauthorized copying of that disk. Quaid invented a key
to that program which unlocked the disk and allowed the user to copy it."
127. 17 U.S.C. § 401 "If a notice of copyright in the form and position specified by this
section appears on the published copy or copies to which a defendant in a copyright infringe-
ment suit had access, then no weight shall be given to such a defendant's interposition of a
defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages. ... "
128. Randall M. Whitmeyer, A Plea For Due Process: Defining The Proper Scope Of
Patent Protection For Computer Software, 85 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW,
1103, 1120 (1991).
[Vol. 9
SOFIWARE REVERSE ENGINEERING
new program and user interface, but in no case should actual code
ever be copied from a competitor's program.
Companies which routinely analyze programs produced by
others should do everything possible to separate its product from
the original program. If for some reason a company desires to
achieve compatibility with another's product, and this cannot be
done by independent creation, then that company should seek a iI-
censing agreement from the owner of the original program. In
some cases this may be expensive, but avoidance of court costs
alone might make these agreements more economically justifiable.
This is particularly true in the situation where costs would be in-
curred in the development of a program that might be ruled a copy.
VI. SOLUTION AND PROPOSAL
At the present time, authors of computer programs may obtain
legal protection for their work in the areas of patent, copyright,
trade secret, trademark, unfair competition and arguably trade
dress. While this may be acceptable to some, this author and others
view such provisions as cumbersome and in need of replacement. 29
Often plaintiffs in infringement suits are forced to plead many dif-
ferent causes of action in order to ensure recovery for what is in
essence, copying by the defendant. Also the 75 year duration of
copyright protection 130 is too long for computer technology. The
software industry has exploded in the last ten to fifteen years and
many advances have been made which make old technologies use-
less. While the useful lifetime of a computer program is not known
at this time, it is known that technology is changing so rapidly that
a monopoly for 75 years is commercially an eternity. 31 Upgrades
and new programs for old applications are introduced daily due to
technological advances and the resultant improvement in software
programs.
129. Id. at 1103. "The unique characteristics of computer software - its ease of copy-
ing; its various aspects (algorithms, source code, object code, and user interface); and its
simultaneously functional and literary nature - have made the application of traditional
intellectual property principles to software difficult." Id.
130. For corporations, 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) provides: "In the case of... a work made for
hire, the copyright endures for a term of seventy-five years from the year of its first publica-
tion, or a term of one hundred years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first." 17
U.S.C. § 302(c).
For an individual authors, protection is provided for life plus 50 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
131. "In the high technology area of computers... the economic life of an innovation
may only be a few years." Andrew G. Rodau, Protecting Computer Software: After Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., Does Copyright Provide the Best Protection?, 57
TEMPLE L.Q. 527, 532 (1984).
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While the 17-year monopoly 32 provided by patent is still too
long for computer software, the alternative of trade secret protec-
tion is virtually limitless, as long as the invention can be kept secret.
Reliance on these traditional legal theories has detracted from the
competitive interaction which made the software industry what it is
today.133
Congress should establish a workable compromise by enacting
new legislation which deals exclusively with computer software and
the issues concerning protection and infringement of computer
software. This legislation should extract elements from each of the
areas mentioned in the above paragraphs as well as elements from
other areas of the law including contracts and torts. The Semicon-
ductor Chip Act 134 was enacted to protect mask works through ba-
sically the same mechanism, and could be used as a model.
The goals of this legislation should be to:
1. Foster and maintain the competitive edge that has been
achieved by the U.S. Computer Software Industry. 135
2. Reward computer software inventors for their time and fi-
nancial investments.13 6
3. Promote the development of new software and improve-
ments of old software.
4. Encourage the free dissemination of ideas embodied in popu-
lar and innovative software programs.13 7
5. Allow others to use elements of programs that have come to
be standards in the industry.
6. Provide meaningful penalties for violation of this legislation.
As mentioned above, the U.S. software industry is viewed by
many as the best in the world. 3  Any new legislation to protect
property interests in computer programs should first serve to pro-
tect and enhance the position already achieved by American
132. 35 U.S.C. § 154 "Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a
grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years."
133. Vance Franklin Brown, The Incompatibility Of Copyright and Computer Software:
An Economic Evaluation And A Proposal For A Marketplace Solution, 66 NORTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW, at 97 (1988).
134. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988).
135. See Toole, supra, note 4.
136. Copyright does not extend protection for the actual work done by an inventor. In
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1295 (1991) the Court
stated, "the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no doubt that originality, not "sweat of
the brow," is the touchstone of copyright protection in directories and other fact-based
works."
137. "New ideas must be disseminated throughout society so that further progress can be
made without having to reinvent the wheel." Brown, supra note 133 at 978.
138. See Toole, supra note 4.
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software companies. A reward or some kind of economic incentive
is needed to encourage new development and innovation in com-
puter software. Thus, the open exchange of ideas and techniques
should be balanced with the need to reward inventors. There also
should be encouragement for other companies to use elements of
programs that have developed into industry standards.1 39 Tradi-
tionally, American society has allowed the first market entrant to
set the industry standard."4 But, the manner by which some
software companies are presently utilizing copyright protection aI-
lows the first market entrant to control the market. "The first de-
veloper of successful software who is able to set an industry
standard may now use the copyright law as.a shield against compet-
itive market forces." 14'
Software companies are now choosing to actively enforce prop-
erty interests in their programs through copyright law.'42 This en-
forcement could have an adverse effect on' innovation as
development of new products may decline and standardization
could become impossible.143 Society can only benefit from the dis-
semination of innovations developed by software developers,
whether this is accomplished by reverse engineering of licensing
agreements. 1 4 Any new legislation to protect property interests in
computer software should promote standardization of computer
programs as much as possible. "Standardization is particularly im-
portant for computer software, where compatibility is essential for
the sharing of data between programs." 145
The original developer should however, receive some benefit
from another's use of his program. Any new legislation should in-
clude economic incentives to entice developers to continually create
new innovations. This should be balanced with the opendissemina-
tion and teaching necessary to promote standardization and effi-
ciency, thus minimizing duplication of effort. This author suggests
a system modeled after the music industry's compulsory licenses. 146
Such protection serves to reward the first innovator who brings
139. An industry standard would be an element of a program that is accepted as such by
the market. Examples include the user interfaces of certain programs.
140. Examples of this are the convention of having the brake pedal -to the left of the gas
pedal and the "figure-H" pattern of an automobile stick. Brown, supra note, 133 at 977.
141. Id.
142. See Kapor, supra note 7.
143. Toole, supra note 4.
144. Id. at 147.
145. Id. at 150.
146. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) "When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have
been distributed to the public in the United States under the authority of the copyright
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something new to the market but also makes this technology readily
available to others who wish to adapt it for use in their own pro-
grams. Exact copying would not be permitted unless authorized by
the owner of the technology. But, a new method or interface could
be used by others' programs, as long as a per unit license fee was
paid to the developer of that method or interface. As within the
music industry's compulsory license, the license fee could be set by
statute. Or, a lesser fee could be negotiated between the user and
the owner. 147 The original author of the software program could be
given a shortened statutory period such as two years in which to
exploit the exclusive right to use the parts of the program. After
this two year period, the original author would still own the copy-
right in the program, but others would be free to use it upon pay-
ment of the compulsory license fee or negotiation of a direct license
with the original author.
One potential problem with such legislation, is that some de-
velopments could be viewed as trivial, and therefore should not be
governed by compulsory licenses. A way around this problem is to
adopt a standard much like the patent statute's nonobvious stan-
dard148 and require any potential licensor to first register any inno-
vative method or interface before becoming eligible to collect fees
from any company taking advantage of the compulsory license stat-
ute. This statute should also include an element which requires the
original developer to disclose any innovative methods or interfaces
for which she wishes to receive compulsory fees. This still allows
the developer to protect the technology through trade secret if that
would further the company's best interests. Of course, any technol-
ogy protected by trade secret should lend itself to secrecy and meet
the statutory guidelines for trade secrets.14 9
Under this proposed system, because one company should not
be able to exclude all others, the computer software industry should
become more efficient. Innovation will be encouraged and re-
warded, but perhaps even more important is that improvement of
owner, any other person may, by complying with the provisions of this section, obtain a
compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords of the work."
147. "The usual effect of the system is to make the statutory royalty rate a ceiling on the
price copyright owners can charge for use of their songs under negotiated contracts: if the
owner demands a higher price in voluntary negotiations, the manufacturer can turn to the
statutory scheme, but if the owner is willing to accept less than the statutory rate, he is free to
do so." Recording Industry Association of America v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal 662 F.2d
1 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
148. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
149. California Civil Code § 3426.1(d).
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existing programs will be allowed and even encouraged. 150
VII. CONCLUSION
Computer programs can now be protected under various theo-
ries of intellectual property law. As long as these traditional theo-
ries are in force, software developers should be aware that there are
some activities which are prohibited when reverse engineering or
analyzing another company's program. No actual code should ever
be copied; all of the code for a new program which is based on
another's program, should be written independently. Companies
trying to protect their programs from reverse engineering should
incorporate as many safeguards as possible into the programs. Such
safeguards include devices which prevent copying, and the pur-
poseful inclusion of unneeded code in the program which will assist
the company in meeting its proof burden should it be necessary to
prove instances of copying during infringement litigation.
New legislation should be enacted to better protect computer
programs and the American software industry. One potential
model is provided by the compulsory licenses now in use by the
music industry. This method of protection would allow free dis-
semination of the ideas and methods used in innovative software
development and should serve to enhance the overall efficiency of
the software industry. While such change may initially be difficult
to implement, it is long overdue and new legislation should be en-
acted before it is too late.
150. "But, it seems likely that more programmers will take advantage of opportunities to
improve an existing application by making it faster, easier to use, or more functional."
Whitmeyer, supra note 128 at p. 1120.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To outside investors, the People's Republic of China (PRC)
often seems like a hungry tiger waiting to pounce on its next victim.
Investors are wary because information regarding Chinese trade
and investment policies is often scarce or contradictory.' More-
over, the mercurial nature of the PRC's economic development pol-
icy has frightened potential investors.2 For example, the 1979-80
cancellation of a large number of contracts relating to the Baoshan
Steel Plant created an atmosphere of caution and skepticism for
companies entering into contracts with the PRC.3 Skepticism is
compounded by the widely-held perception that Chinese contracts
lack legal enforceability despite the existing PRC judicial and arbi-
tration bodies.4
This reputation for non-performance of contracts stems from
the Vickers-Zimmer case and similar incidents in the late 1960s.1
The Vickers-Zimmer dispute arose out of a contract to build a pe-
trochemical plant in China.' In the original contract, Vickers-Zim-
mer and China agreed that in the event of a contractual dispute that
both sides would submit to arbitration in Stockholm.7 However,
when Chinese soldiers prevented Vickers-Zimmer from building its
plant, Vickers' request for arbitration was rejected and two of its
employees were arrested as spies.' Furthermore, in a later proceed-
ing from which Vickers-Zimmer was excluded, the company was
found liable for "failure" to fulfill its contractual obligations.9
Throughout the 1970s, accounts of purported Chinese efforts
to avoid arbitration and reject requests for dispute resolution per-
meated the international investment community, raising doubts
1. "The majority of [PRC] legislation [is] frequently plagued by ambiguities and con-
tradictions." Richard J. Goossen, Non-judicial Dispute Resolution in the People's Republic of
China, Bus. L. REV. 331, 335 (1986); "The most striking thing to the newcomer to the Chi-
nese business environment and legal environment is there's no ready proof that China has a
legal system in the conventional Western sense." Nancy L. Ross, Veteran China Hands Offer
Some Advise to Businessmen, WASH. POST, April 9, 1978, at K2 (quoting former Harvard
Law School Associate Dean Jerome Cohen).
2. See Goossen, supra note 1.
3. Jerome Alan Cohen and Stuart J. Valentine, Foreign Direct Investment in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China: Progress, Problems, and Proposals, 1 J. CHINESE L. 161, 202 (1987).
4. Id.
5. See Jerome Alan Cohen, The Role of Arbitration in Economic Co-operation with
China, in FOREIGN TRADE INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 508-509 (Michael J. Moser ed., 1987).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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about China's reliability as a business partner.10
This comment discusses the reliability of arbitration as a means
of dispute resolution for foreign parties engaged in technology
transfers with China. Part one describes the various types of tech-
nology transfers to the PRC, followed by a discussion of the
problems and possible preventive measures for use in negotiations
involving negotiating arbitration clauses in contracts dealing with
Chinese businesses. Part two describes the Chinese arbitrational
structure and process. The conclusion analyzes the viability of the
Chinese arbitration system as a forum for resolving disputes in cases
concerning foreign technology transfers to China.
II. BACKGROUND
One of the PRC's major concerns in the 1950s was to develop
its technological and industrial base."1 Unfortunately, China lacked
expertise and equipment to design, build, and operate modern man-
ufacturing plants.12 As a result, China depended upon its "Big
Brother," the Soviet Union, as its primary source of technology and
aid. 3 By 1960, the Soviets had supplied the Chinese with enough
expertise to build 130 industrial projects. 4 However, as a result of
deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1960s, the Soviets
withdrew their technical support and China was unable to continue
these projects." Accordingly, the importance of technological ad-
vancement and self-reliance were reflected in China's political and
economic policies.16
Between 1973 and 1978, the PRC began importing heavy ma-
chinery to support large technical projects from the most reputable
corporations, including airplanes from McDonald Douglas, micro-
computers from Wang computers, petrochemical plant construc-
tion, and joint ventures for production of locomotives.' 7 In addi-
tion, China decentralized its highly structured and rigid foreign
trade system by increasing the number Chinese entities permitted to
10. See Cohen, supra note 5.
11. See CRAIG DIETRICH, PEOPLE'S CHINA: A BRIEF HISTORY 84-85 (1986).
12. Id. at 85.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id at 138-141.
16. China is "determined to be as self-sufficient as possible and trades only to make a
political point or to acquire modem equipment it cannot easily make itself." Jay Mathews,
Chinese Are Expected to Increase Trade With Rest of World Slowly, WASH. PosT, January 9,
1977, at G7.
17. Id.
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enter into technology transfer agreements with foreigners.' 8 Unfor-
tunately, while decentralization increased the speed of technology
transfers, many of these transfers were either unnecessary or
useless. 19
In 1984, China established a single administrative authority,
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
(MOFERT), to govern over foreign trade in China and to effectuate
efforts to re-centralize.20 Furthermore, the PRC developed a new
industrial policy to meet China's needs in the 1990s. There are four
primary goals which dominate this policy: 1) by the year 2000, to
reach level of technological development comparable to that which
Western industrialized nations had achieved in 1990; 2) disseminate
technology into rural areas; 3) develop infrastructure and natural
resources; and 4) promote high technology in the areas of com-
puters, electronic, biotechnology, laser, robotics, and space and sea
exploration.21
A. Forms of Technology Transfers in the PRC
1. Pure Licensing Agreements
Pure licensing agreements for technology or industrial prop-
erty are the inexpensive alternative available to foreign investors in-
terested in investments in China.22 These contracts are relatively
risk-free and involve a minimal level of continuing cooperation on
the part of the transferor.23 However, the benefits of licensing con-
tracts are often negated by Chinese demands that the transferor
guarantee the quality of the product manufactured by the trans-
ferred technology.24 Furthermore, the transferor may be required
to assume responsibility for any other machinery and equipment in-
volved, whether or not the transferor manufactures it.25
18. Id.
19. DIETRICH, supra note 11, at 257.
20. Interview with Professor Anna Han, Associate Professor, Santa Clara University
School of Law (Apr. 8, 1992) (hereinafter Han Lecture).
21. Id.
22. Stanley B. Lubman & Gregory C. Wajnowski, Technology Transfer to the People's
Republic of China: Practice and Policy, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA § 3.02[l] (William P.
Streng & Allen D. Wilcox eds., 1992).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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2. Compensation Trade/Countertrade Transactions
In a typical countertrade transaction,26 the foreigner supplies
equipment or licenses technology, in return for repayment by the
PRC in product.27 This type of transaction is often pursued by
companies in need of raw materials or low cost labor.28 Moreover,
the Chinese strongly encourage investors to engage in countertrade
because such transactions conserve China's foreign currency
reserves.
29
3. Contribution of Technology to a Joint Venture
Technology transfers are one of China's primary goals in en-
couraging joint ventures. In these agreements, the transferred tech-
nology is a significant portion of a foreign joint venture partner's
total capital contribution. Equity joint ventures and Sino-contrac-
tual joint ventures (also referred to as "foreign cooperative enter-
prises") are two types of joint ventures used in Chinese business. 30
a. Equity Joint Ventures
A equity joint venture is a limited liability company in which
each investor's liability is limited to their original capital invest-
ment.31 Each investor in an equity joint venture must contribute at
least 25 percent and not more than 99 percent of the total invest-
ment32 "in cash or kind." Thus, the investor's proportionate capital
26. In China, countertrade may be conducted under various methods. Countertrade
structures include barter, buy-back or direct compensation trade, counter purchase or indi-
rect compensation, advance purchase, offset, government-to-government trade agreements,
clearing agreements, and switch transactions. See S. Linn Williams & Clark D. Stith,
Countertrade, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA § 10.04 (William P. Streng & Allen D. Wilcox
eds., 1992).
27. Lubman and Wajnowski, supra note 22, at § 3.02[4].
28. Williams & Stith, supra note 26, § 10.01.
29. See id § 10.02[1].
30. Compare Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Co-operative En-
terprises, I China Bus. Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 6-100 (1988) [hereinafter
Contractual Joint Ventures] with Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Joint
Equity Enterprises, I China Bus. Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 6-500 (1988)
and Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, 1 China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH
Austl. Ltd.) 6-550 (1983).
Another entity that promotes technology transfers in China is the wholly foreign-owned
enterprises. These wholly foreign-owned enterprises are beyond the scope of this Comment.
Interested readers are referred to the Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning
Enterprises with Sole Foreign Investment, 2 China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.)
13-506 (1986) [hereinafter, Foreign Investment].
31. Joint Venture Regulations, supra note 30, 6-550(19).
32. "In March 1987, Provisional Regulations of the State of Administration for Indus-
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contribution may consist of foreign currency, technology and/or
equipment.33 All parties who wish to invest in China must comply
with technology transfers in the form of equipment, "know-how"34
or training of scientific management, technical and managerial per-
sonnel.35 The normal duration of an equity joint venture is between
ten and thirty years, but this term may be extended to fifty years
with special approval.36 At liquidation, the assets are distributed
"among the parties to the joint venture according to the proportion
of each party's investment unless otherwise provided by agreement,
contract or the articles of association.",37
b. Contractual Joint Ventures
These Sino-foreign co-operative joint ventures are governed by
the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Co-
operative Enterprises. ' 38 The purpose of this regulation is to ex-
pand and facilitate cooperation and technological exchanges be-
tween foreign entities and China.39 The structure of a cooperative
joint venture provides greater flexibility to the contracting parties
than equity joint ventures.4° For example, foreign investors may
invest as little or as much as the parties agree upon.41 In contrast to
equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures permit partners to
recoup their investment and depreciation expenses during the ven-
ture period.42 In choosing whether to enter into a equity joint ven-
ture or a contractual joint venture, the foreign investor should
try and Commerce Concerning the Proportion of Registered Capital to Total Investment of
Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures were promulgated. These regulations establish registered capital
requirements for equity ventures of different sizes." Michael W.T. Chan, Business Ventures
in the People's Republic of China, in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY JOINT VENTURES IN
THE COUNTRIES OF THE PACIFIC RIM 61, 64 (James A. Dobkins ed., 1988).
33. Joint Venture Regulations, supra note 30, 6-550(3).
34. "Know-how" is described as technical knowledge which has not been made public
and is used for manufacturing, product design, quality control or management and technical
process." Anna Han, China's New Regulations for Technology Import Contracts: An Evolving
Primer For Technology Transfers to China 3 (April 1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Professor Anna Han, Santa Clara University, School of Law).
35. Joint Venture Regulations, supra note 30, 6-550(4).
36. Id. 6-550(100) (as amended in 1986).
37. Id.
38. Contractual Joint Ventures, supra note 30.
39. Id. 6-100(1).
40. The parties may choose not to create a legal "person" with limited liability and set
forth all duties, rights and liabilities through contractual negotiation. Cohen & Valentine,
supra note 3, at 180. However, "in some instances, the [contractual joint venture] is a legal
entity with its own articles of association and board of directors, and occasionally even lim-
ited liability." Id.
41. Id.
42. See Contractual Joint Ventures, supra note 30, 6-100 (22).
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consider tax implications and foreign exchange repatriation.43
B. Rules and Regulations
Prior to 1985, the PRC had no established legislative regula-
tions governing the transfer of technology.A Thus, negotiations for
technology transfer through capital contributions and other means
occurred without the benefit of published legal guidelines or state
approval.45 Often these technology transfers were made by Chinese
authorities on an ad hoc basis." Consequently, foreign investors
were subject to contradictory investment requirements and uncer-
tain prospects for success. 47
Due to the increased volume and complexity of technology
transferred into the PRC, the Chinese legislature promulgated a
number of regulations to handle technology transfers more effec-
tively.48 In 1985, "Regulations on Administration of Technology
Import Contracts of the People's Republic of China" (Technology
Regulations)49 were promulgated, setting forth general guidelines
for technology transfers. In 1987, "Detailed Rules for the Imple-
mentation of the Administrative Regulations of the People's Repub-
lic of China on the Control of Technology Import Contracts"
(Implementing Regulations) were promulgated. 50 In contrast to the
Technology Regulations, which basically provided for contracts
dealing with patent know-how,51 the Implementing Regulations
have broadened the contract scope to include the transfer of propri-
etary technology and trade secrets.52
All contracts are subject to explicit requirements for technol-
ogy import contracts. These contracts must include:
1. Name of the contract;
43. See Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 205. The problems of foreign exchange
repatriation and the tax consequence associated with it will not be discussed in this comment.
44. Lubman & Wajnowski, supra note 22, at § 3.04.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. §§ 3.03[3]-3.04.
48. Id. § 3.04.
49. Regulations on the Administration of Technology Import Contracts of the People's
Republic of China, 1 China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) % 5-570 (1985) [herein-
after Technology Regulations].
50. Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Administrative Regulations of the
People's Republic of China on the Control of Technology Import Contracts, 1 China Laws
for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 5-573 (1987) [hereinafter Implementing Regulations].
51. Technology Regulations, supra note 49, 5-570(2).
52. Implementing Regulations, supra note 50, % 5-573(2). This includes technical ser-
vice contracts, whereby the licensor is authorized to use a specified technology to provide
service or consultation. Id.
19931
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2. Description, scope and requirements of the technology to be
imported;
3. Criteria, time limits and standards for assessing and examin-
ing the apportionment of liability for risk and measures to be
adopted;
4. Obligation of confidentiality with regards to the imported
technology, and the ownership and sharing of improvements to
the technology
5. Total price and enumeration, price of individual items and
form of payment;
6. Method of computing the amount of damages for breach of a
contract;
7. Methods for the resolutions of dispute; and
8. Definitions of technical terminology. 3
The Technology Regulations also set forth guidelines limiting
the types of technology that will be approved for import and imple-
mentation in China. For example, "technology to be imported
must be advanced and appropriate" and is required to comply with
at least one of the following goals:
1. Developing new products;
2. Improving product performance, reducing the cost of product
performance, reducing the cost of products and conserving en-
ergy or raw material;
3. Favorable to maximizing the utilization of local resources;
4. Enhancing foreign exchange earnings;
5. Favorable to environmental protection;
6. Favorable to production safety;
7. Improving management; and
8. Upgrading scientific and technical standards. 54
However, current administrative practices and policies provide
little direction for foreign investors as to which of these eight factors
will be given greatest emphasis by Chinese officials. Nonetheless, it
seems likely that contracts that foster the basic policy objectives of
the PRC would be more likely to again approval. Technology con-
tracts such as those which promote the development of new prod-
ucts for export or increase foreign exchange earnings, are more
likely to be approved, because these factors comport with the basic
policy objectives of the PRC.
The requirement that the technology be advanced underlies the
PRC's concern that the imported technology be current." Such
53. Id. 1 5-573(7).
54. Technology Regulations, supra note 49, % 5-570(3).
55. See Joint Venture Regulations, supra note 30, q% 6-550(3)-(4).
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concerns demonstrate that Chinese authorities are very wary about
being "stuck" with the West's outdated technology.5 6 Conse-
quently, determining whether a proposed transfer involves "state of
the art" technology has become a major issue in the approval pro-
cess.57 The PRC has often preferred to license the most technologi-
cally advanced knowledge or product, despite the limited utility of
such knowledge may have in China.58 For example, new technol-
ogy is often incompatible with existing manufacturing plants or
computer systems within the PRC. 9
The PRC's insistence on the imposition of warranty provisions
upon foreign transferor has been incorporated into the Technology
Regulations and the Implementing RegulationsY' The transferor
must guarantee lawful ownership and to compensate the PRC for
any and all losses resulting from an intellectual property infringe-
ment claim. 61 Furthermore, the transferor must warrant that the
technology or documents, and information provided are "complete,
correct, valid and capable of accomplishing the technical targets
prescribed in the contract. 62
The Technology and Implementing Regulations both include
provisions which invalidate all contracts which place unreasonably
restrictive requirements upon the Chinese party. 63 The underlying
purpose behind these restrictions is to protect the PRC from the
exploitation by unscrupulous foreigners. For example, a transferor
may not include any of the following clauses in a technology con-
tract, without first obtaining special approval:
1. Include in the contract additional conditions which are rele-
vant to the technology being imported, such as requiring the
transferee to purchase unnecessary technology, technical serv-
ices, raw material, equipment and products;
2. Restrict the transferee's freedom of choice to obtain raw
materials, parts components or equipment from other sources.
3. Restricting the transferee's development and improvement of
imported technology;
4. Restricting the transferee's acquisition of similar or compet-
ing technology from other sources;
56. Han Lecture, supra note 20.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Implementing Regulations, supra note 50, T 5-573(11).
62. Id. $ 5-573(9).
63. Technology Regulations, supra fiote 49, t 5-570(9); Implementing Regulations,
supra note 50, $ 5-573(18).
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5. Imposing unequal terms of exchange upon the transferee of
improvements of the imported technology.
6. Restrict the imported technologies quantity, variety and sales
price of products to be manufactured by the transferee;
7. Restrict unreasonably the transferee's sales channels and ex-
port markets;
8. Forbid use by the transferee of the imported technology after
the expiration of the contract; or
9. Require the transferee to pay for or to undertake obligations
for patents which are unused or no longer effectivef 4
Every agreement or joint venture contract containing a tech-
nology transfer component must be approved by the Chinese gov-
ernment.65 This is often a lengthy and frustrating process, due to
the presence of various barriers which must be overcome. 6 The
first barrier a transferor must address is determining which Chinese
entity has approval authority. This is a difficult determination de-
spite the intent of the Implementing Regulations to provide some
clarity. However, as a general rule, joint venture contracts require
approval by MOFERT or its local designee or bureau.67
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Implementing Regulations, if a
local agency has approved the joint venture feasibility study, the
local agency retains the power to examine and approve the final
contract.68 Accordingly, in order to determine who has approval
authority, the transferee and the transferor must first determine the
appropriate authority for reviewing the feasibility study.69 This is a
crucial determination because the feasibility study and project pro-
posal must be approved by the proper Chinese authority, before the
transferor and transferee can negotiate a technology transfer
agreement.7°
The key factors in this determination are the project's location
and its total value.7' For most projects involving a feasibility study
less than $5,000,000 (U.S. dollars), approval may be obtained from
the ministry under whose authority the project is being under-
taken.72 Projects between $5,000,000 and $50,000,000 (U.S. dol-
lars) require approval by a ministry level entity or by MOFERT
64. Technology Regulations, supra note 49, 5-570(9).
65. Lubman & Wajnowski, supra note 22, at § 3.04[4].
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Lubman & Wajnowski, supra note 22, at § 3.04[4].
71. Id.
72. Id.
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(located in Beijing).7 3 When a large project is involved and the total
project value exceeds one hundred million dollars, approval by
MOFERT and the State Council is imperative.74
The location of the project is also a factor in determining the
appropriate approval authority. The PRC has granted independent
approval authority for projects involving at least $30,000,000 U.S.
dollars to the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Dalian, Tianjin, and
Guangzhou.75 In addition, special economic zones (SEZ) have au-
tonomous approval authority and a core of separate and distinct
technology transfer regulations.76
Once negotiations are concluded, the contract will not be vali-
dated until it is scrutinized by the approving authority for compli-
ance with the Implementing Regulations." The Implementing
Regulations require MOFERT or the appropriate authority to
make a decision on the contract within fifty days, or it is deemed
approved.78 However, it is questionable whether the Chinese will
honor a contract that has been approved by this default provision.
Without the proper approval signatures and stamps, the necessary
Chinese entities may be unwilling to cooperate. Authorization is
required to implement any foreign project.79 Often, the approval
authority determines that the parties must make specific amend-
ments to the contract within a specified period before their contract
will be approved. 80
Although joint venture enterprises engage in technology trans-
fer, the PRC has expressly exempted equity, contractual and wholly
owned enterprises from the scope of the Technology Implementing
Regulations.81 The governing law for technology transferred as
capital contribution in a joint venture is the "Regulations for the
Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment" (Joint Ven-
ture Regulations).82 However, foreign parties can expect joint ven-
ture contracts involving technology transfers to be similarly
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Lubman & Wajnowski, supra note 22, at § 3.04[4].
76. See Stanley B. Lubman & H. Zheng, The Special Economic Zones and Coastal Cit-
ies, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA § 20 (William P. Streng & Allen D. Wilcox eds., 1992).
77. See Jesse T.H. Chang & Elson Pow, Technology Transfer to China, EAST ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., Jan. 15, 1986, at 8.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Han, supra note 34, at 3.
82. Joint Venture Regulations, supra note 30.
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scrutinized as if the Implementing Regulations were applied. This
is perhaps due to the fact that MOFERT and the provincial ap-
proval entities for joint venture contracts are the agencies most
often involved in approving contracts that fall under the Technol-
ogy Regulations and the Joint Venture Regulations. In fact, the
provisions for the capital investment contributions of technology in
joint venture contracts encompass many of the same clauses as the
Technology Regulations.13
III. DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES FOR TECHNOLOGY
CONTRACTS AND JOINT VENTURE CONTRACTS WITH
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER COMPONENTS
The "Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Repub-
lic of China (FECL)84 has established standards for settling all con-
tract disputes involving foreign investors. The regulation
establishes basic resolution procedures for use in the event of a dis-
pute. Under this regulation, "[a]ny disputes arising from the con-
tract ought to be settled by the parties, if possible, through
consultation or mediation of a third party." 5 However, if the dis-
pute cannot be resolved by consultation or mediation, the dispute
may be settled by arbitration, or by suit in the People's Court if
"neither an arbitration clause is provided in the contract nor a writ-
ten agreement [to arbitrate] is reached afterwards."86
Due to the loosely drafted joint venture regulations, many is-
sues are left open to contract negotiation, including alternative
means of dispute resolution. Consequently, international law and
practice must fill the contractual and regulatory gaps. This allows
the joint venture partners to decide issues not covered by Chinese
law. Examples include the language used in the contract, the choice
of venue for arbitration, and the amount of liquidated damages.
This enables the parties to draw on international law to resolve dis-
putes, should conflicts arise.8 7 Further, FECL expressly permits
contract provisions based on international treaties which the PRC
has participated in or concluded to differ from PRC laws.A
83. Compare Technology Regulations, supra note 49 with Joint Venture Regulations,
supra note 30.
84. Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, I China Laws
for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 5-550 (1985) [hereinafter FECL].
85. Id. 5-500(37).
86. Id. 5-550(38).
87. Goossen, supra note 1, at 332.
88. FECL, supra note 84, 5-550(6) (except treaty clauses to which the PRC has de-
clared reservation).
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A. Problems and Solutions for Negotiation of Dispute
Resolution Clauses
Although the broad language of the joint venture laws and
FECL implies that there is a tremendous amount of freedom for
contracting in drafting their joint venture agreements, this is not
necessarily true. Foreign investors have limited autonomy because
China's approval process is "plagued by confusion, bureaucratic in-
conveniences, and excessively rigid policy."89This lack of autonomy
is evident from MOFERT's model contract, which sets forth a form
contract which includes China's position on issues regarding dis-
pute resolution." Consequently, if an arbitration clause is omitted
from the contract, MOFERT may be reluctant to approve the joint
venture. Moreover, even though the joint venture regulations pro-
vide for dispute resolution in the courts, none of the model clauses
offers this alternative.91 In addition, foreign treaties entered into by
China make it clear that conciliation and arbitration are in fact fa-
vored methods of dispute resolution.92 FECL allows parties to ini-
tiate a suit only in the absence of an agreement to arbitrate; a party
may not go to court if there is such an arbitral agreement. 93
The PRC has often claimed that a choice of forum is available
to foreign investors, because Chinese law states that arbitration can
take place in the defendant's domicile or where the dispute arose.94
However, the PRC will always attempt to make the determination
that the dispute arose in China.95 Therefore, the arbitration will
89. Chan, supra note 32, at 62.
90. See Christan Sakibaing, Dispute Settlement in China, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA
§ 21.05(1) (William P. Streng & Allen D. Wilcox eds., 1992); the model contract is reprinted
in English in COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS, & TRADE LAWS: THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, booklet 27,28 (Owen D. Nee Jr., et al eds, 1983). This form contract was created as a
starting point for joint venture negotiations and was in part drafted to protect the interests of
the PRC. Salbaing, § 21.05[1]
91. The model clauses have been interpreted to involve the courts in only the enforce-
ment of the resolution. Walter Sterling Survey, Dispute Settlement in U.S. - China Trade -
Another Look, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 277 (1985).
92. "Article 8 of the Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement which was signed on 5 January
1974 provides for recourse to friendly consultation to resolve disputes, followed by arbitration
if negotiation fails. Similarly, Article VIII of the US-China Trade Agreement emphasizes
that the friendly negotiation and conciliation processes should be attempted before arbitra-
tion is adopted." ERIC LEE, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN CHINA 10 (1985). See
Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., art. VIII, 31 U.S.T. 4651. The U.S
and the P.R.C. agreed to settle any dispute arising from or in relation to their contracts
through friendly consultation, conciliation, or mutually acceptable means, including interna-
tional third party arbitration. Goossen, supra note 1, at 332.
93. FECL, supra note 84, 5-550(37)-(38).
94. See Goossen, supra note 1, at 334.
95. See id.
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nearly always take place in China.96 For example, the PRC always
takes the position of defendant itself so that it can invoke the clause
for permitting the arbitration to occur in the defendant's domicile.
Alternatively, if the place of arbitration is decided on the basis of
where the dispute arose, it is inevitable that the arbitration will take
place in China.
As the model contracts do not offer a choice of forum in the
arbitration clauses, an increasing number of Chinese recipients are
asking that arbitration take place in Beijing under the auspices of
the Foreign Economic Trade Arbitration Commission (FETAC) in
China.9 7 An investor who does not wish to arbitrate under FETAC
should specify the place of arbitration at the outset of negotiations.
When the contract is silent as to the location of the dispute forum
and choice of law, the law of the country which has the "closest
connection" with the contract will be applied as set forth by the
FECL.98 Consequently, almost all joint venture contracts in which
technology is imported for use in China will be deemed as having
the closest connection to China. 99
Dispute resolution clauses are negotiable," °° and MOFERT
has approved contracts where the agreed location of arbitration is
outside of China and governed by an arbitration organization other
than FETAC.101 Most sample contracts permit third country arbi-
tration if consultation has failed to resolve the dispute.10 2 In fact,
MOFERT continually has approved third country arbitration in
Sweden under the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 10 3 the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Laws (UNCITRAL)
rules,"4 in Zurich under Swiss arbitration," 5 in Hong Kong under
96. See id.
97. Han, supra note 34, at 8.
98. FECL, supra note 84, 5-550(5).
99. Han, supra note 34, at 8.
100. Id. at 8.
101. See e.g., FECL, supra note 84, 1 5-550(35).
102. Anne Judith Farina, Comment, "Talking Disputes into Harmony" China Ap.
proaches International Commercial Arbitration, 4 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 137, 167
(1989).
103. "Any dispute 'shall be settled though friendly consultation between the parties;' but
if settlement cannot be reached, the dispute shall be submitted for arbitration." Abitration is
to take place in Stockholm, Sweden, under the auspices of the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce." CHARLES A. BROWER & LEE R. MARKS, INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 245 (1983) (providing an summary of a typical arbitra-
tion clause used between a U.S. party and a PRC governmental entity).
104. Han, supra note 34, at 8.
105. Id.
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the Hong Kong Arbitration Center,10 6 and most recently under the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). 0 7
UNCITRAL has been the accepted arena for dispute resolu-
tion since 1979, when the United States and the PRC signed a trade
agreement. 108 Article 8 of the Trade Agreement, which addresses
dispute settlement, provides that:
The Contracting Parties encourage the prompt and equitable set-
tlement of disputes arising from or in relation to contracts be-
tween their respective firms, companies, corporations, and trade
organizations through friendly consultations, conciliations, and
other mutually acceptable means.109
If a dispute cannot be resolved promptly through consultation
or conciliation, the treaty provides that the parties may submit to
arbitration in the People's Republic of China, the United States or a
third country.10 The rules of procedure of the relevant arbitral in-
stitutions are either those of UNCITRAL or any other rules of pro-
cedure agreed upon by the two parties."'
Hong Kong has also been approved for third party arbitration
through the Hong Kong Arbitration Center." 2 Use of this Center
may be advantageous to a foreign investor for various reasons, in-
cluding the great expertise of Hong Kong arbitrators in Chinese law
and investment practices (these arbitrators have more experience in
dealing with Chinese laws and practices than any other third coun-
try tribunal). 1 3 In addition, Chinese language translation and in-
terpretation services are readily accessible in Hong Kong." 4
106. Goossen, supra note 1, at 335.
107. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States of 1966, opened for signature March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 [hereinafter ICSID]. The ICSID was established by convention, in 1966. It was intended
to address settlement of disputes between states and nationals of other states under the spon-
sorship of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). The
convention provides short-cuts to resolution of disputes between host states and investors of
other states. Although China has been a member of the World bank, it has not been until
recently that China agreed to participate in ICSID.
108. See Agreement on Trade Relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C., executed July
7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651, T.I.A.S. No. 9630.
109. Id.
110. Harold Sacks, Arbitration of Disputes Between The People's Republic Of China and
US. Corporations, in ARBITRATION AND THE LICENSING PROCEss 5-83, 5-91 (Robert Gold-
scheider and Michel de Hass eds., 1984).
111. Id.
112. Goossen, supra note 1, at 335.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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In China, contract conciliation and mediation proceedings
must be held prior to the initiation of arbitration.115 These proceed-
ings involve the inherent risks that friendly conciliation may con-
tinue to the point at which the parties are denied an opportunity to
conclude the dispute through a determination based on the merits
of the case."I6 Thus, in order to ensure the speedy determination of
a dispute, joint venture investors should specify a time limitation for
conciliation proceedings before commencing arbitration.I 7 For ex-
ample, the parties may agree that, if after ninety days the concilia-
tion process has proven ineffective, either party may initiate
arbitration proceedings."' In most cases, if investors keep
MOFERT informed on the progression of the negotiations, it is
very likely that the foreign party will be able to negotiate a contract
that is agreeable to both the Chinese party and MOFERT." 9 How-
ever, if the parties did not negotiate a contract for arbitration in a
third country, foreign companies may look to the PRC arbitration
system for resolution of disputes which arise during the course of
the transaction. 20
IV. ARBITRATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
In the 1950s the China Council for the Promotion of Interna-
tional Trade (CCPIT) established two entities to handle arbitration
proceedings between Chinese and foreign parties.' 2' All maritime
related disputes are resolved by the Maritime Arbitration Commis-
sion (MAC).' 22 Arbitration arising out of unresolvable disputes
over joint venture contracts, patents and related know-how, and
trademarks fall under the auspices of FETAC.'23 FETAC's main
office is located in Beijing, but disputes may also be heard in the
branch offices located in Shanghai and Shenzhen.' 24
115. FECL, supra note 84, 1 5-550(37).
116. See Thomas Peele & Marsha A. Cohen, Dispute Resolution in China, CHINA Bus.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 46, 48-49.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. See FECL, supra note 84, S 5-500(37).
121. LEE, supra note 92, at 15.
122. MAC was established by CCPIT in 1958 to handle maritime disputes involving
foreign parties. Id. at 13. This comment will not discuss MAC.
123. The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC) renamed FETAC was estab-
lished by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in 1954 to
handle arbitration between a Chinese party and a foreign party. Id. at 21.
124. Interview with Xu Sanqiao, Legal advisor to the China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission, Shenzhen Commission, in Shenzhen, PRC (August 5, 1991)
[hereinafter Sanqiao Interview].
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FETAC's procedural rules are administered during every arbi-
tration session involving Chinese and foreign parties.12 5 Moreover,
because, FETAC is supervised by CCPIT, which is in turn super-
vised by MOFERT, the rules and procedures administered by
FETAC are influenced by national policies. 126 These procedural
rules are set forth in the revised Arbitration Provisions of the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC). 127
Although these procedures were enacted to promote foreign in-
vestment in China, investors are still skeptical about the reliability
of the Chinese arbitration process. 128 This uneasiness is primarily a
product of investor ignorance in the process and a history of failed
business relations. 129  This apprehension stems from three main
concerns: 1) whether the Chinese arbitration process is unbiased, so
that foreign parties are ensured a fair resolution of the issue; 2)
whether the process is capable of resolving the issues that may arise
in a contracts dealing with technical complexities; and 3) whether
the foreign party will be able to enforce a judgment award decree by
the arbitrational tribunal.
A. Can Foreign Parties Obtain Fair Resolution of Disputes?
Recent revisions have greatly improved the position of a for-
eign investor in the arbitration process. For example, each party
has now the right to select an arbitrator from the official list of arbi-
trators. 130 Before applying for formal arbitration, the plaintiff may
select one arbitrator; after receiving the arbitration form, the de-
fendant may nominate one arbitrator.1 31 However, neither party
may choose an arbitrator whose name does not appear on the offi-
cial list of arbitrators list.1 32 Upon request, either side may also
defer selection of their arbitrator to FETAC. 133 A third arbitrator
who acts as the presiding arbitrator, is appointed by the chairman
125. Goossen, supra note 1, at 331.
126. Farina, supra note 102, at 152-53.
127. These rules were adopted in September of 1988 by CCPIT and effective on January
1, 1989. Arbitration Provisions of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission, 2 China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 1 10-505 (1988) [hereinafter
Arbitration].
128. Sacks, supra note 110, at 5-86.
129. Id.
130. See Arbitration, supra note 127, 55 10-505(3)-(8). This list is comprised of arbitra-
tors appointed by CCPIT, pursuant to the procedural rules of FETAC. Id. 1 10-505(4).
131. Id. 11 10-505(3)-(8).
132. Id.
133. Id.
1993]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4WJOURNAL
of FETAC. 134
FETAC's arbitrators list includes both Chinese and foreign
persons with "professional knowledge and actual experience in in-
ternational economics and trade, and science and technology."' 135
Since the effective date of the new rules, the arbitrators list has been
updated and is increasingly composed of foreign members.13 6 The
opportunity to select foreign, as well as Chinese arbitrators should
lend balance to the arbitration tribunal. 137
However, the arbitral voting process may be less fair than the
selection process, because arbitration awards are based on a major-
ity vote of the three-person arbitration tribunal. 138 While FETAC
presiding arbitrator has a duty to be unbiased, as a member of
CIETAC, he is also overseen by a superior authority and may be
compelled to vote in accordance with its wishes. 139 Consequently,
legal practitioners disfavor arbitration in China because they believe
their interests will only be represented by a minority vote on the
arbitration panel.1" Nevertheless, the number of judgments favor-
ing foreign parties has greatly increased since the reformation of the
FETAC procedural rules.1 41 The increase in the number of judg-
ment awards for foreign parties, combined with China's current
policies intended to encourage foreign investment and technical de-
velopment, seems to indicate that the PRC is attempting to make
FETAC a more attractive alternative to foreign investors. 42
Arbitration hearings are conducted as conferences.14 3 Conse-
quently, a party will never have a case thrown out, or its claim dis-
missed, due to ignorance of FETAC procedures.'" In fact, the
disputing parties may confer with FETAC on matters relating to
the arbitration proceedings in person or through an attorney.14 5
134. Id. 110-505(14).
135. Id. 110-505(4).
136. Interview with Lu Kun, arbitrator for FETAC (Oct. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Kun
Interview].
137. Id.
138. Arbitration, supra note 127, 10-505(33).
139. "Although the arbitration tribunals formed to conduct references are independent,
they may nevertheless submit questions involving state principles and polices to [FETAC] for
guidance. This is to ensure that the arbitration carried out will conform to the official policy
on foreign trade." LEE, supra note 92, at 22.
140. Interview with Audrey Yu, attorney at Denton, Hall, Burgin & Warrens, in Hong
Kong (Aug. 3, 1991).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Kun Interview, supra note 136.
144. Sacks, supra note 110, at 5-86.
145. Id.
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FETAC's willingness to educate a foreign investor about Chinese
arbitration procedures should help alleviate investor fears of being
disadvantaged during the arbitration process.
While a case before the Chinese courts may only be litigated by
an attorney who is a Chinese national,146 FETAC rules allow the
foreign party to choose as their advisor, an attorney or representa-
tive who is a Chinese citizen or a foreign citizen. 47 Furthermore,
an attorney may act on behalf of the investor as long as he or she is
granted power of attorney. 48
B. Can the Chinese Arbitral Body Competently Resolve
Disputes Involving Technical Contracts?
Unlike other international methods of arbitration, Chinese ar-
bitration involves a combination of both conciliation and arbitra-
tion.1 49 "Subject to consent of both parties, conciliation can be
conducted at any time prior to or after the commencement of arbi-
tration proceedings and before a final arbitral award is granted." 15 °
The Chinese prefer that the two parties negotiate a compromise
through conciliations, as illustrated by a joint venture case involv-
ing a Hong Kong corporation and a Chinese corporation in
Guangzhou.15
1
In this case, one of the two shareholder's of a Hong Kong cor-
poration (shareholder A) signed an agreement with the Chinese cor-
poration to set up a factory to produce a certain commodity. 152 The
Hong Kong corporation was to contribute the equipment and tech-
nology, and the Chinese company agreed to provide all the raw
materials, the factory building, and workers. 153 The contract also
set forth conditions for the goods to be re-exported.15 4 The joint
venture was successful until the shareholder who did not sign the
146. Sanqiao Interview, supra note 124.
147. Id.
148. In the past, the arbitration proceedings were open session hearings in which em-
bassy officials were able to observe the arbitration and evaluate whether the awards were
fairly allocated. Id. However, under the new rules, article 25 of the Arbitration Provisions
states that arbitration tribunals shall not hear cases in open session unless both parties request
that an open session be held. Arbitration, supra note 130, % 10-505(25).
149. Tang Houzhi, Arbitration: A Method Used by China to Settle Foreign Trade and
Economic Disputes, 4 PACE L. REv.519, 521 (1984).
150. Id.
151. Interview with [name withheld by request], in Hong Kong (Aug. 3, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Confidential Interview]. The interviewee consented to the interview on the condition that
his identity and those of the parties remain unidentified.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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agreement (shareholder B) informed the Chinese party that share-
holder A had left the Hong Kong corporation. 5 Shareholder B
then persuaded the Chinese corporation that it should sign another
contract with him so that he could continue the joint venture. 156
However, when shareholder A discovered what had happened he
returned to the Chinese party and asked that they comply with the
original agreement.1 57 When shareholder A and the Chinese party
failed to resolve the dispute through mediation, they applied to
FETAC for arbitration." 8 The arbitration panel's first step was to
request that both parties attempt to resolve the problems on their
own through conciliation.159 This method proved successful in this
case."6 The head office of the Guangzhou corporation which was
located in Beijing found another factory in Beijing with which the
original agreement could be carried out.1 61
In another case, involving the sale of goods, conciliation took
place during the arbitration proceedings. 162 In this case, a foreign
firm signed a contract with a Chinese company for the shipment of
a certain tonnage of goods to be delivered in separate shipments to a
port designated by the foreign firm.1 63 The agreement also con-
tained a penalty clause for non-performance fixed at five percent of
the non-performed amount of the contract.164
The Chinese party obtained the necessary export permit license
and shipped the goods.1 65 However, the goods were mistakenly sent
to the wrong foreign firm.1 66 When the Chinese party tried to ob-
tain a second export license their request was denied.1 67 Because
the Chinese firm could not export the goods, it proposed that the
contract be cancelled.1 68 The foreign corporation did not agree to
the proposed cancellation of the contract, and applied to FETAC
for arbitration, claiming the amount stated in the penalty clause,
damages for loss of profits, and expenses incurred.1 69 The Chinese
155. Id.
156. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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party argued that it should not be responsible because the failure to
deliver the goods was due to the export permit not being granted, a
circumstance beyond its control.17 During arbitration, the tribu-
nal, with the consent of both parties, went into a conciliation
process.1 71
The only instruction the arbitration tribunal made was that
since the Chinese corporation had an export license for the first lot
of goods, the Chinese corporation should at least be responsible for
its failure to deliver that particular lot. 171 The foreign firm was not
allowed to claim both the penalty and damages for its lost profits. 173
Consequently, both parties settled on a reasonable compromise, in
which the Chinese party would pay a specified amount as compen-
sation and 60% of the arbitration costs, and the foreign party would
bear the remaining 40%. 17 4
In meeting the goals of arbitration to resolve problems through
third party dispute resolution and compromise, the Chinese method
has many positive aspects. It increases the probability that the dis-
puting parties will continue to do business in the future. However,
there are serious drawbacks to the Chinese arbitration process. For
example, FETAC arbitration provisions have no discovery proce-
dures for interrogatories or document production. Under Article 6
of the FETAC rules, the party requesting arbitration must attach
documentation of the facts of the dispute to the arbitration applica-
tion.1 75 The party receiving the application must, in reply, submit
any defenses and relevant documents within 45 days to the arbitra-
tion commission and the plaintiff. 176 However, neither party is obli-
gated to submit documents or answer any questions posed by the
opposing party. 177 During arbitration, both sides are required to
produce facts supporting their complaints or defenses. 178
This absence of a comprehensive discovery mechanism is a ma-
jor weakness in the PRC arbitration, as exemplified by the serious
disadvantage imposed upon the less informed party entering into
the arbitration. In addition, parties can introduce new evidence at
formal hearings without notice.' 79 Consequently, a party might be
170. Id.
171. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Arbitration, supra note 127, 1 10-505(6).
176. Id. 1110-505(8).
177. See id., 11 10-505(6)-(13).
178. Id., 10-505(6), 10-505(9).
179. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
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put in a position in which it cannot adequately protect itself, having
no time to adequately review new evidence and raise defenses.
Although FETAC rules give the arbitrator and the arbitration
committee power to conduct their own investigation, gather further
evidence, and subpoena materials for the purpose of arbitration, the
rules are silent with regard to the power to subpoena witnesses.' 80
Since the power to subpoena a witness is not explicitly set forth in
the procedural rule, the arbitration commission is not obligated to
help parties obtain the witnesses. Therefore, a foreign party may
find it impossible to compel an unwilling witness to testify.
Another concern for investors is that presiding arbitrators se-
lected by the Chairman of the Arbitration Commission from the
Arbitrational Commission's list of arbitrators, may not have the
background knowledge to resolve disputes of a technical nature.
This concern is mitigated by the ability of the arbitration tribunal to
consult experts and/or appraisers in disputes involving sophisti-
cated technical issues.18 An expert may be a Chinese national or a
foreign organization or citizen.'1 2 However, the rules provide no
language to ensure that the selected expert or appraiser be a neutral
and unbiased party.
C. Enforcement of Awards
FECL contains provisions allowing parties to appeal to Chi-
nese courts for enforcement of arbitral awards.18 3 In order to seek
enforcement of arbitral awards in courts under foreign jurisdiction,
FECL expressly allows foreign investors and technology suppliers
to look to the United Nations Convention of the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Conven-
tion) "'84 for guidance. When China entered the New York Conven-
tion, it agreed that awards involving international commercial
matters rendered in other contracting states would be enforced
within the PRC. The convention states that:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as bind-
ing and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure
of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the condi-
tions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be im-
posed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or
180. Arbitration, supra note 127, 10-505(26).
181. Id. 10-505(28).
182. Id.
183. Id. T 10-505(38).
184. Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards of New York of 1958,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to
which this Convention applies than are imposed on recognition
or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
185
Consequently, under the New York Convention, joint ventures
and other suppliers of technology are subject to the procedural rules
of the territory where the enforcement of arbitral awards is to be
made.186 If an arbitration award is to be enforced in China, Article
195 of the PRC Civil Procedure Code,187 which describes judicial
enforcement of arbitration decisions, will be applied. 
188
However, the New York Convention contains defenses to the
enforcement and recognition of arbitration awards.1 89 For example,
if the party against whom the award is invoked can show proof of a
valid defense (e.g., incapacity of the parties, improper notification of
arbitration proceedings, or invalidity of the arbitration proceeding
as contrary to the contractual agreement), 190 the award will not be
enforceable. In addition, parties may protest enforcement of the
award in China on public policy grounds. The New York Conven-
tion states:
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be
refused if the competent authority is in the country where recog-
nition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of set-
tlement by arbitration under the laws of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to public policy of that country.191 (emphasis added).
As far as investors engaged in technology transfers through
joint ventures are concerned, subpart (a) should not be a problem
because FETAC via the CCIPT is capable of settling all foreign
investment disputes. However, subpart (b) may pose an obstacle
because the term "public policy" is vague and open-ended. Accord-
ingly, the "public policy" exception is considered a notoriously flex-
ible method of avoiding the requirements of Chinese law.192
Those countries which have treaties with China and have in-
cluded provisions for the enforcement of awards are in a much bet-
185. Id., art. 111.
186. Id.
187. The Law of Civil Procedure of the People's Republic of China (adopted March 8,
1982) [hereinafter CPC].
188. See Sacks, supra note 110, at 5-525.
189. New York Convention, supra note 184, art. V.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Cohen, supra note 5, at 525.
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ter position than other countries.1 9 3 For example, bilateral and
multilateral treaties significantly increase the effectiveness of the
foreign awards, by limiting the grounds available for denial of rec-
ognition and enforcement.1 94
Although there is a strong likelihood that foreign arbitral
awards will be enforced in China, there is still uncertainty regarding
the enforcement of Chinese arbitrational awards. China's Civil pro-
cedure codes are too loosely drafted to adequately enforce an arbi-
tral award made by FETAC. If the person against whom the award
is made can present evidence, the court, after examination and ver-
ification, can rule to deny enforcement of the PRC arbitral
award. 195
In addition, public policy is grounds upon which enforcement
of an arbitral award may be denied. According to Article 260, if the
People's Court determines that execution of an award would be
against public policy, the court shall deny execution. 196 This lan-
guage leaves too much discretion in the Chinese courts, and too
little security for the party seeking to enforce the award. For exam-
ple, a public policy exception could be unpublished inter-depart-
mental "neibu"' 197 documents that are kept secret for security
reasons, rules not yet drafted, ideology or judicial preference.' 98
Moreover, the Code fails to provide any procedural protection
for parties seeking to enforce the award against the PRC. For ex-
ample, there are no provisions in the Code for hearings at which the
party enforcing the award may raise an objection to an Article 260
motion. Therefore, if the person against whom the award is being
sought raises a 260 motion, the party awarded damages through
arbitration has no recourse if the court decides that the award
should not be enforced. In addition, there is no provision which
allows FETAC to intervene or assist the party to the recipient of a
decreed award. In effect, FETAC has no means of enforcing its
193. Additionally, modern treaties, statutes and judicial developments have greatly con-
tributed to facilitation of enforcement of arbitral awards through recognition of transnational
arbitral awards. Farina, supra note 105, at 170 n.215 (citing Delaume, Court Intervention in
Arbital Proceedings, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DisPUTs (C. Carbonneau ed. 1986) at
222).
194. Id.
195. CPC, supra note 187, art. 260 (1991).
196. Id.
197. Neibu regulations are expressions of policy and politics that China does not wish to
make public but that have the force of law. Anna Han, The China Trade, RECORDER, Dec.
18, 1991, at 8.
198. See id.
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awards. Consequently, Article 260 leaves the enforcement of arbi-
tration awards to the whim of Chinese judges.
Consider a recent joint venture case,199 in which a foreign cor-
poration (plaintiff) entered into a ten year contractual joint venture
contract to produce a product with a Chinese corporation (defend-
ant) in which the total registered capital was the sum of
$300,000,000 Hong Kong dollars. The plaintiff contracted to con-
tribute an investment of $180,000,000 Hong Kong dollars with
$150,000,000 to apply to the purchase of necessary equipment (60%
of the total registered capital).2" The defendant's capital contribu-
tion totalled $140,000,000 Hong Kong dollars with $100,000,000
used for the purchase of necessary equipment and machinery." 1
The defendant was to receive 70% of the products; it was agreed
that losses and profits would be split equally.2"2 Both parties lo-
cated a German corporation which agreed to sell its machinery to
the joint venture.20 3 The defendant sent his agent to the German
corporation to negotiate the sale terms.' 4 While in Germany, the
defendant's agent sought the machinery for about $257,465 Hong
Kong dollars, but had the German corporation request a credit
transfer for almost $384,725 from the plaintiff, alleging it as the ac-
tual cost of the machinery.20 5 The plaintiff sent the requested
amount to the German Corporation, leaving the defendant with ap-
proximately $127,260 Hong Kong dollars profit.20 6
When the plaintiff discovered what the defendant had done, it
applied to FETAC for arbitration proceedings. 2 7 Each party chose
their respective arbitrators and FETAC selected the presiding arbi-
trator according to the FETAC arbitration rules.20 8 However, on
the date arbitration was scheduled to commence, the defendant
failed to attend.20 9 After the arbitration tribunal reviewed the facts
and evidence, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. 10
The judgment award decreed that: 1) the defendant must pay its
share of the capital contribution (40%) of the joint venture to the
199. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Confidential Interview, supra note 151.
210. Id.
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plaintiff within 30 days or the plaintiff could invoke the Guangzhou
county laws; 2) the defendant must return the $127,260 Hong Kong
dollars within 30 days, or an interest rate of 7% would be added;
and 3) the defendant must compensate for all losses within 30 days
or an interest rate of 7% would be added to the total sum due and
unpaid.21
In this case, although the judgment award went to the plaintiff,
the arbitration rules do not necessarily guarantee enforcement.
Under the first provision, if the defendant fails to pay the plaintiff,
the defendant may invoke the courts in Guangzhou county.212 The
question then becomes one of whether the Guangzhou county
courts will enforce an arbitrational award against their local "com-
rade." Consequently, it is likely that many local courts may honor
the local party's request not to have the award enforced. The plain-
tiff's success or failure will depend on which judge is presiding,
which party has the most influence in the local community, and,
perhaps, luck. Without an arbitrational procedure that can ade-
quately enforce its own judgment awards, FETAC cannot be con-
sidered viable means on which parties can rely for dispute
resolution.
V. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
Although China has developed and formalized its arbitration
system, procedural and structural defects remain. The most obvi-
ous of these are the unfair rules, such as those that allow parties to
introduce new evidence during arbitration without notice. Conse-
quently, the primary goal of promoting friendly dispute resolution
within the Chinese arbitration system may be severely undermined.
In order to make the system more fair, the Chinese legislative
body should adopt a discovery mechanism which bars introduction
of evidence into arbitration if such introduction will result in preju-
dice against a party. A modification of FECTAC rules to allow a
party to subpoena witnesses is also necessary. Furthermore, if the
Chinese want to encourage technology transfer investments through
joint venture enterprises, as well as establish FECTAC as an inter-
nationally recognized and respected arbitral center, the entire Chi-
nese system must cooperate in the enforcement of arbitral awards.
This includes modifying the availability of the PRC Civil Procedure
260 motion. For example, an objection provision to a 260 motion
211. Id.
212. See Arbitration, supra note 127, 1 10-505(38).
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should provide the party enforcing the arbitral award with the op-
portunity to state both the reasons against the granting of a 260
motion and the reasons supporting the enforcement of the arbitral
award. In addition, FETAC should be able to intervene through
written statements or oral presentations on behalf of the party en-
forcing the arbitral award. This intervention could be accomplished
by a written statement of support by FETAC or via oral presenta-
tions on behalf of the party enforcing the arbitral award.
However, the prevalent problem of local courts favoring their
local residents may still exist even if the Civil Procedure Code is
amended to allow objections to a 260 motion. One remedy to allevi-
ate or avoid local favoritism is to have a clause permitting a 260
motion objection to be transferred to a neutral court for review. In
the alternative, a special court or entity to handle enforcement of
arbitral awards could be established.
Regarding the provision which stipulates that issues are to be
adjudicated according to public policy, the Chinese legislative draft-
ers should establish some reliable guidelines. For instance, Chinese
administrative bodies from the central government to local munici-
pal levels2" 3 need to eliminate neibu regulations so that all parties,
including foreigners, will be aware of the operative laws and
requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although China has taken significant steps towards realizing
its goals of (1) reaching a 1990 level of technological development
common to Western industrialized nations by the year 2000, (2) dif-
fusing technology into rural areas, (3) developing an infrastructure
and natural resources, and (4) promoting high technology in critical
areas, it is far from reaching these goals. While the enactment of
the Technology Regulations, Implementing Regulations, and other
legislation advances China's interest in achieving its goals, the re-
maining flaws in the Chinese system are a major obstacle to maxi-
mizing foreign investment. Consequently, the rules must be
modified to alleviate investor concerns. For example, the rules and
regulations applicable to foreigner investors should contain detailed
language and minimal bureaucratic ambiguity. In addition, the ap-
proval process should be simple and straightforward so that inves-
tors can develop both reliance and confidence in the PRC system.
213. See generally JAMES A. TOWNSEND, POLITICS IN CHINA 82-87 (2d ed. 1980) (dis-
cussion of the political organization of the PRC, including administrative entities at the state,
provincial, county, and municipal level).
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Because current laws and regulations are not sufficient to meet these
needs, foreign investors should negotiate favorable terms that incor-
porate protections of the investor for neutral dispute resolution.
Furthermore, if China hopes to meet its development goals
through foreign investment that encourages technology imports, it
must offer foreign investors a fair, reliable and predictable environ-
ment in which to do business and resolve disputes. Unfortunately,
for the investors and Chinese businesses, the present Chinese arbi-
tration rules fail to meet these goals. In spite of the fact that the
Chinese system is patterned after international arbitration organiza-
tions, the effectiveness of FETAC is undermined by problems such
as the lack ofjudgment award enforcement procedures and/or laws.
Thus, it is highly likely that until FETAC demonstrates that it is a
fair tribunal, capable of issuing reliable and enforceable judgments,
foreign investors will continue to be wary of investing in the PRC.
CASE NOTES
NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT INTERMEDIATE
COPYING OF OBJECT CODE IS FAIR USE
Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2D 1561
(9th Cir. 1992).
Ronald A. Peterst
INTRODUCTION
In a case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
reverse engineering is fair use if it is the only way to gain access to
the unprotected functional elements of a program's object code and
there is a reasonable purpose behind such access.
FACTS
Sega manufactures and sells video game systems, including the
Genesis console and game cartridges. Accolade manufactures
software game cartridges that are compatible with the Genesis con-
sole. In order to gain this compatibility Accolade "reverse engi-
neered" Sega's programs. Accolade "disassembled" or
"decompiled" Sega's object code, downloaded it to a PC and trans-
lated it to human readable source code. Other software manufac-
turers were also producing game cartridges compatible with Sega's
Genesis Console, however they had entered into licensing agree-
ments with Sega and were paying for the privilege. Sega sued Acco-
lade. The district court ruled in favor of Sega, stating that Accolade
could have gained access to the functional elements of compatibility
by some other means,' and granted Sega's request for injunctive
relief.2
Copyright © 1993 by Ronald A. Peters.
t B.A., M.A. University of Oregon; J.D. Santa Clara University School of Law, 1993.
1. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F.Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
2. The District Court enjoined Accolade from (1) disassembling Sega's copyrighted
object code; (2) using or modifying Sega's copyrighted code; (3) developing, manufacturing,
distributing or selling Genesis-compatible games that were created in whole or in part by
means that included disassembly; and (4) manufacturing, distributing or selling any Genesis-
compatible game that prompts the Sega Message. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1565.
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Accolade raised four arguments in support of its position.3
First, Accolade argued that intermediate copying does not consti-
tute infringement under section 106 of the Copyright Act unless the
final copy is "substantially similar" to the work being copied.4 Sec-
ond, Accolade argued that decompiling or disassembling object
code in order to gain access to the functional requirements for com-
patibility is lawful under section 102(b) of the Act, which does not
extend copyright protection to such functional elements.- Third,
Accolade argued that disassembly is authorized by section 117 of
the Act, because it permits the lawful owner of the copy of a com-
puter program to load (copy) the program into a computer's mem-
ory.6 Lastly, Accolade argued that its copying of the object code in
order to gain access to the functional elements contained in the code
is a fair use which is privileged by section 107 of the Act.7 The
court was quick to point out that Accolade's first three arguments
were without merit, stating that Accolade's act of copying of the
object code was in fact infringement. However, as to Accolade's
fourth argument, the court concluded:
based on the policies underlying the Copyright Act that disas-
sembly of copyrighted object code is, as a matter of law, a fair
use of a copyrighted work if such disassembly provides the only
means of access to those elements of the code that are not pro-
tected by copyright and the copier has a legitimate reason for
seeking such access. Accordingly, we hold that Sega has failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright
claim. Because on the record before us the hardships do not tip
sharply (or at all) in Sega's favor, the preliminary injunction is-
sued in its favor must be dissolved, at least with respect to that
claim. 8
A. Intermediate copying9
In support of its ruling as to Accolade's first three arguments
above, the court pointed to the ruling in Walker v. University Books,
in which it held that the copyright act does not concern itself with
what stage of the process the infringement took place.'" Regarding
3. Id. at 1565.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1565-1566.
7. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1566.
8. Id. It seems apparent that the fact that Sega, along with Nintendo, dominates the
video game industry played a significant role in the Court's decision.
9. Id.
10. Id. Citing Walker v. University Books, 602 F.2d 859, 864, 202 U.S.P.Q.2D 793 (9th
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Accolade's citation of several cases which allowed some copying,
the court pointed out that in all of those cases it was the "degree of
similarity between the allegedly infringed work and the defendant's
final product" that provided the basis of the court's decision."' In
none of the cases was intermediate copying at issue. 12 The court
therefore concluded that the issue of whether "intermediate copying
of computer object code infringes the exclusive rights granted to the
copyright owner in section 106 of the Copyright Act is a question of
first impression." 13
B. The Idea/Expression Distinction4
Accolade argued that its copying of the object code did not
violate Section 102(b).I5 Accolade stated that because object code is
not humanly readable "disassembly of a commercially available
computer program into human-readable form should not be consid-
ered an infringement of the owner's copyright."' 6 In response, the
court pointed out that Accolade's argument ran contrary to settled
law 7 and that further, by making such an argument, Accolade was
stating essentially that object code should not be accorded the "full
range of copyright protection."' 8 The court, showing its familiarity
with computer technology, stated:
Nor does a refusal to recognize a per se right to disassemble ob-
ject code lead to an absurd result. The ideas and functional con-
cepts underlying many types of computer programs, including
word processing programs, spreadsheets, and video game dis-
plays, are readily discernible without the need for disassembly,
Cir. 1979), where the court stated: "[T]he fact that an allegedly infringing copy of a pro-
tected work may itself by only an inchoate representation of some final product to be mar-
keted commercially does not in itself negate the possibility of infringement." Id. at 864.
11. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1566. The only cases cited by Accolade which involved
similar copying of object code were Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2D 1241
(2d Cir. 1992); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2D 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989); and E.F.
Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F.Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985). Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at
1566.
12. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1566.
13. Id. at 1567.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1567.
18. Id. The Court went on to cite the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) which recommended that the "1980 Amendments to
the Copyright Act unambiguously extended copyright protection to computer programs,
Pub. L. 96-517, sec. 10, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. Sections 101, 117); see
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report I
(1979)[CONTU Report]." Id.
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because the operation of such programs is visible on the com-
puter screen. The need to disassemble object code arises, if at all,
only in connection with operations systems, system interface pro-
cedures, and other programs that are not visible to the user when
operating - and then only when no alternative means of gaining
an understanding of those ideas and functional concepts exists.
In our view, consideration of the unique nature of computer ob-
ject code thus is more appropriate as part of the case-by-case,
equitable "fair use" analysis authorized by section 107 of the
Act. 19
C. Section 11720
In response to Accolade's argument that the provision of Sec-
tion 117 which allows for the copying of computer programs for the
purpose of utilizing those computer programs2 authorized such
copying of Sega's object code, the court stated that Accolade's use
of Sega's object code went far beyond that which was contemplated
by section 117.22
D. Fair Use 23
Accolade finally succeeded with its fourth argument regarding
fair use. Accolade argued that its copying of the object code was a
"necessary step in the examination of the unprotected ideas and
functional concepts embodied in the code... and therefore was a
"fair use that is privileged by section 107 of the Act."'25 The court
agreed, stating:
Where there is good reason for studying or examining the unpro-
tected aspects of a copyrighted computer program, disassembly
for purposes of such study or examination is a fair use.26
The court rejected Sega's argument that use of the fair use de-
fense in cases involving disassembly of object code is precluded by
section 117 of the Act stating:
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1568.
21. Id.
22. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1568, citing the CONTU Report at 13 which stated
"[b]ecause the placement of any copyrighted work into a computer is the preparation of a
copy [since the program is loaded into the computer's memory], the law should provide that
persons in rightful possession of copies of programs be able to use them freely without fear of
exposure to copyright liability." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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That argument verges on the frivolous. Each of the exclusive
rights created by section 106 of the Copyright Act is expressly
made subject to all of the limitations contained in sections 107
through 120. 17 U.S.C. Section 106. Nothing in the language or
the legislative history of section 117, or in the CONTU Report,
suggests that section 117 was intended to preclude the assertion
of a fair use defense with respect to uses of computer programs
[that] are not covered by section 117, nor has section 107 been
amended to exclude computer programs from its ambit. 27
The court went on to say that in fact section 117 covered those uses
that were "lawful per se '" 2s and that section 107 was enacted for the
purpose of establishing "a defense to an otherwise valid claim of
copyright infringement. ' 29  The court concluded that because
"Congress has not chosen to provide a per se exemption to section
106 for disassembly does not mean that particular instances of dis-
assembly may not constitute fair use.",30
Regarding Sega's second argument that the legislative history
of Section 906 of the Semiconductor Chip Protector Act of 1984
indicated that Congress did not intend disassembly to be a fair
use,3 1 the court pointed out Congress's intent in passing Section 906
of the SCPA was to provide particular protection to semiconductor
chips because their uniquely "utilitarian" nature32 might exempt
them from protection under the Copyright Act.33 The court ob-
serves that the SCPA does not say anything about the lawfulness of
disassembly.34
The court cited section 107's factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether a particular use is a fair one:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
27. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1568.
28. Id., citing 17 U.S.C. Section 117.
29. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1568.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Court noted that "Section 906 of the SCPA authorizes the copying of a
'mask work' on a silicon ship in the course of reverse engineering the chip. 17 U.S.C. Section
906." Id.
32. Id. at 1569.
33. Id.
34. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1569.
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of the copyrighted work. 5
With regard to the district court's treatment of these factors and its
application of the factors to this case, the court pointed out:
In determining that Accolade's disassembly of Sega's object code
did not constitute a fair use, the district court treated the first
and fourth statutory factors as dispositive, and ignored the sec-
ond factor entirely. Given the nature and characteristics of Ac-
colade's direct use of the copied works, the ultimate use to which
Accolade put the functional information it obtained, and the na-
ture of the market for home video entertainment systems, we
conclude that neither the first nor the fourth factor weighs in
Sega's favor. In fact, we conclude that both factors support Ac-
colade's fair use defense, as does the second factor, a factor
which is important to the resolution of cases such as the one
before US. 3 6
Regarding the first factor, the court pointed out that the pre-
sumption against fair use when a commercial purpose is involved
can be rebutted by examining the characteristic of the particular
use. 7 The court stated that because Accolade copied the object
code only to reveal the uncopyrighted ideas and functional elements
of the program, the commercial nature of the copying was only "in-
direct or derivative."' 38 Furthermore, the court stated:
...we are free to consider the public benefit resulting from a
particular use notwithstanding the fact that the alleged infringer
may gain commercially. . . .[i]n the case before us Accolade's
identification of the functional requirements for Genesis compat-
ibility has led to an increase in the number independently
designed video game programs offered for use with the Genesis
console. It is precisely that growth in creative expression, based
on the dissemination of other creative works and the unprotected
ideas contained in those works, that the Copyright Act was in-
tended to promote.39
Regarding the second statutory factor the court noted that not
all forms of expression are entitled to the same protection under the
Copyright Act:
The protection established by the Copyright Act for original
works of authorship does not extend to the ideas underlying a
35. Id. Citing 17 U.S.C. § 107.
36. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1569.
37. Id., citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th
Cir. 1986).
38. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1569.
39. Id. at 1570.
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work or to the functional or factual aspects of the work. 17
U.S.C. section 102(b). To the extent that a work is functional or
factual it may be copied, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-04
(1879), as may those expressive elements of the work that "must
necessarily be used as incident to" expression of the underlying
ideas, functional concepts or facts, id. at 104.... Works that are
merely compilations of fact are copyrightable, but the copyright
in such a work is "thin." Feist Publications, 111 S. Ct. at 1289. 40
The court pointed out that although computer programs may
contain some creative elements, they are essentially "utilitarian arti-
cles' 41 and that because of this "hybrid nature of computer pro-
grams"'4 2 there has developed no established standard for separating
out protected and unprotected elements.43
The court rejects Sega's argument that the record does not es-
tablish that disassembly was the only means by which Accolade
could gain access to the functional aspects of Sega's program and
notes that the district court committed "clear error" in that the rec-
ord clearly establishes that humans cannot read object code and
that although it is possible to disassemble object code by hand in-
stead of through the use of a "decompiler" it is clearly necessary to
make a written or electronic copy of the object code in order to
translate it into human readable form.' Furthermore, with respect
to the district court's finding that Accolade could have utilized a
process known as "peeling" to avoid copyright infringement as au-
thorized by 17 U.S.C. section 906, the court stated this too was er-
ror because peeling reveals only a "physical diagram" of the object
code and does not eliminate the necessity of translating the object
code into source code.45
The court concluded as to the second factor that "because
Sega's video game programs contain unprotected aspects that can-
not be examined without copying, we afford them a lower degree of
protection than more traditional literary works."46
As to the third factor, the court noted that because Accolade
copied Sega's programs in their entirety, this factor weighed against
40. Id. at 1571.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1571. The Court cites the Second Circuit's observation that
the attempts to deal with this issue could be characterized as attempting "'to fit the prover-
bial square peg in a round hole.' CAI, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1257."
44. Id. at 1572.
45. Id. The Court also rejected the District Court's contention that Accolade could
have avoided copyright infringement by programming a "clean room." Id.
46. Id. at 1573.
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Accolade. However, the court also stated that the copying of the
entire program "does not, however, preclude a finding of fair use
per se."47 The court concluded in fact that "where use is limited as
it was here, the [third] factor is of very little weight. Cf Wright v.
Warner Books Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 738 [20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1992] (2dCir. 1991). ' ' 48
As for the fourth statutory factor, the court pointed out that
while Accolade's use of Sega's program, if it became widespread,
may have an adverse effect on Sega, Accolade did not seek to usurp
Sega's games but created its own games which were now compatible
and could be used on Sega's Genesis console.49 Further, the court
pointed out that devotees of video games could reasonably be ex-
pected to purchase both Sega's games as well as Accolade's." As
to the fourth factor, the court therefore concluded:
In any event, an attempt to monopol[i]ze the market by making
it impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory
purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot constitute a
strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use
doctrine. Thus we conclude that the fourth statutory factor
weighs in Accolade's, not Sega's, favor notwithstanding the mi-
nor economic loss Sega may suffer.51
As to the interpretation of the four statutory factors, the court
concluded by stating that the first, second and fourth statutory fac-
tors weighed in favor of Accolade,52 and that only the third factor
weighed slightly in favor of Sega.5 3 Accordingly, as to the question
of whether the Accolade's use was fair the court concluded:
.. where disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas
and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer
program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such
access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a
matter of law. Our conclusion does not, of course, insulate Ac-
47. Id., citing Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449-50; Hustler, 795 F.2d at 1155.
48. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1573.
49. Id. at 1570. The Court points to several cases which hold that a use would not be
considered fair if 'it would adversely effect the potential market for the copyrighted work.'
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 [220 U.S.P.Q. 665] (1984). Id.
50. Id. at 1571. The Court noted that video game buyers typically purchased more than
one video game and that "There is no basis for assuming that Accolade's 'Ishido' has signifi-
cantly affected the market for Sega's 'Altered Beast,' since a consumer might easily purchase
both; nor does it seem unlikely that a consumer particularly interested in sports might
purchase both Accolade's 'Mike Ditka Power Football', and Sega's 'Joe Montana Football',
particularly if the games are, as Accolade contends, not substantially similar." Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1573.
53. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1573.
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colade from a claim of copyright infringement with respect to its
finished products. Sega has reserved the right to raise such a
claim, and it may do so on remand. 4
E. Trademark Issues55
Sega's trademark Security System (TMSS), initialization code
not only allows game programs to operate on Sega's Genesis III
console, but also generates an on-screen display of Sega's
trademark.5
6
Having gained access to Sega's Genesis console through the
initialization code, Accolade also, in using that code, triggered an
on-screen display of Sega's trademark. Both parties agreed that this
was an unauthorized and improper use of Sega's trademark.57 How-
ever, the Court wrestled with the question of whether Accolade was
the injured party because users of its games were lead to believe that
the games were manufactured by Sega, or whether Sega was the
injured party because its name was being used without its authori-
zation. Both Sega and Accolade claimed that the other was in vio-
lation of statutes due to the use of the on-screen display.58
Accolade claimed that Sega's use of the TMSS code to trigger the
on screen dispay was a "false designation of origin under Lanham
Act section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. section 1125(a)." 59 Sega, for its part,
claimed that Accolade's use of its trademark was a violation of
32(l)(a) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. sections
1114(1)(a), 1125(a), respectively.6'
The court concluded that because there was no other way to
gain access to the Genesis III console and because Accolade clearly
had no desire to appropriate Sega's trademark for its own use, it
was in fact Sega who would be held primarily responsible for any
resultant confusion created by the on-screen display of its
trademark.
F. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit held that disassembly of computer object
code is fair use if such disassembly is the only way to gain access to
54. Id. at 1574.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Sega, 24 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1574.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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the functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer pro-
gram, and if there is a legitimate reason for this access. The court
further held that the confusion arising out of the on-screen display
of Sega's trademark, was in fact attributable to plaintiff.6' Despite
the Court's ruling that intermediate copying of computer code con-
stitutes infringement, it is possible to argue that it does not in fact
constitute copyright infringement if the intermediate copying is
done to create an original program which does not copy the pro-
tected expression of the copyrighted work. 2
61. Id. at 1577.
62. See eg., NEC v. Intel, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989). That case involved the
disassembly of microcode. The Court ruled that studying code that is not copied does not
infringe, nor does copying that is "deleted or so disguised as to be unrecognizable."
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"CORRESPONDENT LINK" BETWEEN A PROTEIN AND
NUCLEIC ACID SEQUENCE DOES NOT RENDER THE
GENE OBVIOUS
In Re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
Kamrin T. MacKnightt
On 20 April 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed a decision by the Board of Patent Appeals
& Interferences (Board), and granted a patent directed to genes
which code for insulin-like human hormones to Chiron Corporation
(Emeryville, CA).1
The decision written by Judge Lourie,2 overturned the Exam-
iner's final rejection of Bell's patent application Serial No. 065,673,
entitled "Preproinsulin-like Growth Factors I and II," on the
ground of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The Federal Circuit
ruled that the "Board erred in concluding that the claimed nucleic
acid molecules would have been obvious in light of the cited prior
art."
'3
BACKGROUND
The claims of the application in dispute are directed to nucleic
acids (DNA and RNA)4 which encode human insulin-like growth
Copyright © 1993 by Kamrin T. MacKnight.
t B.S. Brigham Young University; M.A. San Jose State University; Ph.D. University
of California, Berkeley; J.D. Santa Clara University School of Law. Dr. MacKnight is a
technical consultant in the law firm of Haverstock, Medlen & Carroll, San Francisco, CA.
1. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The application was filed in the names of
three inventors, Graeme I. Bell, Leslie B. Rall and James P. Merryweather. Hereinafter, the
patent application and its components are referred to as "Bell." Chiron Corp. is the assignee.
2. The case was heard before Judges Rich, Lourie, and Schall.
3. Bell, 991 F.2d at 782.
4. The two major types of nucleic acid are deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and
ribonucleic acid (RNA). DNA is the "genetic blueprint" for the vast majority of organisms
(including humans). DNA is a double helix, similar in shape to a spiral staircase. The four
"bases"-adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine form the steps of the staircase; sugar and
phosphate molecules comprise the handrails. RNA is similar to DNA in that it contains
adenine, guanine, and cytosine. However, it contains uracil, rather than thymine. For a
description of basic genetics and recombinant DNA technology, the reader is referred to such
texts as BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENES (2d ed. 1985); BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE CELL (1983); MAXINE SINGER AND PAUL BERG, GENES AND GENOMES
(1991). In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 895-899 (Fed. Cir. 1988), also contains a general dis-
cussion of the technology involved here.
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factors I and II (IGF). s Claim 25 (conceded by the parties to be
representative of the claims at issue) includes the following:
A composition comprising nucleic acid molecules containing a
human sequence encoding insulin-like growth factor (hIGF) sub-
stantially free of nucleic acid molecules not containing said
(hIGF) sequence, wherein said hIGF sequence is selected from
the group consisting of (a) . . . ; (b) . .. ; (c) nucleic acid se-
quences complementary to (a) or (b); and (d) fragments of (a),
(b), or (c) that are at least 18 bases in length and which will
selectively hybridize to human genomic DNA encoding hIGF.6
The relevant prior art consisted of two publications which dis-
close the amino acid sequences7 of IGF I and II,8 and U.S. Patent
No. 4,394,443 issued to Weissman et al., entitled "Method for Clon-
ing Genes." The Weissman patent describes a general method for
the isolating genes for which at least a short amino acid sequence is
known.9 This method involves preparation of a nucleic acid probe 0
which corresponds to the known amino acid sequence and using
this probe to isolate the gene of interest. Weissman teaches that it is
advantageous to design and use a probe which is based on amino
acids specified by unique codons.11
The Examiner rejected Bell's claims as obvious over the com-
bined teachings of Rinderknecht and Weissman, after determining
that it would have been obvious, "albeit tedious," to prepare probes
according to Weissman, based on the Rinderknecht amino acid se-
quences." The Examiner argued that an ordinary artisan would
know how to determine the nucleic acid sequence which corre-
sponds to a known amino acid sequence. 3 Based on this argument,
5. These growth factors are single-chain serum proteins involved in the mediation of
cell growth following the administration of growth hormones.
6. Bell, 991 F.2d at 782, n.3. The text omitted here discloses the nucleic acid
sequences.
7. Amino acids are the "building blocks" of proteins.
8. Rinderknecht et al., The Amino Acid Sequence of Human Insulin-Like Growth Fac-
tor I and Its Structural Homology with Proinsulin, 253 J. BIOL. CHEM., 2769-76 (1978); and
Rinderknecht et al., Primary Structure of Human Insulin-like Growth Factor II, 89 FEBS
LETrER, 283-86 (May 1978).
9. Specifically, Weissman describes the isolation of a gene which encodes a human
histocompatibility antigen, a protein unrelated to IGF.
10. A probe is a sequence of DNA or RNA which is used to identify a particular se-
quence of interest in DNA or RNA of unknown sequence.
11. A "codon" is a sequence of three nucleotides which codes for one of the twenty
natural amino acids. Because there are twenty animo acids and sixty-four possible codons,
most amino acids are coded for by more than one codon.
12. See Bell, 991 F.2d at 783.
13. Id.
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the Examiner rejected the application because the claimed se-
quences and hosts1 4 would have been readily determinable by and
obvious to, those of ordinary skill in the art at the time the inven-
tion was made. 5
The Board upheld the Examiner's rejection of Bell's claims, by
holding that the Examiner had established a prima facie case of ob-
viousness for the claimed sequences, despite ,the lack of conven-
tional indicia of obviousness. 6 The Board's rationale was that
although a protein and the DNA encoding it are not structurally
similar, they are linked based on the DNA code. In view of Weiss-
man, the Board determined that there was no evidence "that one
skilled in the art, knowing the amino acid sequences of the desired
proteins, would not have been able to predictably clone the desired
DNA sequences without undue experimentation."' 7
Bell argued that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) failed
to establish its prima facie case of obviousness, because it did not
show how the prior art references, alone or in combination, taught
or suggested their invention. Importantly for Bell, these arguments
are in agreement with previous decisions which have held that the
PTO bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of obvi-
ousness. 8 Thus, despite the Board's support of the Examiner's re-
jection, the Court agreed with Bell.
DISCUSSION
The Federal Circuit reviews the Board's rejection of patent ap-
plications based on obviousness grounds de novo.' 9 As previously
stated, "[a] prima facie case of obviousness is established when the
teachings from the prior art itself would appear to have suggested
the claimed subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in the art."20
The Court indicated that the Examiner's rationale that a "cor-
respondent link" between a gene and its protein via the genetic code
renders the gene obvious if the amino acid sequence is known,2 '
amounts to a rejection based on the two Rinderknecht publications
14. The "hosts" are the cells used to prepare the probes.
15. Bell, 991 F.2d at 783.
16. Id. This rejection was based on structural similarity between the DNA encoding
for IGF-I and the amino acid sequence of the IGF-I polypeptide.
17. Id.
18. In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
19. In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
20. In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1151 (CCPA 1976).
21. Bell, 991 F.2d at 783.
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alone.22
The Court realized that unlike chemical homologs, analogs
and isomers, which may create a prima facie case of obviousness,23
the established relationship between a gene and its correspondent
protein does not make a gene prima facie obvious over its corre-
spondent protein.24 The Court recognized that while the knowl-
edge of the protein structure and sequence may be used to
hypothesize about the gene sequence, the degeneracy of the genetic
code results in a vast number of potential nucleotide sequences
which might code for a specific protein.25
However, the Court also stressed that when the amino acid se-
quence is known to be specified exclusively by unique codons, the
gene may be rendered obvious.26 In this case, Bell argued, without
contradiction, that the Rinderknecht amino acids could be coded
for by more than 1036 different nucleotide sequences, only a few of
which are the human sequences claimed in the patent application. 7
The Court found that the nearly infinite number of possibilities sug-
gested by the prior art, and the failure of the cited prior art to sug-
gest which of these possibilities were the human sequences claimed,
rendered Bell's sequences non-obvious.28 Thus, because there was
nothing in the prior art to suggest which of the 1036 Rinderknecht
sequences correspond to the IGF gene, the Court found that the
PTO did not meet its burden of establishing that the prior art would
have suggested the claimed sequences.29 The Court stressed that
Bell did not claim all possible 1036 nucleic acids which potentially
-code for IGF, nor did he claim all nucleic acids coding for a protein
with the biological activity of IGF. 0
22. Id.
23. See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(en banc), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1682 (1991).
24. Bell, 991 F.2d at 784.
25. This degeneracy is based on the fact that there are sixty four possible codons, but
only twenty natural amino acids. In addition to "degeneracy" in the genetic code, the ten-
dency for similar amino acids to be represented by related codons is believed to minimize the
effects of mutations. This helps to ensure that a single random base change has an increased
probability (as compared with a completely random assignment of codons) of resulting in
either no amino acid substitution or substitution by an amino acid of similar character.
Lewin, supra note 4, at 96.
26. Bell, 991 F.2d at 784. In footnote 6, the Court indicated that it "express[ed] no
opinion concerning the reverse proposition, that knowledge of the structure of a DNA, e.g., a
cDNA, might make a coded protein obvious." Id. Thus, the Court has left this avenue open
for continuing debate.
27. Bell, 991 F.2d at 784.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
592 [Vol. 9
IN RE BELL
The Court also reviewed obviousness determinations based on
combinations of references. It reiterated the requirement that obvi-
ousness "cannot be established by combining the teachings of the
prior art to produce the claimed invention, absent some teaching or
suggestion supporting the combination."31 The Court also repeated
the rule that the teachings of a reference and the determination of
whether it teaches toward or away from the claimed invention are
questions of fact.32
The Weissman patent suggests that it is generally advantageous
to design probes based on amino acid sequences specified by unique
codons. 33 The PTO argued that this suggestion would be "easily"
applied to the isolation of genes for an array of proteins, including
peptide hormones. The PTO further argued that, in view of Weiss-
man, a gene is rendered obvious once the amino acid sequence of
the corresponding protein is known. However, the Court refused to
view Weissman in such a broad scope. The Court indicated that
Weissman teaches away from the present invention because it is
directed toward situations in which unique codons are known. In
contrast, the present invention involves no unique codons (or only
one).34
While reaffirming that "a reference must be considered not
only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly sug-
gests,"' 35 the Court found that because Weissman does not suggest
how to apply its teachings to amino acids sequences lacking unique
codons, it could not say Weissman "fairly teaches" that its methods
should be combined with the teachings of Rinderknecht.36
The Court also discussed the emphasis the PTO placed on the
similarities in the methods used by Bell and Weissman to produce
their respective isolated genes. As Bell claims compositions of mat-
ter, rather than a method, the PTO's focus was found to be mis-
placed. This is due to settled law that for composition of matter
claims, the issue is the obviousness of claimed compositions, not the
31. ACS Hosp. Sys. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
32. See Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 960-1 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984).
33. Bell, 991 F.2d at 784.
34. In contrast to the Weissman sequences, Bell used a probe with 23 nucleotides based
on a sequence of eight amino acids, none of which were unique. Rinderknecht indicates that
IGF-I has only a single amino acid coded with a unique codon and IGF-II has none. Thus,
Weissman is in opposition to Bell.
35. In re Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1179 (CCPA 1979).
36. Bell, 991 F.2d at 785.
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obviousness of the method by which the composition is made.37
CONCLUSION
The Court concluded that: (1) the Board was clearly in error in
its determination that Weissman teaches toward, rather than away
from Bell's claimed sequences; (2) the requisite teaching or sugges-
tion to combine the prior art references was absent; and (3) the PTO
did not establish that the claimed sequences would have been obvi-
ous over the combination of Weissman and Rinderknecht. 38 The
Court's conclusion that the combination of prior art references does
not render the claimed invention obvious, resulted in reversal of the
Board's decision to affirm the Examiner's rejection of Bell's Claims
25-46.
The importance of Bell is that it is in opposition to the PTO's
policy to declare as gene derived from known amino acid sequences
by use of general cloning methods to be obvious. 39 This decision
will require Examiners to take a closer look at this type of patent
application on an individual basis in order to make a decision re-
garding obviousness.
The Bell decision is an addition to a growing body of case law
dedicated to the unique concerns related to biotechnology. 40 This
case law should provide encouragement for biotechnology compa-
nies desiring to protect their inventions which are the products of
expensive, labor and time-intensive research. This law provides at-
tractive incentives (i.e., patent protection) to companies who devote
their resources to research. It is an indication that the current
boom in biotechnology will continue long into the future.
37. In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1985). "Patentability of a product does not
depend upon its method of production." Id., at 697.
38. Bell, 991 F.2d at 785.
39. See Rex Bossert, Ruling Hailed as Protection for the Future, DAILY JOURNAL, April
26, 1993, at 1.
40. For example, this decision is consistent with other recent Federal Circuit cases, in
which the Court granted patents for genetic materials used in treatment of anemia and multi-
ple sclerosis.
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT:
LAW AND PRACTICE IN JAPAN, Teruo Doi.
George J. Alexandert
In the United States, a number of authors have, produced com-
prehensive work on domestic intellectual property. A needy lawyer
has alternatives to the electronic databases.
Customarily, United States treatises are concise and informa-
tive, weaving a myriad of specifics into a pattern of law. It may not
be great literature but it is very useful law.
Many of the works produced in other countries are different
and, I would be tempted to say, more verbose and less comfortable
for case-hardened lawyers. That assumes it is written in English,
the only language U.S. lawyers are likely to understand. The differ-
ence in expression may be a product of the differences between com-
mon law and code based systems.
Professor Doi has produced a masterful book in the American
tradition. It is destined to hold the place of a Prosser on Torts in
the field of Japanese intellectual property law. The book would be
an outstanding addition to legal literature if many others had com-
peting volumes. In a field in which English language information-is
very scarce, it is a unique contribution.
The book is comprehensive, with chapters on such traditional
topics as employee inventions, regulation and copyright in cable tel-
evision, performance rights, trade secrets, domestic trademark pro-
tection and protection against infringing importation and restrictive
trade practices in patent and know-how licensing. It is extremely
timely, reporting Japanese legislation concerning unfair competi-
tion, the Copyright Act, and the Trademark Act passed or modified
in the 1990s.
Coverage is not tradition-bound, however. It has chapters on
such evolving concepts as computer technology copyright and the
Copyright © 1993 by George J. Alexander.
t Professor of Law and Director, Institute of International and Comparative Law,
Santa Clara University.
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copyright protection of videograms. It gives insights into Japanese
organization. When describing government regulation and copy-
right protection of cable television, the author provides charts
describing the growth of the industry and ownership of cable sta-
tions. When employee invention rights are discussed, the problems
are fully explored, even reaching the question of taxation of com-
pensation for employee inventions.
This book is indispensible for lawyers who have professional
concerns about any of the issues covered. They will find it lucid,
comprehensive and authoritative. More than that, they will find it
of familiar style requiring no special knowledge of Japan or its legal
system. The book is also clearly not transliterated. Professor Doi is
an expert in his field not only as it applies to Japan but also in its
American application. If it has a fault, it may be that its master-
fully uncomplicated exposition may lead an novice attorney to be-
lieve that Japanese law is as similar to her own as the law of another
state.
For those less interested in specific information concerning
Japanese law, however, a close reading of the book can provide an
insightful view of cultural differences between the United States and
Japan. Here trade secrecy is a often a problem because employee
mobility makes it difficult for employers to suppress the spread of
secrets. Domestic law protects mobility by limiting the rights of
employers to declare production methods secret thus allowing em-
ployees to market their skills elsewhere.
In Japan, the author notes, employees are reluctant to leave an
employer. "Under such a system there is not much fear of trade
secrets being stolen by employees," the author notes.'
Professor Doi has created a work no intellectual property law-
yer affected by Japanese law should neglect. That probably includes
almost all intellectual property lawyers.
1. T. Doi, Intellectual Property Protection and Management: Law and Practice in
Japan (Waseda University 1992) at 35.
[Vol. 9
THE HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER IN THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER. By Bruce Sterling. Bantam Books,
1992. 328 pages. $23.00
By Kenn Larat
INTRODUCTION
The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic
Frontier, by Bruce Sterling, is a contextual account of the police
raids against electronic bulletin boards that occurred in the early
1990s. Using these law enforcement hacker raids as the narrative
watermark of the book, the author places the raids within the his-
torical milieu of telephones and computers. He divides the book
into four major chapters: Crashing the System, The Digital Under-
ground, Law and Order, and The Civil Libertarians. Within each
chapter, the technological concepts and their functions within the
system or network are discussed. In addition, Crashing the System
includes historical and social background on the telephone and the
telephone companies. This chapter also describes the real life char-
acters who played roles in using, and sometimes abusing, the tech-
nology and the system. The Digital Underground looks at the
kinds of computer users that inhabit electronic bulletin boards, and
gives characterizations of those users who were daring enough to
exploit the openness of "cyberspace." Interjected between the tech-
nology and the human users are discussions of the conceptual
frameworks, theories, and philosophies that guide the interaction
between the people and the machines of the "electronic frontier."
The chapters on Law and Order and The Civil Libertarians high-
light, on a personal level, the conflict between the law and the
hackers.
This is a story of the breakthroughs, events, and people that
created the electronic frontier. It is also a story of the legal and
theoretical implications of this new time and space frontier, a fron-
tier the author terms as "cyberspace." The book is a fascinating
introduction to the technology, lingo, and people of cyberspace,
which is all told in easy-to-read and -understand language.
Copyright © 1993 by Kenn Lara.
t J.D. Santa Clara School of Law, 1993.
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CRASHING THE SYSTEM
This section begins by highlighting the crash of AT&T's long-
distance telephone switching system on January 15, 1990. The au-
thor considers this event the catalyst for the eventual hacker crack-
down. The crash, which left 60,000 people without service and took
nine hours to repair, convinced politicians and law enforcement
agencies to regard computer hackers seriously as national security
threats. After much investigation, it was found that the AT&T
crash of January 15, 1990, was caused by a software defect ("bug")
and not by hacker interference. However, forces were set in motion
that placed indirect, if not direct, blame upon computer hackers as
a potential threat which could result in such mishaps in the nation's
telephone system.
In a flashback, the author reviews the birth and development of
the Bell System, and its holding company, AT&T. From Alexan-
der Graham Bell to the breakup of "Ma Bell," the reader is given an
overview of the symbiotic growth and expansion of the telephone
and Ma Bell. There is also an overview of Ma Bell's guiding philos-
ophy of public service and intensive research and development -
"One Policy, One System, Universal Service." A brief account is
given of the special relationship between Ma Bell and the govern-
ment; this relationship often was intimate enough to almost be ille-
gal. It was a relationship that ended in 1983, when the Bell System
was ordered by a federal court to dismantle itself. From this
breakup, there resulted the Regional Bell Operating Companies, the
RBOCs (pronounced "arbocks"), which would play significant roles
in the hacker crackdown, both as victims of hackers and as their
eventual pursuers.
The author gives the reader an adequate foundation for com-
prehending the impact of hackers on the telephone company estab-
lishment. The concept of secrecy and the means of maintaining it
are also discussed in this chapter. Telephone companies, or
"telcos," wanted to maintain the security of their property and serv-
ices, both tangible and intangible, but their systems were susceptible
to electronic break-ins. Property security in cyberspace was a diffi-
cult matter because "theft" of telco services and electronic docu-
ments often left no physical evidence. The only evidence was the
appearance of classified documents on numerous electronic bulletin
boards, or long-distance service used but for which no payment was
made. To the telcos, security meant preventing the misuse of their
services and electronic documents. Only in the '90s have security
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concerns realistically focused on potential threats to the entire tele-
phone system.
THE DIGITAL UNDERGROUND
This chapter is very effective at pulling the reader into the
world of semi-clandestine electronic bulletin boards (BBs) and their
users. Sterling presents the relationships clearly and convincingly,
leaving the reader with a good understanding of the users' mental-
ity, the impact on the telcos, the RBOCs, the government, and
cyberspace. This is by far the best chapter in the book.
As related by Sterling a fascinating world of code names,
"techno-lingo," "handles," and bravado fills cyberspace. For exam-
ple, the philosophy of a "phone phreak" is markedly different from
that of a computer hacker. The latter does not even consider the
former to be a member of cyberspace, but many people, including
those in law enforcement agencies, regard both as "cyberpunks."
Phone phreaks, the author attests, are mainly concerned with
the misappropriation of phone service. Their activities range from
breaking into phone booths and stealing the change to using black
boxes to discover long-distance access codes. The author believes
their activities are both destructive and criminally reprehensible.
In contrast, computer hackers also like to break into telco sys-
tems, but are less destructive and less criminally reprehensible in
their actions, as they usually leave the system intact. The challenge
of navigating through supposedly secure telco systems is what
drives these cyberpunks. They only copy a document as proof of
their hacking skills; it is a trophy to show off to their friends and the
rest of the world. Because they leave the original where they found
it, they do not consider copying a file to be stealing. They do not
use the copied document for financial gain, only for personal brag-
ging rights, which they employ against other telco bandits and the
telcos themselves.
The electronic bulletin boards are considered neo-speakeasies
for computer users. They have names such as "The Administra-
tion," "ALIAS," "Anarchy Inc .... "Apple Mafia," "Black Bag,"
"Elite Phreakers and Hackers Club," "Legion of Doom, .... The
Phirm," "The Punk Mafia," "Neon Knights," and "Nihilist Or-
der," to name a few. Members link up with the BB and begin com-
munications, most of which involve the uploading and downloading
of various and sundry items such as pirated software, copied confi-
dential documents, credit card numbers, long-distance access codes,
and text files for manuals. It was a gathering place where your
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"handle" hid your true identity and your infiltration skills spoke for
you. Users with handles such as "Carrier Culprit," "The Execu-
tioner," "Black Majik," "Solid State," and "Mr. Icon" would elec-
tronically congregate and exchange news of their exploits. It was
an electronic underground that changed often, as users logged in
and logged out and the BBs went online and offline. User access to
and within the numerous boards was often secretive and elitist.
Only those "in the know" were allowed the greatest access. To be
"in the know" meant knowing the lingo, "the rap," and the action.
As the boards and users become bolder, they attracted the attention
of law enforcement agencies.
LAW AND ORDER
As boards became more blatant in their neo-criminal "phreak-
ing" activities and because communications often crossed state
lines, the federal government, especially the Secret Service and the
FBI, began to take an interest. With the help of the Secret Service
and FBI, regional law enforcement agencies mounted sting opera-
tions and investigations of crooked boards. They sometimes put up
their own board to catch crooked users. Or, they would send in an
undercover officer as a user on a suspect board.
This kind of covert action scared many a BB system operator
("sysop") and user. Some BBs took themselves offline and laid low
for a while, but would eventually go back online. Users began to
distrust other users, especially new ones. But few were ever to dis-
cover the undercover officer users. These agencies and officers,
termed by the author as "Cyberspace Rangers," became well known
within cyberspace. With the cooperation of the telcos, they success-
fully infiltrated the boards and began arresting and prosecuting in-
dividuals connected with boards involved in illegal activities.
A major issue discussed by the author is that during the raids,
all the equipment was seized. Even in cases where no charges were
pressed, the authorities have continued to keep the equipment, to
the financial detriment of the owners.
Unfortunately, the author does not delve into other possible
Fourth Amendment problems and evidentiary questions. The
dummy BBs set up by law enforcement agencies and undercover
users bring up entrapment and wiretapping issues, as well as
problems involving search warrants and resonableness. The author,
however, does give some attention to first amendment concerns in
the next chapter.
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THE CIVIL LIBERTARIANS
The actions by law enforcement agencies, described in the pre-
vious chapter, triggered a counterreaction from computer civil lib-
ertarians. Hacker raids in 1990 and 1991 by the Secret Service,
Chicago Task Force, and the Arizona Organized Crime and Racke-
teering Unit were highly publicized in the media. This attracted the
attention of computer entrepreneurs such as Mitch Kapor, of Lotus
1-2-3 fame, who founded the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a
civil liberties organization, in reaction to the hacker crackdown.
These computer civil libertarians seek to defend those who were the
targets of the hacker crackdown. They believe that the raids and
seizures are constitutionally unsound. To these civil libertarians,
the First and Fourth Amendments are being compromised in cyber-
space for so-called "national security reasons."
The author gives background on some of these entrepreneurial
civil libertarians who brought publicity to bear against the law en-
forcement operations. For example, the reader is given an account
of the well-publicized trial of Craig Neidorf, who was charged with
wire fraud and transportation of stolen property. Neidorf ran a
board that, through a circuitous route, obtained a confidential
Southern Bell document. Neidorf was apparently the unfortunate
recipient of the pirated document through users who uploaded and
downloaded the document.
CONCLUSIONS
This book guides the reader through the stories of the hacker
crackdown, via a narrative, story-telling format which prohibits the
excessive use of technical language. This is both a strength and
weakness. It is a weakness because it does not go into much legal or
technical depth of the subject matter. It does not purport to be a
manual on cyberspace, hacking, phone phreaking, or the telcos and
their systems. It is, however, broad in its treatment of the recent
interactions between citizens and the law in cyberspace wherein lies
the book's strength.
It gives an overview of the electronic frontier and its potential
legal implications. For some readers the lack of in-depth discussion
and/or analysis on the first and fourth amendment ramifications of
the hacker crackdown may be troublesome. However, it appears
that constitutional lawyers were not the targeted audience of this
book. Thus, the legal analyses may be sufficient for the lay reader
who simply wants to learn more about computer hackers and elec-
tronic bulletin boards.
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There are places in the narrative where the author seems to go
off on philosophical tangents that tend to lose the reader. The rele-
vancy of the tangent to the story matter is often questionable. It
seems that the author sometimes gets lost between the narrative as a
story and the narrative as a philosophical monologue of free
thought. But in these instances, the author does eventually extri-
cate himself, and the narrative continues.
In general, this book makes for a good introduction for lawyers
who may want to enter the legal cyberspace. It is a timely and easy-
to-read work that introduces the reader to the contextual back-
ground of cyberspace, where the constitutional battles of tomorrow
will soon be fought.
